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
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


# OUR SOUTH AFRICAN EMPIRE.

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VOL. I.









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# OUR SOUTH AFRICAN EMPIRE

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
WILLIAM GRESWELL, M.A., F.R.C.I.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL I.

LONDON: CHAPMAN AND HALL  
LIMITED

1885



ROY W. B.  
1881  
VIA R.L.

To the Honoured Memory of  
THE LATE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
SIR H. BARTLE FRERE, BART.,  
G.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c., &c.,

WITH THE HIGHEST APPRECIATION OF  
HIS MERITS AS A FAR-SEEING AND ABLE ADMINISTRATOR IN  
THE BRITISH COLONIES OF SOUTH AFRICA,

THESE VOLUMES

ARE INSCRIBED

BY THE AUTHOR.

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“Remember all  
He spoke among you, and the man who spoke;  
Who never sold the truth to serve the hour,  
Nor paltered with Eternal God for power;  
Who let the turbid streams of rumour flow  
Through either babbling world of high or low,  
Whose life was work.”

*From the “Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington.”*



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## PREFACE.

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IN the following chapters I have attempted to give, to the English reader especially, a conspectus of many of the principal events in South African history, and, with this object, have arranged my subject matter under certain heads, each forming an independent study in itself, but preserving, as far as possible, a chronological sequence. I have deemed this plan preferable to that of dry historical narrative where, as in the record of the Kafir wars, the memory becomes surfeited with names, dates, and all the monotonous details of a frontier campaign, and so, where the annalist in the limited sense of the word may have been long, I have been short. My desire has been to show cause and effect, to trace the workings of a policy or the drift of a line of action. For instance, I have drawn attention to the fact that the Imperial Government have on many occasions, in fact, almost persistently, ignored and disclaimed a "forward" policy in South Africa.

This irresolution and hesitancy have cost them dear. Somehow or other, ever since the Albany settlers of 1820 were located along the frontier, responsibilities have been forced upon the mother country which she could not ignore. Her South African empire has grown up in spite of her protests. The difficulties arising from indecision and uncertainty are obvious. It has never been clearly and definitely laid down whether an independent Dutch State or States should be allowed to exist alongside of our own colonies or not. Consequently we hear of independence being given and then taken away, first in the case of the Free State and then in the Transvaal. The republicans themselves have been at a loss to know what the real intentions of Englishmen have been in South Africa, their affairs being first at the mercy of a progressive and then a retrogressive Cabinet in England. In other colonies the position of settlers has been different. Little has occurred in Canada and the Australias to prevent a uniform progress. The native problem has been the stumbling-block in South Africa, and the English taxpayer has too often been reminded of its costliness by the bills he has had to pay from time to time. In a speech delivered before the Imperial Parliament on the Bechuana-land difficulty (March 1883), Mr. Gladstone

calculated that England had spent more than twelve millions of money in the Kafir wars. There has, of course, been much that is romantic in the annals of frontier life, both in its perils, trials, and privations, especially in the early days; and it is to be hoped that some African poet may take up the pen that Pringle laid down; but it must be confessed that as a rule the record of South African history has come to the people of England as a wearisome and monotonous tale.

After devoting an introductory chapter to the consideration of the colonial movement in Europe, and the especial character of British colonisation, I have taken up the point of South African history where it can be best said to begin. The landing of Van Riebeeck in Table Bay (April 5, 1652) marks the exact time when the Dutch, then a most powerful nation commercially, thought seriously of occupying the Cape peninsula. The Portuguese explorer, Bartolomeo Diaz, had first rounded the Cape in 1486, but the interests of the Portuguese were not so great in the eastern seas as to justify their permanent occupation of Table Bay. This nation occupies a unique place in the history of colonisation. Portugal produced in the fifteenth century a race of bold explorers, and she could boast of an enterprising and adventurous prince; but she had no strong

and lasting mercantile activity to back her explorers up. She has never advanced since those days, and still sits at the receipt of customs waiting to tax the industry of other nations.

I have endeavoured to show the true nature of the Dutch occupation of the Cape from the days of Van Riebeeck to the final English occupation in 1806. I have pointed out that, during that period, the Dutch regarded Table Bay simply as a port of call on the way to their eastern possessions, and Cape Town, together with the surrounding country, as the exclusive possession and property of the Netherlands East India Company, governed by officials of that Company on *purely monopolist principles*. The burghers outside—who consisted, in the first place, chiefly of dismissed and time-expired servants of the Company, with occasional recruits from Europe; also of a number of French refugees, who found a home in Stellenbosch, French Hoek, the Paarl, and the quiet valleys of the Western Province after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes—had no voice or share in the government of the country, and were actually in revolt against the Dutch authorities at Cape Town when the British fleet anchored off Muizenburg beach.

With the advent of the British came an era of liberty and progress. They brought with them

the true colonising instinct, such as they had already displayed in a marked degree in North America. The reason why they first came to the Cape was probably their fear lest the French, in the course of that death struggle which was going on in Europe, would seize the Cape peninsula and command the ocean route to India. As Professor Seeley has well pointed out, the ambition of Napoleon and of the French nation was directed, during the course of the last century, as much to the realisation of a colonial empire as it was to the assertion of their European ascendancy. The importance of the Cape was fully acknowledged by such statesmen as Lord North, who termed it "the physical guarantee of our Indian possessions." On two separate occasions the English took the Cape, first in 1795 and afterwards in 1806. In the first instance they did not come as conquerors and aggressors. Admiral Elphinstone carried with him a letter from the Stadtholder, a refugee at that time in England, stating that the British were sent out to protect the colony against the French, and directing that the troops and ships should be considered as allies of Holland. Upon the second occasion General Baird, in 1806, re-assumed British authority, which had been abandoned at the Cape since 1802, and the reason given for this second occu-

pation was the same as before—*i.e.* fear of the French. Finally, in 1814, a convention was agreed upon between the Netherlands and Great Britain, by which, “in *consideration of certain charges provided* by the latter for the defence of the Low Countries, the colony of the Cape, together with Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo, were ceded in perpetuity to the British Crown.”

I have pointed out that the most important event in the first years of the British occupation was the immigration of the “Albany settlers” in 1820, and the founding of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. No fewer than 6,000 selected emigrants were sent from England at the expense of the State, to develop the Eastern Province of South Africa, and form a neutral zone between the natives and the rest of the colonists. These settlements alone, in consideration of their subsequent expansion, would furnish England with the first claim to be considered the dominant power in South Africa. The result, however, of planting the sturdy Scotch and English stock on the eastern frontier was not such as was expected or intended. A neutral zone was found impracticable, and then came that series of Kafir wars and disturbances which has cost England so much blood and money. England would not, and, in fact, could not, leave the Albany settlers to their

fate, and so, little by little, the Kafirs have been pushed northward and eastwards, till they are now confined within narrow and definite limits.

This mention of the Kafir races has led me to interrupt slightly the historical continuity of my chapters by a general review of the aborigines of South Africa. I have given a few sketches of the Bushmen and their Hottentot congeners, which have no especial claim to originality; and I have also devoted some pages to the Bântu (Betsuana, Kafir) tribes, in which I have endeavoured to record more precisely some ideas of my own, gathered from experience and observation carried on for some seven or eight years in South Africa.

Resuming my thread, I have shown that during the long period during which it took us to subdue and pacify the Kafirs and develop a native policy—roughly speaking, from the second British occupation till 1854—there was no one event fraught with greater consequences to South Africa than the passing of the Emancipation Act in 1834. Incidentally it was almost the direct cause of that Boer exodus from the old colony to the region north of the Orange River and beyond the Vaal. From this date the Boers are always trekking, and the British officials are always trying to catch them up and impose British authority



upon them. The maxim, "Nemo potest exuere patriam," was held to apply in South Africa in the case of the "Voertrekkers." "Once British subjects, always British subjects." Such was the cardinal doctrine of our Colonial Office for a long time, especially as the Boers wished to establish rival republics, and pursue a native policy directly opposed to that of England. At first, therefore, the Boers were prevented from founding a republic either at Natal, beyond the Orange River, or the Vaal; but as time went on and the Colonial Office became tired of ruling obstinate Boers, and hesitated, be it remarked, to pursue a firm, consistent, and intelligent policy, the Free State in 1854, and the Transvaal in 1852, were allowed to become independent.

I have dwelt, therefore, upon the Dutch Republics, their origin and progress, in separate chapters, from their establishment to the present time, following their vicissitudes, especially those of the Transvaal, through the "Barkly" and "Frere" *régimes*. Taken by themselves the "Republics" form a fairly consistent study; and as their evolution and progress belong to the present generation, they become interesting as furnishing a rather novel and distinct epoch in the history of colonisation.

From 1852 to the end of the governorship of

Sir Henry Barkly, a period of comparative peace prevailed in South Africa, and the triumph chiefly attached to the *régime* of Sir Henry Barkly was of a purely constitutional order. In 1872 full responsible government was conceded to the Cape, and the last step reached in the ladder which culminates with the most complete self-government. Difficulties certainly arose in the north, where the dispute over "Waterboer's" claim and the possessions of the Diamond Fields threatened to disturb the friendly relations between the Cape Colony and the Free State, but these difficulties were adjusted in London during a friendly meeting between President Brand and Lord Carnarvon in 1877. On the whole, therefore, the reign of Sir Henry Barkly was a reign of peace, although one of the last, if not the last, of the official acts of this Governor was the annexation of the Transvaal.

I have devoted separate chapters to a consideration of the "Frere administration," as it appears to me that during the rule of this distinguished Governor an attempt was made to sum up the results of our previous colonial enterprises at the Cape, define a clear and intelligible policy, and in fact to consolidate our South African empire. Moreover, the commanding personality of the man deserves more than a fugitive notice.

He was a great ruler, striving consistently for great aims.

The consideration of the "Frere" *régime* has naturally suggested the subject of confederation, which was the key-note of his whole policy, and, in connection with it, the semi-official and diplomatic mission of Mr. Froude. I have given some account, therefore, of the two visits of this distinguished envoy to South Africa, as, in the discussion which he provoked both in the Cape Parliament and outside of it, a *résumé* of the popular arguments for and against South African confederation may best be found. Lord Carnarvon's Permissive Bill may be dead and buried for the present, but the idea of confederation must spring up again in some form, and possibly a new Bill may arise, phoenix-like, from the ashes of the old one.

Following on upon the "Frere" *régime*, I have endeavoured to describe the "Basuto" difficulty. The enforcement, or rather attempted enforcement, of the "Native Disarmament Act" of 1878 took place immediately after Sir Bartle Frere left for England. This Basuto question is an interesting one in itself, as the Basutos have illustrated in their history, from the time of Sir Philip Wodehouse, that amount of progress which can be attained by the savages of South Africa within a

comparatively short space of time. Moreover, no tribe has ever been the subject of such an amount of diplomatic and official correspondence as this one, nor has any tribe been subjected to a greater diversity of official treatment. General Gordon endeavoured to exercise a moral suasion upon the rebel chieftains, but he was terribly let and hindered in his attempts at conciliation by the officials of the Cape Government. In many respects the Basuto question may be regarded as a test question in South African politics, and forms a not altogether agreeable *locus classicus* for illustrations of mistaken method. However, a study of its phases must be instructive for all those who wish to make the administration of South Africa after its conquest their object. A few observations on the Bechuanaland and Zululand questions, together with reflections upon the drift of our South African policy, brings me up to date, and within the range of current events.

To conclude, I have ventured to publish in connection with much that has gone before various sketches of a social and political character. In the first of them, under the heading of "Forms of Government in South Africa," I have traced the history and working of constitutional government at the Cape, and described the character of the "democratic oligarchy" of the Dutch Republic,

pointed out the constitutional limitations of a Crown colony, such as Natal, and sketched the rude nature of savage chieftainship on the eastern borders, where European influences have not yet been able to penetrate.

Under the headings of "The Afrikaner Bond," and "The Germans in South Africa," certain prominent movements of political life with their tendencies and aims have been touched upon. Comments upon the broader issues of an Imperial policy are made in the chapter on "Imperial Federation." To conclude, the question of education, especially that of the native races, has been somewhat fully discussed in an original essay.

I must acknowledge with the utmost gratitude the obligations I am under to the editors and proprietors of the *Cape Times*, who, during my residence in South Africa, kindly placed much valuable information at my disposal. Such books also as Judge Watermeyer's "Lectures," Noble's "South Africa, Past and Present," the "Cape of Good Hope Directory," and others, have been of the utmost service to me in my ambitious task of attempting to sketch in a few fragmentary chapters the history of such a great and growing country as South Africa. I feel convinced that this country has a magnificent future before it, and will be counted amongst the

great nations of the earth when class meets class and can converse in the calm spirit of a common civilisation. South Africa sighs for peace, and until peace spreads her ample wings over the land there can be no progress or civilisation. The native is the subject over whom the wrangle of debate and the clash of battle is heard. Cannot all the settlers of the Cape, whether Boers or British, philanthropist or pioneer, take their stand upon some common principle and define a common policy for the native? The question of nationality amongst Europeans themselves out there seems an idle one when there is so much work for all hands to do in Africa. The real task of civilisation lags whilst men quarrel amongst themselves. No great enterprises are done by means of divided counsels. The mission before all, using the term in its highest sense, is a great and noble one, and should enlist the sympathy and aid of that enlightened class which in every community should guide public opinion. The destinies of South Africa are in the hands of the young generation. They are heirs to a better education than their forefathers, and cannot they learn to be strong, united, conscientious in the discharge of their manifest duties? The voice of the "men of light and leading" is not heard distinctly enough in South Africa itself. When

it is heard continually and emphatically on the side of humanity and gentleness, Englishmen will leave South African affairs to the South Africans themselves, as worthy partners in her Imperial greatness. England must know and trust Africa, and Africa must know and trust England. There must be an interchange of sympathy here, strengthened by a knowledge of past history and a faith in future development. When knowledge is full and faith is strong, then peace may rest in South Africa upon the city of the white man and the kraals of the barbarians.

NETHER STOWEY, SOMERSETSHIRE,

*1st January, 1885.*

## ERRATA.

### VOL. I.

p. 3, l. 18,	<i>for</i> "lost"	<i>read</i> "seemed to lose."
p. 197, l. 3,	„ "little to do"	„ "nothing to do."
p. 272, l. 10,	„ "melodramatic"	„ "dramatic."
p. 273, l. 7,	„ "poor Durnford"	„ "Colonel Durnford."
p. 276, l. 26,	„ "must be"	„ "has been."
p. 290, l. 10,	„ "persecute"	„ "pursue."
p. 295, l. 20,	„ "the 10,000"	„ "some of the."
p. 315, l. 2,	„ "ahead of"	„ "ahead will."
p. 317, l. 7,	„ "evil"	„ "strange."

### VOL. II.

p. 21, l. 11,	„ "lavish in his"	„ "wisely generous in his ideas of."
p. 46, l. 4,	„ "disastrous"	„ "disappointing."





# OUR SOUTH AFRICAN EMPIRE.

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## I.

### INTRODUCTORY.

*"Africa quid novi semper præbet."*

"AFRICA has ever some fresh wonder at hand." Thus runs the old aphorism, and it seems to gather forcible and startling illustration every day. All eyes are turned southwards upon the valley of the Nile, and are following day by day, with increasing anxiety, the progress of one of the most hazardous and trying campaigns of our generation. The land itself—the "*arida nutrix leonum*"—bristles with countless and unforeseen difficulties rising up from every quarter for soldier, statesman, and diplomatist. Egypt and Ethiopia were the wonderland of the past, such as the Father of History himself painted them, and surely they are the mysterious and almost insoluble problems of the future.

But Egyptian difficulties, great as they are, do not exhaust the whole sum of African difficulties.

The muse Clio seems to have revisited the classic continent in the spirit of exploration. She has left her ancient haunts along the Nile, and has gone southwards past the sources of the Zambesi, down the valleys westward of the mighty Congo, across the Equator to the more temperate regions of the Cape. Even in remote Zululand she has made more than one river and mountain famous, as the names of Isandlwana, Tugela, and Ityosi will prove. Nor has she travelled without the companionship of the sister muse of Tragedy. Here and there we are suddenly shocked by tales of surprise, reverse, disaster, with every catastrophe that belongs to the chequered course of eventful campaigns. The deserts and wastes of Africa, both north and south, are insatiable. Her sands suck in the life-blood of the noblest; and how often lately have we, as a nation, had to record of some of our most chivalrous sons that they found their graves in Africa! A list of those who have perished on the battle-fields of Zululand, the Transvaal, in the Sûdan, and along the valley of the Nile would be a long one, and fill us with poignant and national regret. Such is the price paid by a race which leads the van in the task of reclaiming a continent! Just recently the names of the gallant Stewart and Earle, and above all the heroic Gordon, need only

be mentioned to recall to the minds of Englishmen that, in each case, a soldier has died whom it is hard to replace. The memory of the tragic field of Zululand is too fresh to allow us to forget the nature of the loss there sustained. The death of the Prince Imperial in that fatal Zulu "donga" was one of those ghastly novelties Africa has at hand for us. Who would have dreamt that the heir of an imperial line would die beneath the savage thrust of Zulu assegais!

And not only have brave men died, but wise men have lost their fame in Africa's inhospitable regions. The shores of South Africa would seem, in the language of metaphor, to be strewn with wrecked policies and ruined reputations. To say nothing of victims of lesser note, the most celebrated administrator South Africa ever knew, Sir Bartle Frere, lost in a colony that good name he had so hardly won in India and throughout the empire. And yet this Moloch, Africa, would seem to require more victims. At risk of life, adventurous soldiers and explorers are turning towards it now, as in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they sailed across the Atlantic to the perilous tracts of the New World. Diplomats and merchants are eagerly scanning its limits and boundaries. The most recent and engrossing study for our statesmen has been that of the geo-

graphy of Africa. Her gloomy forests and lagoons are to the merchant as "the dark, unfathomed caves of ocean," where many a gem can be sought for and perchance dragged forth. The story of the Diamond Fields of South Africa, with their yield annually of three million pounds' worth of gems, reads like a romance, and excites the cupidity of the world in the same way as the Golcondas and Eldorados of former times. The Germans have gone to South Africa in quest of minerals; and they hope to extract from the uninviting wastes of Namaqualand and Damaraland, and possibly from the Transvaal itself, some of those precious rewards of toil and enterprise after which all men hunger and thirst so eagerly.

The Congo, with its teeming thousands of black men who, in Mr. Stanley's words, are anxiously waiting for the trade of the white men, represents to Liverpool and Bremen merchants a mine of wealth. Africa provides us with something new in commerce. Europe, and in fact the New World itself, seems explored and exhausted by the side of the old historic continent, with its indefinite possibilities of gain.

As in commerce so in war. Lord Wolseley's expedition towards Khartoum presents us with a unique spectacle in itself. There is something novel about the procession of "whalers" up the

Nile, and the evolutions of a "Camelry" Corps. The expedition reads like an embellishment of history rather than history itself. Then there is the terrible surprise and unexpected catastrophe of the fall of Khartoum just two days before relief could come. Then a campaign in distant "Ethiopia" may recall to our minds what we have read of the conquering Sesostris and Cambyses, and later still of the Romans; and perhaps the thought and wonder may occur to us whether we Britons can succeed in doing what the latter never could do—that is, conquer and hold "Ethiopia."

Again, the Congo Conference, lately held at Berlin, by which a "Free State" has been created in Equatorial Africa reaching from the watershed of the Zambesi on the east to the mouth of the great river Congo on the west, can inspire us with reflections of another kind. About the very founding of this State there has been a species of knight-errantry. The adventurous travels of Cameron and Stanley, and their unremitting labours in that remote equatorial land, drew men's attention, and enlisted the patronage of a king. King Leopold is the modern counterpart of Prince Henry of Portugal in the fifteenth century. He has seized upon the idea of civilising Africa, and year after year spent money from his own royal exchequer to further the good work. Prince

Bismarck (March, 1885) has paid a public tribute to "the noble efforts of this king, who has founded a work now recognised by all the Powers—a work which will confer most important benefits on mankind." Moreover, the Congo Conference has prompted another movement. Germany and the German Chancellor have announced, in a formal and emphatic way, a new departure from the traditional policy of their country. The martial instincts of the Germans seem to have been hushed for awhile amidst the deliberations of a board of peaceful representatives engaged at Berlin in defining the limits and commercial position of a new State along the banks of an African river. Diplomats have shifted the scene of their thoughts and labours from the banks of the Rhine to those of the Congo and its affluents; and the hero of the hour is, for the moment, an explorer of strange lands, not a military tactician. The subjects, moreover, which have occupied the attention of this international conclave have been those in which England has for a long time past, owing to her colonising and commercial instincts, chiefly interested herself. The topics of free trade, the slave question, neutralisation, protectorates, annexations, were more familiar to the British representative than to others at the Conference. As a rule, the cardinal doctrines of

England formulated by her long ago have now received an official endorsement at the hands of the European Powers. Free trade will be the creed of the Congo Free State; and perhaps its adoption will have an educatory value, and persuade men to become its converts, not only in Equatorial Africa but elsewhere. Amongst other noteworthy incidents of this Conference must be mentioned the quietus given to the sluggish commercial life of Portugal. Portuguese taxation has been a terrible incubus upon African trade, but it will be tolerated no longer at the mouth of the Congo. The Conference itself has provided us with a series of fresh chapters in international law. Surely Africa has prompted, here again, some novel and surprising studies!

But attention has not been confined to the watershed of the Congo and its tributaries. First of all it was directed upon the valleys of the Niger, and a disposition was manifested to apply the regulations of the Congo Free State to this part of Africa. But examination proved that the doctrines of free trade had obtained all but universal acceptance here under the tutelage of the British, and so the Niger basin was left as it was. But during and after the discussions on the Niger and the Congo, the world witnessed a curious phenomenon. As if inspired by a sudden



and uncontrollable energy, the nations of Europe swooped down upon the unoccupied coasts of West Africa. Such a revival of the colonising spirit has never been witnessed before in our age. Within a few months the coastline of Western Africa, from the Cameroons to the northern boundary of the Cape Colony, has been almost entirely accounted for. In this scramble for Africa England was too slow and remiss in guarding her "legitimate interests." The incident of Angra Pequena and the German annexation of the coast from Cape Frio to the Orange River might have occasioned a diplomatic rupture between London and Berlin had our ministers been less complaisant. For a time there seemed to be a real danger that Zululand and St. Lucia Bay, on the south-east of Africa, would be annexed by Germany. The callousness and indifference of our ministers had made this possible. A German of the name of Einwald was inclined to do with less official sanction on the eastern littoral what Dr. Nachtigal had already done on the western. Even now the possibility of the safety of our South African empire being tampered with is not entirely removed. The forces of Sir Charles Warren stand face to face with dangers which at any moment may become serious. Nor have Zanzibar and Madagascar been free from the in-

trigues of Europeans. The land of the Malagasy is coveted by the French, and is suffering from that unjustifiable series of military reprisals with which France strives to make her name respected and to found a commerce.

Italy, whose maritime and commercial interests appeared at one time to be simply thalassic and confined to the Mediterranean, has aspired to the duties and responsibilities of African colonisation. Her expedition to Massowah on the Red Sea is not completely explained in all its bearings, and may possibly end in bringing the Italian Government in contact with the Abyssinian kingdom.

From the coasts of Africa this new-born mania for colonisation has spread southwards and eastwards, and hurried Europeans to the savage coasts of New Guinea, the Samoan group, and the countless islands of the Pacific. German White Books have reminded the British race from time to time of the fact that tacit and prescriptive rights in foreign lands may be questioned and old-standing claims revived. A port or an anchorage, a military post or a coaling station, a trade factory or a large mercantile centre: such seem to be the objects of ambition at present to our European neighbours. And this great movement had its origin in Africa.

As it was unexpected in its origin, so it has been unexpected in some of its results. At first our somnolent statesmen, quite unprepared for it and "gazing at it with a wild surmise," were outwitted and outmanœuvred, as in the case of Angra Pequena. But a more careful scrutiny has been brought to bear upon the limits of our colonial empire, and here and there, in South Africa and in the Pacific, a partial expansion has been sanctioned by a Cabinet never in love with expansion. The Australian colonists have felt themselves called upon to define the zone of their "legitimate interests." Attention has therefore been directed to the nascent power and growing pretensions of our Australian colonies. Queensland, by the formal annexation of New Guinea in March, 1883, pointed out clearly the importance of this island to Australia. But Lord Derby has sulked in his tents. His disregard of this Queensland annexation, and his complete incapacity to understand the strength of colonial feeling in this matter, brought about a state of considerable tension between the colonies and the mother country. The Australians have not hesitated to speak openly and candidly, not only on what they conceive to be their own destiny, but England's duties.

Notwithstanding their irritation, however,

colonists have resolved to oppose the diplomacy of Prince Bismarck, apparently directed to discredit and isolate England in Europe, and have rallied round her in a gratifying and surprising manner. The dispute with Germans in New Guinea and the Fiji Islands, as well as the disagreements with France on the "Recidivist" question in New Caledonia, have made colonists more emphatically true to their Imperial connection than they were before. Deeply as they felt the unpardonable laches of the Colonial Office, they felt the hostile aggressions of foreign States still more. So when the call of patriotism reached their distant homes, they sprang to their feet and sent troops and money to the Sûdan. Such a triumphant expression of loyalty has seldom been witnessed. Indirectly, therefore, Prince Bismarck has been the means of consolidating the idea of Imperial unity. This idea had been floating in the air for a long time, and had been expressed in the creation of the "Imperial Federation League" throughout the empire, but it needed a crisis to give it depth and stability. Following, therefore, the course of affairs, and tracing cause and effect, it would appear as if a German colonisation project, begun in the remote coasts of Africa, had ended in strengthening the bonds of the British empire. Africa is respon-

sible for many unforeseen accidents, but it has seldom produced a more unforeseen and, be it added, gratifying accident than this.

Along the valley of the Nile, therefore, it is probable that Britons from every quarter of the globe will stand shoulder to shoulder to carry out, if required, an Imperial policy. At the present it is idle to speculate what the course of events will be. Will the contest between Moslemism and Christianity be a long one? Will Khartoum be held as an advanced outpost in the desert, and the valley of the Nile, past Gondokoro to the great lake, become in course of time a highway of commerce, until the basin of the Congo and the land of the Sultan of Zanzibar are touched? Or will Mohammedans be found in the vast deserts of Darfur and Kordofan so fierce and intractable to deal with, so fiery in their zeal, and so blindly attached to their propagandist creed, that Christians will be content at the utmost to hold an isolated post, and check slavery, the open sore of Africa, by any precarious methods they can adopt. We know little of these desert clans and their fanatical life, and can scarcely yet calculate the strength of Moslemism in Africa. Some aver that it is stronger here than elsewhere; that the black races of Africa have become, with little persuasion of the Arabs, heart and soul followers

of the great Prophet. The development of history in this strange, uncertain land, is hid from us, but if any good accrues to the races of Northern Africa, it will be due to that united band of Britons gathered from all parts of the world to fight for a common cause and a common empire, and in the interests of a common Christian civilisation.

Above all, and beyond all, towers the figure of the great Gordon, such as all Britons have learnt to know him, a noble exponent of British honour. His life and career are too familiar to be expatiated upon here. Sent to the Sûdan, as scoffers somewhat epigrammatically put it, to rule the Arabs with a walking-stick, he nevertheless proved how much a strong character, even though unassisted by the visible signs of material power, could design and effect. For months his wand seemed to possess, in this ancient land of the Pharaohs, the thaumaturgic properties of the rod of Aaron. At length, worn out by hopeless vigil, waiting to hear the welcome tramp of a friendly host that never came, he fell, betrayed and abandoned by those whom he trusted. The story of the tragic end of General Gordon is a bitter one for all to read; but his example remains. All Britons claim for themselves the heritage of his great name, with its lessons of sublime devotion and

humanity. He was a soldier, administrator, and Christian hero, and also, be it added, a great coloniser, and a coloniser in no narrow or circumscribed fashion. In him was exhibited the true spirit and genius of colonisation. England and her colonists are brought face to face with crucial questions of native administration in every corner of their empire: It is not enough for the British race to conquer natives; they must make up their minds to rule them wisely and in the spirit of humanity. They must not be satisfied with the rôle of merchants and traders bargaining closely with the races they govern, and leaving broken dynasties and clans behind them. There ought to be, and in fact there must be, that spirit of infinite toleration and reconstructive wisdom which makes men regard their position of conquerors as a sacred national trust. General Gordon exhibited in his own person the best qualities of a race that colonises widely. His simplicity of life and the frugal way in which he lived marked him out as superior to mere mercenary considerations. As one instance of his unselfishness in the land of South Africa, it may be recorded how, when called to Basutoland to reduce the rebel Basuto clans, in the official capacity of commandant-general of the Cape forces, he wished to lay aside his official position and take up the

modest rôle of resident with the most rebellious Basuto chief of all, thus hoping to win by conciliation what could hardly be won by war.

Surely the example of Gordon, great and admirable as it is for all, is especially so to the colonists who, by virtue of their circumstances, live in the midst or on the borders of native territories, and are placed, therefore, where there are exceptional opportunities for the display of self-restraint and humanity. It may be hoped that the story of self-devotion and chivalry at Khartoum will never be forgotten. Gordon, after all, may have done great good, even in death, to "those poor Sûdanese" whom he pitied. Light may come sooner or later for North and South Africa. There is an old myth told of the statue reared by devotees to the Ethiopian hero Memnon, that when the first rays of the rising African sun fell upon it, the Titan form and immobile face seemed suddenly endowed with an attribute of life, and saluted the dawn with some distinct and responsive note. To take this miraculous incident from antiquity and invest it with another meaning and application, may not the light of Western civilisation, as it touches the immobile forms of that desert life, evoke from them not simply a voice or a single chord, but a great har-



monious sound full of meaning and responsive sympathy,

To leave, however, these general considerations, and discuss more particularly the character of British colonial enterprise and the nature of our second colonial empire, it will be necessary to compare it briefly with others, and point out certain broad and obvious differences. The shortest possible historical sketch will impress these upon us. Speaking generally, it may be asserted that there are three prominent schemes of colonisation now inviting the attention of the world, viz. the British, French, and German.

With regard to the French system, it would appear in its general features to mean little more than a certain recrudescence of national ambition rather than a revival of a serious colonising spirit. The history of the early French settlements in North America conveys the idea that the French nation in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were more truly colonists in the "British" sense of the term than they are now. The narrative of Longfellow's "Evangeline" and the story of the simple village of Grand Prè give us a picture of homely and contented colonial life. The French are trying to colonise in China, Madagascar, and New Caledonia in a very differ-

ent way from that chosen by the Catholic peasantry of Acadia. Moreover, we read that these Acadian peasants exhibited even the Dutch virtues of patience and industry in cultivating the land they possessed to the utmost. Along the Annapolis River they reclaimed the rich marshes from the sea by dykes, and were content to wait for the reward of their toil. There is a feverish haste and aggressiveness about the present French colonising spirit, and a disposition to win by force rather than by toil. To term the exportation of criminals to New Caledonia or Cayenne a form of colonisation is simply a misapplication of terms. The presence of convicts has been proved to be, over and over again, a deadly hindrance to the development of free settlements.

But, historically speaking, the French aspirations after a colonial empire were crushed last century by the victories of our troops in Canada, and the definite assertion of British supremacy at sea. The contest between the rival colonising powers was a long and severe one. They fought, for instance, over the possession of Acadia for a hundred and fifty years, from 1614 to 1763 ; but the dispute may be said to have been really set at rest in 1749, when the Lords of Trade and Plantations, who had charge of colonial affairs, sent out two thousand five hundred colonists, and

founded Halifax. The knights baronets of Nova Scotia, a remarkable body of men, had received large grants of land there from Charles I., and had done a great deal towards settling the country, and had always been the deadliest rivals of the French settlers. England was sure to win finally, because she seemed to have ever at hand large numbers of emigrants able and willing to come across the seas. As an incident worth recording at a time like the present, when German schemes of colonisation are being so freely discussed, it may be stated that at the end of the last century the British Government, wishing for the rapid growth of Nova Scotia, invited no fewer than two thousand German settlers to Halifax. Their nationality is still preserved in the name of the town of Lunenburg. This is by no means a solitary instance of the wholesale incorporation of Germans within the boundaries of the British colonies.

But French colonisation in the British sense of the term seems, therefore, no longer to exist. If it does it is probably on a small and insignificant scale in stray corners of the world. There is no great and tangible result before us. A new method has sprung up, founded by conquest and maintained at great cost. Lord Reay asserts that France has at the present time to

subsidise her colonies with more than four millions of pounds annually, and to keep up, besides, military and police establishments numbering 121,000 men, and a staff of 16,500 civil employés. On the other hand, not four thousand persons left French ports in 1882 to emigrate, and of these not three hundred settled in French colonies. The expenses of their consular service are enormous, nearly doubling that of England with her vast area of dependencies.

It has been remarked, epigrammatically, that France has colonies but no colonists, Germans colonists but no colonies, England colonies and colonists. With regard to France, it would seem that her colonial system fosters a gigantic and costly bureaucracy.

There is the German method, which is pacific in its nature and gradual in its operation. Prince Bismarck has given us the broad lines of a colonial policy, and intimates that he does not wish to found rival communities across the seas like the British nor to follow a French model. Speaking before the Reichstag in June, 1884, he says: "I repeat that I have not yet given up my former dislike to colonies—I mean according to the colonial system as it existed in the last century, which we may now call the French system—colonies in which the rule

was to give land and other attractions to first settlers, then appoint civil officials and establish garrisons, a kind of colonisation which may suit other countries but which is not practicable for us. I believe that plans for colonisation cannot be drawn up theoretically, and all the instances given in the committee on this subject had this erroneous method in common, creating a port where there was no trade, and building a town without inhabitants. . . . Our object is not the foundation of provinces, but the protection of mercantile enterprises and their utmost expansion, of those also which obtain sovereign rights—a mercantile sovereignty which in the end owes allegiance to the German empire.”

Such ventures, therefore, as that of Herr Luderitz at Angra Pequena will receive the protection and support of the German empire; and there is no reason why such a protection should interfere with British interests, if our statesmen are only cautious enough to secure England's real and legitimate interests, and do not suffer Germany to gain a diplomatic advantage over her. Hitherto Englishmen and Germans have succeeded admirably as fellow-colonists, and the mere fact of their occupying coterminous territories under altered conditions of government will not necessarily make them hostile. It rests with Germans

themselves to decide whether they will live in foreign countries under the flag of Germany. It is just possible that their own imperial protection will involve imperial liabilities, and that the conscription will follow them to their distant factories and settlements. The Fatherland and not a colony is, in Prince Bismarck's policy, the proper and ideal home of a German.

The English method of colonisation is wider in its scope and more complex in its origin than those of other nations. It stands before the world with its mass of colossal results. The Australian colonies and the Dominion of Canada are conspicuous monuments of that many-sided enterprise which has been in operation for so many years, and the history of these communities furnishes us not only with a picture of material growth but a study of free constitutional development. There is a strong family likeness between the branches of the Anglo-Saxon race dispersed over all parts of the globe, displayed not only in their actual tastes and sentiments, leavening their everyday life, but in that strong political instinct which forces them to work out a similar national life. The dispersion of the Anglo-Saxon race to the four quarters of the globe has not resulted in such ethnical variations as would have been *primâ facie* expected. The free-

dom of the political and social life has given every energy of mind and body the fullest possible scope. No deterioration from the parent stock has been admitted as possible. The Englishman living abroad has regarded himself, both in civic virtues and ethical training, as equal to the Englishman at home. He has carried with him his Bible and his Shakspeare, his literature and his language, his Church and his Prayer-book, his orthodoxy and his heresies, his laws and his manners; and if the presence of a certain cosmopolitanism seems to obliterate old types and obscure ancient lines, still the strong English character lies beneath the whole and leavens it.

There is no parallel in ancient or modern history to this growth of the British empire. The colonies of Phœnicia grew up in independence of the mother country from the first. The distance between Tyre and Carthage was too great to allow of frequent communication of ideas and sentiments, so essential to the preservation of a strong feeling of unity. With regard to Greece, Dr. Thirlwall has remarked that, although the common sentiments between the Hellenic communities scattered about in various parts of the Mediterranean was great, and the Hellenic race carried Hellenic culture with them wherever they went, still the political

ties between them were weak. As an instance of their divergencies, it is well known that Greek colonists frequently adopted a form of government different from that under which they had been trained at home, and set up tyrants in cases where democracies would have been expected. The form, therefore, of their constitutions varied according to the shifting standard of local requirements, and was never shaped in obedience to a fixed ideal of political life left behind in Hellas. In British colonies the constitutional Government at home, with its balanced privileges, co-ordinate powers, and triple authority of Crown, Lords, and Commons, has always been more or less reproduced, forming an ideal according to which constitutional reform has been moulded. The Governor, in colonies possessed of full responsible government, represents the Crown, the Legislative Council the Lords, and the Legislative Assembly the Commons. The Assembly is the chief legislating body, with control over taxation and supplies; the Council is the Senate, with its elders of opulent means and high position, with power to check and revise legislation, and breathing a more judicial and serene atmosphere; the Governor is, as far as practicable, the impartial head, ruling the people by the



will of the people, while at the same time he forms the link, constitutionally speaking, between the colony and the mother country.

From the Crown colonies, where the choice of the Executive lies wholly with the Home Government, to the colonies living under a responsible form of government and possessing the power of removing their Executive when it pleases them, is a long and arduous progress, but it is generally achieved. In the case of Jamaica, constitutional government has been given and taken away; but such an instance of a reversal of policy is an extremely exceptional one, and it is more than probable that Jamaica will return to its former state of constitutional liberty. At the present moment Natal, having gained some control over her internal affairs, is agitating for more, and when once concession in the shape of constitutional privileges is begun, it is difficult to resist it. Gibbon Wakefield describes the gift of representative institutions without full powers as similar to the process of "lighting a fire in a room with the chimney closed." In the end it would seem that the colonists must, sooner or later, gain the power of changing their ministers at discretion. The mother country, by means of her resident officials, takes care that this full liberty is not

given too soon when the interest, nay, even existence, of the colony itself may be imperilled. The case of Jamaica seems to prove that full privileges were given too soon. A similar mistake may be made in Natal, if the completest civic freedom and the control of policy is given to a community of 40,000 Europeans living in the neighbourhood of half a million Kafirs.

To quote another view of to the Greek method of colonisation, Adam Smith points out that the mother city looked upon a colony in the light of a fully emancipated child, over whom she pretended to exercise no direct authority or jurisdiction. The settlers were left to choose the form of government they liked best, they enacted their own laws, elected their own magistrate, and made peace or war with their neighbours as an independent state, having no occasion to wait for the approbation or consent of the mother city. This doctrine was of course clearly opposed to the maxim that runs through our conception of the rights of settlers.

The Roman colonies were generally military outposts in a hostile or disaffected country, and the Roman garrison was "like a prize crew put into a captured vessel to retain possession for the captors." In later times the Italian republics made some efforts at colonisation, and Genoa set

up factories in the Levant, and boasted of two settlements—Galata, opposite to Constantinople, and Kaffa, in the Crimea. The former was governed by a podesta, or governor, and was strictly subservient to Genoese laws and Genoese magistrates. To Kaffa was conceded a certain amount of local administration, which threw a liberal colouring over a Genoese settlement, but it was too soon at that time for men to think seriously of a colony as a home for any but the few of the privileged merchants and nobility sojourning there in an official and business capacity. Venice, also, had factories and colonies, such as Candia, obtained by purchase; but this island, as well as all settlements, was never regarded as part of the Venetian state. A few Venetian noblemen replenished their empty coffers at the expense of the inhabitants, and the morality of the podesta was no greater than that of a grasping Roman proconsul lording it over a subject province. The curse of officialdom and the evils of an exclusive caste rested upon Venetian as they did upon Spanish colonies. The commercial policy both of Spain and Portugal was directed to the aggrandisement of an individual or a company. Consequently there was no strength in the Spanish colonial empire, and it fell away from the mother country at once when

a crisis came. The magnificent viceroys of Spanish South America were a source of weakness to the Spanish throne, so far as they caused a dissipation of national energy.

The history of Portuguese colonisation is a still less successful one than that of Spain.

Mr. Stanley, the African explorer, speaking lately at Manchester on the subject of the Congo, observed: "The Congo had been discovered four hundred years ago by a Portuguese navigator, but nothing more had been done by Portugal to establish her rights beyond the mere setting up of a stone; and out of £880,000 worth of goods imported by the traders on the Congo, while £660,000 worth came from British ports, nothing was imported from Portugal except some red wine for the use of the white men there." All that these Portuguese do now is to sit at the receipt of custom and exact toll from industrious workers, for the benefit chiefly of a few officials.

With regard to the fulfilment of duties and obligations to subject and indigenous populations, the history of Cuba and of Hispaniola gives us ample proof how the Spaniards interpreted these. "*Solitudinem facis, pacem appellas*" might have been said again and again of the desolated colonial empire of Spain. No nation has been free

from the grossest cruelty in forming their settlements, and the English as a race have little reason to boast of the methods used in early days to build up a colony ; but a period of repentance, culminating in the Emancipation Act of 1834, came upon them and gave a wholesome and salutary effect to their colonial administration. But no mercy, no repentances, have mitigated the severity of the Spanish rule. The object of Englishmen, in spite of their original offences, has been not so much to preserve a caste as to form a nation in a foreign land. The Spaniards carried about with them the feudal fiction that all land acquired abroad was the property of the sovereign, and they "transported the whole cumbrous, stately, and extravagant administrative forms of the Spanish Government into America." At the present moment Cuba is governed by a despotic official, answerable only to the Peninsular Government, and receiving £10,000 a year, "although this sum does not represent a third of the emoluments that accrue to the holder from various and questionable sources."

Certainly in English schemes of colonisation there has been a noticeable absence of formal organisation and of imperial initiation. Our colonies have grown up at hap-hazard and in spite frequently of remonstrances from home. In

South Africa the almost unvarying cry of our Colonial Secretaries has been to limit the area of our settlements, and keep the black and white races apart. For the purpose of creating a neutral zone between Europeans and Kafirs, six thousand emigrant farmers were sent out in 1820 by the Imperial Government and placed on the eastern frontier of the Cape; but the very existence of these emigrants on the perilous borders of barbarism brought about a "forward" policy. They had to be defended by the Home Government. Even the Cape itself was never looked upon as important *per se* and in its own development—at least by the official mind. It was occupied as a halfway house to India, and thus regarded by Lord North as a physical guarantee of our Eastern possessions. The African continent here, at its southern extremity, has come to be an integral part of the British empire, not by official acts of an aggressive nature, but by the enterprise and industry of the settlers, who came to the country with the assurance of British protection. Adam Smith states that the "auri sacra fames," or the belief in Golcondas and Eldorados, has made most men cross the seas, and directly induced them to found colonial states and empires; but it has frequently happened that gold and diamond mines have been simply the inci-

dental result of an occupation which had as its primary motive the desire to lead a pastoral life, and a social existence free from vexatious laws. Australia provides us with an exceptional case, for there the establishment of a convict station drew our attention to the land afterwards. The desire to live a religious life of their own led the Puritans to America ; hereditary rivalry with France took us to Canada and the West Indies ; and although we were fighting last century for a world empire, we as a nation seemed to have done it unconsciously. With other nations projects of colonisation have been in the forefront of a political programme, and have excited the keen interest of princes. In the reign of King John II. of Portugal, Prince Henry, who was an enthusiast on the subject of exploration, may almost be said to have bribed adventurers to sail round the world and take formal possession of any island, or, in fact, continent, that might be found. John Gonzales Zarco discovered Madeira under royal patronage, and under the auspices of the Prince. Our kings and queens were willing enough to grant charters to companies and individuals, as the many instances at hand prove. Queen Elizabeth encouraged Sir Humphrey Gilbert in Newfoundland ; Lord Baltimore, in 1616, and Sir W. Alexander, in 1621, were

invested with particular rights and privileges from the royal hand. But the initiation in schemes of aggrandisement came generally from the subject, not the sovereign. Throughout English colonial history it is the bold mariner, the trader, the explorer, the company, that has to woo the ear and enlist the sympathies of the sovereign, or, in later times, the executive. Even now, in spite of protests to the contrary, the British nation is compelled to sanction the enterprises of its subjects. The present Government have granted a charter to the Borneo Company, annexed part of New Guinea, protected large tracts of South Africa, not so much because they are enamoured of protectorates and annexation, but because they have to yield to the laws of an irresistible development coming from the English people themselves. The Imperial Government of England have no official plan of extension, and the cry of a Monroe doctrine reaches us from the Pacific rather to the dismay and embarrassment of Downing Street than to their jubilation. The ancient and modern systems of colonisation provide us with two distinct pictures. In the former the official act and the formal annexation is the first step; the whole machinery of law and government is transferred bodily into new lands: it is meant to be a fixed type and inelastic in



nature, and such it continues to be. In obedience to the latter, periods of growth and change are acknowledged. The early life of a community, its struggles and trials, are all typical of the life of the human being from infancy to maturity. Its government is elastic, and the necessity for change comes from within. If expansion in any form is wanted, it is granted. The formal act of official recognition of its maturity and of its growth comes generally after it has been clamoured for. It cannot be long resisted, because the growth is wholesome and from within.

Holland has colonised more successfully than Spain or Portugal, and has shown considerable administrative wisdom in the internal management of her dependencies. Mr. Wallace, in his "Malay Archipelago," has spoken favourably of the manner in which the Dutch manage their native population. The paternal despotism exercised upon them is of a kindly nature; it does not concede too many privileges, nor does it require too many sacrifices. The coloured man is treated generally according to his state of development.

But in a commercial sense the colonies of the Dutch were a failure, a monopolist spirit pervading every one of them. The Cape, for instance, as will be shown later on, was simply a post of

the Dutch East India Company, and nothing more than this. Expansion on the part of the colonists themselves was checked by orders from the Castle at Capetown. The idea of the growth of an independent national life was set aside as an absurdity or an impossibility. To allow a state to expand in South Africa was, in the eyes of the political economists of those days, to allow a rivalry to spring up.

However, the English set the question at rest by supplanting the Dutch almost everywhere. When the Dutch awoke to their errors it was too late, the English had destroyed their navy and held the ocean routes. The brief rule of Commissioner De Mist between the first and second occupation of the Cape by the English, his reforms, administrative activity, and his more tolerant spirit towards the Burghers, point to the fact that the Dutch officials had found out that the true progress of a colony must be made by the colonists themselves under enlightened laws.

France, at this present moment, seems to say with Napoleon, "*Cette vieille Europe m'ennuie.*" She hopes to find a second India in China seas and to replace her lost possessions in the West Indies by the seizure of Madagascar. Her colonial enterprises are, however, founded on force. She hectors over the Malagasy. She thunders at

the ports of China, and demands admittance within the sacred precincts of the Celestial Empire. There are three methods by which European colonists gain a footing in foreign countries — by conquest, by cession, by occupancy. France prefers the first method, Germany apparently would choose the last. The unoccupied places of the earth are coveted by Germans; such centres of civilisation as Peking have attractions for the French, apparently because they have the power to pay a heavy indemnity. The Germans would civilise the world by sending out and encouraging merchants, traders, and farmers; the French by sending out armed hosts. There is no doubt which method of civilisation is the truer and more nearly resembling our own. But will the French achieve a colonial empire after all? China cannot be conquered like India, nor will the Malagasy disappear from their hereditary abodes as easily as the harmless aborigines of the West Indies vanished before Spaniards and French in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moreover, there is a strong competition in the markets of the world for Chinese and Malagasy trade, and the goodwill of the natives has to be conciliated. By aggressive projects, whether successful or unsuccessful, the French run the chance of losing

what trade they have. Even a triumphant entry into Peking might lead to barren results.

Meantime England and her colonies steadily increase. The Anglo-Saxon race, however it came by its colonial heritage, has really subdued the soil in the Virgilian sense, and called forth the fruits of the earth by industry and persistence. Moreover, the British empire extends over those parts of the world in the temperate and sub-tropical zones where her sons can best thrive. The climatic conditions of the Canadian Dominion, of the Australian colonies, and of a large portion of South Africa are suited to a northern race. The course of our colonial empire rolls steadily and strongly on like a great river, gathering rill after rill, tributary after tributary, to swell its volume. At the present moment there are ten millions of colonists living across the seas. Such is the rate of increase that in less than fifty years there may be as many English colonists living abroad as there are English people at home. Their character is essentially the same, they speak the same language, read the same literature, cultivate the same habits of thought, and live under the same laws and institutions. The potentiality of greatness lies before them, and taking the history of America during the last hundred years, since Burke so eloquently

spoke and prophesied, as affording a clue to their possible greatness, there may be three British empires in the future full of vigorous and healthy life—one in the Pacific, one in South Africa, and one in North America—each great in itself, and powerful in the sympathy of the other. Through the whole the spirit of a common life and freedom will breathe.

“ It is not to be thought of that the flood  
Of British freedom, which, to the open sea  
Of the world's praise, from dark antiquity  
Hath flowed, with pomp of waters unwithstood ;  
Roused though it be full often to a mood  
Which spurns the check of salutary bands,  
That this most famous stream in bogs and sands  
Should perish ; and to evil and to good  
Be lost for ever. In our halls is hung  
Armoury of the invincible knights of old.  
We must be free 'or die, who speak the tongue  
Which Shakspeare spake ; the faith and morals hold  
Which Milton held. In every thing we are sprung  
Of earth's first blood, have titles manifold.”

## II.

### THE DUTCH OCCUPATION.

ABOUT thirty years after the time that the "Pilgrim Fathers" landed at Plymouth, in America, the first European immigrants arrived at Table Bay, in South Africa. The "Fathers" sailed across the North Atlantic to escape religious persecution, the Dutch mariners braved the terrors of the South Atlantic to create a fresh link in their commercial empire. The Cape had become the most important post between "East and West." The passage round the Agulhas Banks had the effect of making the marts of Venice desolate, and directing the trade of the world along a new route. The "Fathers" were at first a poor and struggling body of men, solely dependent upon themselves and their own efforts; the Dutch colonists, when they landed at the Cape, were plenipotentiaries of their Mightinesses the States-General of the Netherlands, the richest and most powerful commu-

nities of their day. Cape Town, therefore, which lies on the shores of Table Bay, the first port of call from Europe, is comparatively a very old capital for a colony. It is more than two hundred and thirty years ago since a Dutch commander of the name of Riebeeck landed with the crews of three ships and took possession of the land on which the town now stands in the name of their Mightinesses and the Dutch East India Company. Yet, in spite of the lapse of time, Cape Town can number no more than forty thousand inhabitants, and of these no less than ten thousand are Malays.

Contrast this slow progress with the sudden growth of colonial cities like Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide, or any of the Canadian and American cities. The population of Melbourne, the capital of Victoria, is 265,000, exceeding the whole white population of the Cape, as it was reckoned in the census of 1875, by several thousands. The Australian city has sprung up within the memory of many still living.

There must be some strange and unusual circumstances to account for the disproportionate rate of increase between the two countries. It must be remembered that when Van Riebeeck took possession of the Cape it was with no idea of founding a permanent colony of white men. In

America the immigrants on board the *Mayflower* may be said metaphorically, if not actually, to have sunk their ships when they touched their new bourne. Their enterprise was that of men who sailed the seas in the spirit and with the intention of the Trojan Æneas. They had determined to create a new home of their own, and in those early days probably never thought that they should return to their native land. In every sense of the word the emigrants to America and Australia were genuine colonists. To the Dutch, Table Bay was simply a port of call for the especial benefit of the merchant fleet that came laden with riches from India and the East. For diseased and weary crews it was an absolute necessity in those days that they should get a half-way house where they might recruit. Here it was that there was spread out before as well as behind them that "illimitable main," more truly illimitable in those days when a prosperous voyage from the Cape occupied a space of a hundred and twenty days, instead of, as now, only twenty. The diaries and manuscripts of these sailors tell us how welcome was this rest, and how gladly the crews stretched their limbs upon the slopes of Table Mountain, how they devoured with avidity the fresh meat, ate even the wild herbs, the mustard leaves, and scurvy grass.



Many a frame utterly enervated with the toils of the sea, and the ceaseless rush of the waves in the latitude of the "roaring forties," grew strong and healthy here. In these days, when voyagers carry with them frozen meat, condensed milk, and many luxuries of the age in steamers, which may be described more truly as floating palaces than ships, it is almost impossible to realise the hardships which sailors of the seventeenth century had to undergo. A single glance at the position of the Cape Peninsula at once shows us how it commands the passage round the southern seas, and must therefore *always* be a place of first-rate importance. To glide from the regions of the South Atlantic to those of the Indian Ocean is to pass from the region of travel and toil to that of riches and reward. The Coromandel coast and the Malay archipelago with its countless islands have been the spurs which have led the sailor across the stormy Bay of Biscay, past the sweltering Doldrums, and over the rough region of the south-east trades. Even the tempestuous Cape, called by the old sailors "Cabo di totos tormentos," was robbed of its terrors at the prospect of the El Dorado beyond.

The Cape, with all the romance of early days around it, with the figure of the impious Flying Dutchman trying fruitlessly to round its iron-

bound shores in a phantom ship, with its storms, its terrors, and its isolation, must ever evoke from us a feeling of unusual interest. But more than this, it is from its natural position the key to the Southern seas. An accident to the Suez Canal, a rupture with European powers, an unlucky campaign, may any day send the Eastern trade of England round the Cape of Storms. It was many years ago that two Dutch sailors, called Janssen and Proot, who had been wrecked here from a ship called the *Haarlem*, saw the importance of Table Bay. When, after many adventures, these castaways got home they impressed their views upon the directors of the United Netherlands East India Company in a written document. This document was approved of a year or so afterwards. Anthonie van Riebeeck, formerly a surgeon in the company's service, was sent out. It was on April the 7th, 1652, that this Van Riebeeck sailed into Table Bay with his small squadron of three ships, the *Dromedarie*, *Rieger*, and *Good Hope*, after an unusually good voyage of one hundred and four days. This was the first attempt at a permanent settlement in South Africa by Europeans, though the Cape had been discovered for a hundred and fifty years already, for it was in 1503 that Antonio de Saldanha, a Portuguese explorer, who has

given his name to a bay north of Cape Town, on the west coast, dropped anchor under the shadow of Table Mountain. The lot, however, of the enterprising Van Riebeeck was a hard one. In April—an autumn month in that part of the world which lies thirty-four degrees south of the Equator—the ground had been parched, and vegetation withered up by the south-east trades, so that the lovely country which Janssen and Proot saw in the spring months of 1649 seemed a fiction of the imagination. Moreover, to add to their discomfort, the storms of rain came down upon them from the chilling north-west, and they learnt what the rigour of a Cape winter was for unprotected and unsheltered men. All who have lived on the slopes of Table Mountain know how sudden is the rush of wind down the valleys or kloofs, how dense the blinding torrents of rain. Many of Van Riebeeck's seamen, invalids from the merchants' ships, wandered hopelessly about, and, as the old chronicle tells us, met with death from cold and dysentery, which they had escaped in the course of a long and dangerous sea voyage. The Cape asylum seemed not a refuge, but a grave for the destitute. Presently, however, spring set in, the weather grew milder, and men grew stronger. A ship was sent to the neighbouring islands, and a large store of penguins'

eggs was procured. At this time there was abundance of wild life both by sea and land. In no country in the world has there been known to be such a variety of game as in South Africa. Lions prowled round the foot of Table Mountain, hippopotami wallowed in the marshes and rivers, in the bay itself whales were frequently seen, and on the islands basked thousands of seals. Where the government offices now stand was a deep quagmire, surrounded by thick bush and forest. Van Riebeeck's object was not, however, to clear the forest or drain the marshes. He was satisfied with a less irksome *rôle*, for his was not the spirit of a rough pioneer. He erected a fort near the place where the Western railway terminus now stands, and kept the company's servants employed in the occupation of growing cabbages and vegetables for the crews of their ships. With regard to foreign vessels, it was strictly enjoined by the Council of Seventeen that they should not be made partakers in these supplies. On one occasion Van Riebeeck supplied an English vessel with two oxen, but he excused himself to his superiors for this piece of hospitality on the ground that the oxen were diseased. At this time there was *no native question* in South Africa. The aborigines were few and miserable, and spent a mean existence wandering along the shore. They

were called "strand-loopers," or "beach-rangers," in Dutch, and were satisfied with roots and shell-fish. The policy of the Government was to have as little as possible to do with these natives. They wished to conciliate them if they came across them, and so procure as many sheep and cattle as they could from them. The natives themselves were willing enough to fall in with this policy. In lieu of money they received copper and tobacco. Generally speaking there was a more charitable feeling in the middle of the seventeenth century towards the natives than there was a hundred years afterwards.

The profession of Christianity put both upon the same level. At the present day one of the fundamental principles of the Orange Free State and of the South African Republic is, that the black man is not the equal of the white man, either in Church or State. But in early days there did not exist this intense and bitter class hatred, the inheritance left by innumerable border feuds and Kafir wars. Old Nicholas Proot, the shipwrecked sailor above referred to, says, "by maintaining a good correspondence with natives we shall be able in time to employ some of the children as boys and servants, to the glorifying of God's name." Another extract from one of the placats of the company is even more deci-

sive in its philanthropy ; it runs thus : " Whoso therefore ill-treats and beats any of the natives, whether he be in the right or wrong, shall, in the presence of the company's officers, be scourged with fifty lashes, in order that they may perceive that such conduct is against our will, and that we are anxious to deal with them in all love and friendship according to the order of our superiors." Moreover, when two bold sea captains of our own, Andrew Shillinge and Humphrey Fitzherbert, took possession of the Cape and hoisted the English flag in 1620, in the name of the high and mighty Prince King James, they set forth the advantages of the place, its strong natural position, its fine climate, and excellent bay, &c. ; and with regard to the blacks they said, " Time will no doubt make them your servants, and by serving you they will become hereafter the servants of God."

The community of the company's servants was, however, of a most rigid and exclusive character. In fact its constitution seems to have resembled that of a man-of-war with an extremely strict martinet as captain. To us the rules and ordering of it seem quaint and punctilious. Anthonie van Riebeeck was of course at the head with a most absolute dictatorship ; next to him

came the Pontifex maximus, or the ecclesiastic called the "sick comforter." The principles of Church and State were never upheld with more autocratic hands than they were in the Cape Peninsula. The name of the sick comforter was William Barentz Wylant, and he seems to have caused a grave scandal by preaching an extempore sermon. No sermon at the Cape had ever been preached in this irresponsible way before, and so serious was this breach of custom, considered to be that the whole circumstance was reported officially to Batavia. William Wylant got off with a severe reprimand for this brief attempt at discursive eloquence. It is worthy of note, moreover, that the wife of this ecclesiastic gave birth to the first Afrikander child on June 6th, 1653, and so Barentz, though a bad ecclesiastic, may still be considered to be a good colonist. Besides the company's servants there was no other recognised class. The first step towards creating a burgher, or peasant class, was when, on February 21st, 1657, ground was allotted to nine ex-servants of the company. Previously to this a certain number of privileged individuals were allowed plots of ground and gardens, and we read that the first person to profit by this was a certain Mrs. Hendrik Boom, a good thrifty old woman, known by the more familiar

name of Annetje de Boerin. She was given a lease of the company's cows, and for each cow she had to pay yearly fifteen gulden. She had the privilege of selling milk, first of all to the commander and his staff, and then to passing ships. There was very little excitement at the Cape in those days. The monotony of life was relieved only by the occupation of catching seals and penguins, and making small expeditions up the coast. One local hero, however, especially stands out conspicuously in the quaint annals of the settlement, called Harry, chief of the loafing Hottentot beach-rangers. He had an immense amount of impertinence—in the first place because he had experienced the good fortune of sailing with an English crew to Bantam, and secondly because he was utilised as an interpreter and admitted to the commander's table. He showed his appreciation of the civilisation bestowed upon him by a series of cattle-lifting and border atrocities, thus proving himself a true forefather of those numberless chiefs who have done the same thing subsequently.

The arrival of the East India fleet laden with the treasures of the East was *the* event of those times. The whole community, from the governor and the sick comforter downwards, woke up from their death in life. News was given and re-



ceived, and the homeward-bound ship heard what the latest arrival from Holland had to tell of matters of state. The news certainly might be rather old, perhaps more than a hundred days, but it was no doubt fresh and acceptable to the men of the time. Wars and complications might have arisen in Europe, and it was just possible that a hostile fleet might bring its own news and inform the merchantmen that there was a state of war between their high Mightinesses and England or France. Commercial enterprises in those days had not only the dangers of the seas to encounter, but the attacks of hostile fleets and piratical rovers.

The coast of Morocco and the Bay of Biscay were points at which the Dutch argosies of the East might be surprised and captured, just as the galleons of the Spanish fell victims to the audacity of Raleigh and Drake. Still, in spite of bad news or anticipations of dangers ahead, this bourne of Table Bay must have been a welcome one to the crews already tempest-tossed and harassed with their long voyage. Here too they might congratulate themselves upon having passed the Agulhas Banks and rounded the most dangerous rocks of the "Cabo di totos tormentos." Well indeed does this cape merit that title when the storms of the north-west in the winter months

sweep round it, and raise mountains of waters unequalled anywhere else. At the Banks themselves is the meeting point of two currents, the Mozambique and the Antarctic, the one carrying the warm waters of the tropics, the other the icy waters of the South Pole; and here therefore is the meeting point of all the winds. The many wrecks round this particular part of the coast, even within the last few years, testify to its dangerous nature, notwithstanding our improved implements and superior skill in navigation. However, when once their ships had dropped anchor under Table Mountain, the sailors might safely look back upon the worst part of the voyage as over.

With their bows turned northwards they would soon reach the latitude of the south-east trades, which would carry them up as far as, or beyond, the line, a distance of two thousand miles. So regular is this trade that the sailors might not have to haul on a rope or shift a block for a fortnight at a time. Times are indeed changed since then. In Table Bay may be seen now large and powerful steamers, belonging to such companies as the "Orient," the "Union," the "Donald Currie," and the "Clan," who often make the passage in eighteen days. Now the news of the world is flashed along the cable every

day. But to Van Riebeeck and his companions the flash of light upon the canvas of the ships of the merchant fleet was as welcome and almost as rare a sight as the funnel of a steamer is now to a dweller in the lonely Tristan d'Acunhas.

It was not until 1687 that a really important immigration took place, and this was of French refugees, during the governorship of Van der Stell.

These men had left their country at the time of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and they brought with them to the Cape their Protestant faith and their Puritan manners, to which their descendants have clung with remarkable tenacity. They also brought slips of vines from the famous wine districts of France; and the broad vineyards of Constantia and the Paarl are the result of this forethought. These refugees numbered only three hundred at first, but a few dribblets came in afterwards. Their descendants have so increased that they now form a large portion of the whole indigenous population of the Cape. But these men did not help to increase Cape Town itself. They were sent to distant and fertile valleys, such as those of the Stellenbosch and Drakenstein districts, they forgot the language and literature of France—in fact, they were prohibited from talking and

reading it by the Dutch Company—and they forgot, be it added, the spirit of romance and chivalry that breathes through this language and literature.

No race is so unimaginative as that of the present Afrikander; in vain may we look for the gay *insouciance*, the fanciful vivacity, the light wit credited to Frenchmen of all ages. The descendants of the French Puritans of 1687 are like the Dutch—solemn, decorous, and phlegmatic.

The change is so marked that it deserves the notice of ethnologists. No stronger instance of adaptation to environment can be quoted.

The French language was stamped out so quickly that in less than a hundred and fifty years after the first landing of the refugees not a man spoke it.

A quaint story is told of one of these French Boers, who was asked by a traveller whether he spoke French—his name, De Clerc, being decidedly a French one—"No," was his reply, in the broken Dutch *patois* of the Cape, "but I have French Rambouillet ram."

Not a trace of French literature is preserved, and the spirit of inquiry and scientific thought, so peculiar to the French nation, seems to have disappeared altogether. Mr. Needham Cust, writing on the South African languages in a scientific

spirit, mentions the fact that the Boers alone of the peoples of South Africa had contributed nothing to help him in his researches. There is absolutely no indigenous literature amongst the Boer or farmer class. The only poet South Africa can boast of is a Mr. Pringle, a Scotchman, who came to Algoa Bay in 1820.

The arrival of the French Huguenots made the community at the Cape a larger and more mixed one. The successors of Van der Stell seem to have thought that their position, as interpreters of law and conventionality at the castle, was being endangered by the access of this new element; so, to hedge in themselves and their privileges, they drew a harder and faster line of demarcation between themselves as the representatives of their High Mightinesses the States-General and the common burghers.

The etiquette of this Lilliputian court was of a most vexatious character. A feeling of caste was most industriously promoted and cultivated in the smallest matters. No burgher was supposed to pass the house of the Governor without uncovering his head, and it is said that it was the special occupation of certain dames to sit behind the window-blinds to take note of passers-by who neglected the "obsequious bow to the unseen magnate."

The late Judge Watermeyer has particularly drawn attention to the exacting spirit of the small knot of monopolists who appropriated to themselves, by every paltry regulation and exaction, not only the trade but the homage of a discontented people.

The following are some of the laws and rules taken from the placats of Governor Tulbagh, relating to *Pracht en Praal*, that is, luxury and ostentation :—

*“ Of Large Umbrellas.*

“ *Art. 6.*—No one less in rank than a junior merchant, and those among the citizens of equal rank, and the wives and daughters only of those who are or have been members of any council, shall venture to use umbrellas.”

This was equivalent to saying that not more than fifty out of the whole population were to have this desirable privilege.

*“ Of Carriages.*

“ *Art. 4.*—Every person, without exception, shall stop his carriage and get out of it when he shall see the Governor approach; and shall likewise get out of the way, so as to allow a convenient passage to the carriage of any of the members of the Court of Policy.”

Other sumptuary laws are amusing; such as those that prohibited the wearing of silk dresses by all ladies under a certain grade, also those which prohibited all women, whether married or single, without distinction, whether in mourning or out of mourning, under a penalty of 25 rix-dollars, from wearing dresses with a train.

It will thus be seen that the divinity of this little Commissioner of the High Mightinesses was guarded as far as it could be by small rules of this kind. There was little love lost between him and the burgher class. More irksome still than the sumptuary laws were those relating to trade and commerce. The only chance the burgher had of improving his position was by selling the produce of the Cape, in the shape of vegetables and milk and wine, to passing vessels. He was debarred from doing this with success by the vexatious regulations of the Governor. As this functionary's salary was only 4,200 gulden, or £350, per annum, he had to resort to all kinds of methods of making money. Complaints were raised against the younger Van der Stell that he compelled the wine farmers of the Cape to sell their produce to himself alone at a certain price, at the same time reserving to himself the sole privilege of retailing this wine to passing ships at a price ten times the amount of the original cost.

Moreover, he possessed large farms and cattle stations, on which he employed no less than sixty of the company's servants. In these enormities the Governor seems to have been countenanced by his *alter ego*, the "sick comforter." The following is an extract from the complaint sent home by the burghers: "In few words we shall add something more of our minister. Be it known to your Honours that he, too, is one of the largest farmers. He makes no account of religion, inasmuch as he is more interested about his cultivated lands than about his pulpit. He sometimes for a fortnight together enjoys himself on his farm."

The expansion of colonial industry was impossible under these conditions. The burghers were compelled not only to submit to the arbitrary rules of the Governor and his officials, but they had to pay a tithe of everything to the government. The political equality of their colonists was never for a moment admitted by the Hollanders. They were "permitted, as a matter of grace, to have a residence in land of which possession had been taken by the sovereign power, there to gain a livelihood as tillers of the earth, tailors, and shoemakers."

But a different era was in store for the Cape burghers at the beginning of this century. In



June, 1795, Admiral Elphinstone anchored off Simon's Town with a fleet of eight ships and a force of 4,000 men. It was in August that Sluysken, pressed on one hand by the English admiral, and on the other by the threatening attitude of the rebellious burghers, surrendered the country to General Craig. The fact that there existed a body of "Nationalists" in the Cape Colony, itself hostile to the Dutch Government at the moment of capitulation, throws light upon one or two facts of subsequent South African history. Between the Cape Colony and Holland there has never been any real tie of interest or affection. The recent visit of the Transvaal delegates to Holland, and their attempts to enlist sympathy in their own behalf as former colonists, is almost ridiculous. The only power to which the burghers of the Cape owe a really deep debt of gratitude is England. From English occupation alone can be traced their civilisation, their government, their general advance in all the improvements of modern times.

There is ingrained in the Boer element an impatience of authority and legitimate control. The system of a well-ordered government in all its numerous and complicated branches is unintelligible to them at present. The Free State certainly is governed well, but in a country where

the whole population does not exceed fifty thousand people, the fashion of their government must be simple. Perhaps the life of these men has something to do with framing their political ideas. In the open veldt there is a feeling of unbounded expansion, of freedom from conventionality, and immunity from law. For many generations these influences of their local surroundings have been acting upon them; the temptations to roam were too great for the early settlers, and in vain the Dutch governors in the eighteenth century published proclamations forbidding the settlers to leave their "loan" farms, in vain they threatened corporal and capital punishment and confiscation of all their property. The settlers simplified the question by moving away so far that the edicts of the "Council of Seventeen" could not reach them. A certain commissioner, Van Goers, finding the impossibility of enforcing law, proposed that the Cape Peninsula should be severed from the mainland. No plan could possibly have shown more clearly the drift of the Dutch policy of those days.

### III.

#### THE ENGLISH OCCUPATION.

THE English occupation of the Cape must be considered in reference to political circumstances in Europe. In consequence of the successful invasion of the United Provinces of Holland by the French, the Stadtholder was compelled to take refuge in England. It was then, as upon many occasions, necessary to England's prosperity that the tide of French victories should be stemmed, and, accordingly, an alliance was made between England and the United Provinces. As the Cape of Good Hope was another Gibraltar in the southern seas, and the war with the French was waged all over the world, both by sea and land, it was deemed advisable that the Cape, in reality not a colony but an outpost of the Netherlands East India Company, should place itself under the protection, for the time, of the British Government. Accordingly Admiral Elphinstone and General

Craig were sent out with a fleet and a large number of troops to exercise this act of protection. They arrived at the Cape in June, 1795, and presented the order of the Stadtholder, directing that the troops and ships should be received as the allies of Holland coming to protect the settlement from the possible invasion of the French. The Dutch officer, Commissary Sluysken, and his councillors, the Raad Politique, refused to obey the order of the Stadtholder, and prepared to defend themselves. Accordingly the English landed at a place called Muizenberg, in False Bay, lying to the south-east of Table Bay and Cape Town, and after a short resistance obtained the capitulation of the forts and Government Castle. The officers of the Dutch East India Company left the colony in November, 1795, after an occupancy of nearly 150 years.

The first English governor of the Cape was General Craig, who took in hand vigorously several urgent reforms, both on the subject of monopolies and oppressive taxes. Strictly, this first occupation of the Cape was not effected by conquest. The English were the allies of the Dutch in Europe, and they came armed, as has been stated, in the first instance with an express order from the Stadtholder to the garrison, bidding them place themselves under British

protection. Had the Commissary obeyed home instructions no blood would have been shed. The colony itself was already in a state of political unrest, the burghers of Swellendam and Graaf Reinet having gone so far as to set up their own magistrates, thus placing themselves in direct opposition to the constituted authority of the Dutch East India Company. The first official acts of General Craig were directed to the alleviation of local discontents.

The English held the Cape from 1795 to 1803. In this year the settlement was restored to the sovereignty of the Batavian republic in pursuance of the Treaty of Amiens, and a certain M. de Mist was appointed Commissary-General for the republic, with the task of installing the new governor, General Janssens, into his office. The Dutch now saw how badly the monopolist rules of their East India Company had worked, and they abolished formally many privileges which had grown up under the old régime, and had already been to some extent the subject of General Craig's reform. In fact, attempts were made of a most thorough description to alter the whole system of the civil administration of the colony.

But this Dutch occupation did not last long. The peace of Amiens was rudely interrupted, and English and French were again at war.

Under these circumstances it was simply impossible to allow such a strategic post as the Cape to fall into the hands of the French. Accordingly an expedition was sent to secure it, under General Sir David Baird. It did not attract much notice in Europe, as far greater events were happening. The battles of Austerlitz and Trafalgar were fought whilst the fleet was in the South Atlantic. On land Napoleon had succeeded in defeating Austria, and had gained fresh glory of a dazzling description; but this little fleet of General Baird's sailed southward, in an unknown and unnoticed manner, to lay the foundation of a South African empire. The difference between French and British enterprise could hardly be better illustrated than by these parallel incidents.

In January, 1806, the forces anchored off Table Bay, and, after a few short skirmishes with the Batavian and colonial forces, Cape Town fell a second time into the hands of the British.

If a nation has to submit its title deeds to a strict examination, and court the judgment of the whole world upon their righteousness and justice in the abstract, it can scarcely escape condemnation. There is not a nation existing that has not some serious flaws, some iniquitous transaction to show in its records; and if an *ex post facto* judgment has to be executed upon every conquest,

annexation, or protectorate, the chief occupation of the present generation will be to condemn the deeds of their forefathers. If the English settler had no right to South Africa as a heritage unjustly won, neither had the Dutchman or French Huguenot who drove away the aboriginal races from hereditary pastures. Even the Kafir, who appeared only recently in South Africa, has no right to *berg* or *veldt* by this canon of justice. The country should be handed back to those who are left of the clicking Bushmen, the most ancient indigenous race. "*Beati possidentes*" is a maxim which involves frequently something quite different from the apparent brutality of high-handed force and injustice ; it involves the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. Although, therefore, the attack upon the Cape Colony may have seemed unprovoked, there was much to extenuate it. A great duel—a duel to the death—was going on in Europe, which had lasted over a generation and had cost oceans of blood. In the desperate struggles of this combat the adversaries pitted against one another seized any weapon at hand. It was deemed politic to retake the Cape, and secure the position which made it "the physical guarantee of the Indian empire." The English were animated by no vindictive hate towards the Dutch or the Dutch settlers ; they granted in

1806, as in 1795, the most liberal terms to the burghers.

For some years after the successful entry of General Baird into Cape Town, the settlement was looked upon as "*merely a temporary possession by conquest,*" an acquisition rendered necessary by the force of circumstances. In 1814 a convention was entered into between the Sovereign of the United Netherlands on the one hand and the King of Great Britain on the other, by which the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, together with Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, were ceded in perpetuity to the British Crown. It is recorded in this Convention that this surrender was made *as an equivalent for certain charges provided by the King of Great Britain* for the defence of the Low Countries and their settlement in union with Holland. Technically, therefore, the possession of the Cape was legalised by the action of the Government in Holland on both occasions, in 1795 and 1806. In the first instance there was an express sanction of the action of General Baird on the part of the Stadtholder; in the second, if there was no official sanction from Holland, still there was no strong protest against the British expedition to the Cape. The contingency of inaction on the part of the King's Government would have been French occupation



of Table Bay, a most undesirable contingency for Holland as well as England.

With regard to the action of the officials stationed at the Castle in Cape Town, and the colonists themselves outside, there was neither harmony nor agreement. There was veiled if not decided hostility between burghers and officials. Even after the era of attempted reforms in 1806 there was nothing approaching to a national sympathy with the Batavian officers. The late Judge Watermeyer, a most able and impartial historian, as well as judge at the Cape, remarks: "Some national feeling in favour of the Fatherland may have lingered, but substantially every man in the colony, of every hue, was benefited when the incubus of the Dutch East India Company was removed." It is necessary to review the statements of that national party in South Africa who have sprung up into existence of late, challenge the right of Englishmen, and characterise their occupation of the Cape as unjustifiable on any grounds. "Africa for the Afrikaner" is a taking and possibly fascinating cry wherewith to conjure up a national feeling that had, in Judge Watermeyer's words, no real existence eighty years ago, but it can deceive those only who know nothing of the history of South Africa. Since the English flag has been

hoisted there progress of every kind and description has been rapidly made. The law has been administered justly, education has vastly increased, and the record of material prosperity is a convincing proof of a wise and beneficent government. Had the Cape not come under English influences it is difficult as well as idle to conjecture what its fate might have been. The Dutch officials might have cajoled rebels and persuaded the burghers to submit to constituted authority, they might have reformed their ways and lived according to the better spirit of Commissary de Mist, but in a general European war the Cape must infallibly have become the prize of the boldest and the strongest naval power. With regard to the internal management of the Colony, it is impossible to imagine how the Batavian Government, even supposing they enjoyed an immunity from attacks by sea from Europeans, would have grappled fifty years ago with the growing dangers of the numerous Kafir wars which have cost Great Britain so much blood and so much treasure.

A certain class of politicians in England have been found, however, to develop a most sensitive conscience with regard to South Africa. They have postulated the argument that England and Englishmen have genial their heritage there

by unlawful means. They would, in a logical fashion, wish to retire from the country and leave it to those settlers who, under the general name of "Boers"—a rather inaccurate term, by the way—are supposed to have prior claims. But what are the claims of these "Boer," "Dutch," or "French," or "Afrikander" peoples, limiting the phrase to the descendants of the old settlers, as opposed to the later British colonists? Are they just or unjust? An examination of the pages of colonial history can alone give us a satisfactory answer. And this examination must be whole and thorough, and aim at obtaining true results. For instance, simple occupation of land, the strong argument of Dutch Boers for their prior claims, must be treated as only one, perhaps an inferior, argument in the discussion of the general question of colonisation. Now, if any student were asked to place his finger upon the spot in South Africa where the greatest achievements and enterprises have taken place in the work of settling the country, he would choose the district of Albany, the home of the state-aided English settlers. The difficulty of pioneering, which has been considered to be the particular one of the Dutch *voer-trekkers*, was theirs in a most especial sense. They were imported not only to find themselves homes but to fight the

Kafirs. The claim of the descendants of these men to be considered as a valuable and integral portion of the British empire are overwhelming. Hitherto they have been distinguished for their loyalty and devotion to the British Crown, and if at any time the movement for a separate Dutch Afrikaner nation, with an Afrikaner flag, became successful, they would probably stand on one side and declare the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony a separate republic. If matters ever came to this most undesirable climax, and if these settlers so wished it, they would have an historical and independent right to do so. Considered in comparison with the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic, their life and progress show a much more complete whole and a far more valuable page in colonial enterprise.

At the beginning of this century the western part of the Cape Colony, as contrasted with the eastern, was fairly well occupied. The Hottentots and Bushmen and the aboriginal tribes had been driven out of their ancestral homes, and supplanted by the Dutch and French pioneers. To drive out and shoot down these nomadic and disorganised natives was easy work. The real fighting was to begin when the pioneers touched upon the outlying hunting grounds of the Kafir races. The Kafirs have done what the degenerate

holding fast to this empire of South Africa. Of this we may be assured, that no other European nation has done one-hundredth of the real good to South Africa that England has done.

However, to return to the subject of the first English immigration. In 1778 the Fish River had been regarded as a natural boundary, and all tribes who wandered westward of this in the kloofs of the Zuurveldt were regarded as interlopers. It was in 1809 that Colonel Collins made a tour along the frontier, with a view of keeping settlers and natives apart; he expressed it as his opinion, in fact as his policy, that every Kafir, without exception, whether free or in service, should be compelled to withdraw over the eastern border. A policy, however, in South Africa is of no good unless it can be enforced, and it became necessary for armed troops to clear the Zuurveldt. The three officers commissioned to do this were Colonel Graham, Major Cuyler, and a Mr. Stockenstrom, the Landdrost of Graaf-Reinet; Slambie and Congo were the Kafir chiefs. The Europeans tried to persuade them to retire beyond the Fish River, but Slambie said, "This country is mine; I won it in war, and I will maintain it. Here is no honey; I will eat honey, and to procure it shall cross the rivers Sunday and Zwartkop."

Shortly after this Mr. Stockenstrom was crossing the Zuurberg range, and met a number of Kafirs at an historic place called Doorn Nek. He believed them to be friendly, and did all he could to persuade them to cross the Fish River. In the midst of the interview news came that blood had been shed, and an attack was instantly made upon Mr. Stockenstrom and his party. The old Landdrost and eight of his comrades were slain. This is one of the first most notable instances of frontier fights. The spot itself where the Europeans fell is a wild and picturesque one. It is situated high up on the Zuurberg range, and commands an extensive view of the surrounding country. Below and towards the south are the densely wooded sides of the mountains, from which it seems miraculous that a foe like the Kafir could ever have been expelled. All around are bare and bleak krantzies, with faces scarred and seamed by the action of the storms. Vegetation grows dense and strong on the slopes facing the interior, but the word for the scene is desolation. Only here and there, in the distant valleys and kloofs, is the eye relieved by the welcome sight of a homestead. The road, constructed by an engineer named Woodfield, winds in and out of the gorges, and was the chief highway before the railroad from Port Elizabeth to the interior.

There should be some memorial to mark the spot where these men fell, as they were some of the first who with their blood have helped to roll back the Kafir tribes. Throughout the colony there are many such spots, and it has often occurred to the traveller there what an interesting "Itinerary" might be composed by one who had taken part in the perils of the frontier wars. There are a few pioneers still surviving who could give the remote kloof a story of stirring adventure, and to many a lonely donga a tragedy. One word about the Kafirs and their land. At first sight it seems hard upon Congo and Slambie that they should be ordered to remove their kraals and trek across the Fish River. Slambie, however, when he shouted "What I have won I will keep," introduces the principle of right resting with might, and found that it recoiled upon his own head. The fact is that the Kafirs are not the aborigines of the southernmost part of the African continent. They were a conquering, roving, marauding race, only recently arrived from the interior. The Bushmen and Hottentots had a far stronger claim to the land than they ever had. This historical fact must be borne in mind whenever the cruelty of subjugating Kafir races is enlarged upon.

It is, however, a most important point in the history of the colony when the Kafir races are first touched. This contact introduces a new element and a new phase of colonisation. With this epoch the settlers of Albany, in 1820, are most intimately connected, as no such immigration had ever taken place previously. The French and other Protestants around Stellenbosch and the Drakenstein had done a great deal with their vines and flocks, but they were few in number compared with the gallant four thousand who landed through the surf in Algoa Bay in 1820.

The history of the Cape shifts now to the Fish River and to the Eastern Province. Around Bathurst and Grahamstown the work of colonisation is centred, and eastward the course of empire takes its way. With the really hard work of colonisation the burghers living in the west, more than 500 miles distant, had little to do. The 1820 settlers, as they were termed, came out under peculiar conditions. The general policy of bringing them out had been recommended by Colonel Collins in 1809, who saw that the best guarantee for the peace of the colony lay in filling up the frontier districts with sturdy British immigrants. This policy was adopted after some delay, and in the year 1819 the English Government voted a sum of £50,000 in aid of immigration to



the frontier. So great was the desire of Englishmen to cast their lot in this part of the world, in spite of its wars and dangers, that no fewer than 90,000 men applied. Out of these, 4,000 were chosen and despatched in twenty-three ships, the first to arrive being the *Chapman* and the *Nautilus*. There has seldom been such an exodus from England, and if there are found any to doubt the wisdom of State-aided emigration they should travel to Algoa Bay and the Eastern Province of the Cape, and see what has been done by these men and their descendants. A few of the original settlers are still alive, and there could be no chapter of colonisation more interesting than that which one of these patriarch pioneers could tell. The area occupied at first extended over 3,000 square miles, but the descendants of the settlers have long since spread far beyond this narrow limit. Being English by extraction and English in their sympathies, these settlers form the most loyal and important part of her Majesty's subjects in the Cape Colony, and their presence alone would contradict the ignorant assertion that English people have no right to intrude English ideas and English manners and customs upon a Dutch colony. Such absolutely untrue historical impressions as this have found ready acceptance with those

who have wished England to retire from every well-earned vantage ground and colony she possesses.

The prosperity of the Eastern Province is, moreover, a standing proof of the wisdom of State-aided emigration. The settlers themselves have become wealthy even beyond their expectations—so hard were the first conditions under which they commenced their colonial life—and from a commercial point of view have always been exceedingly good customers of the old country. The sheep farmers of Albany and Somerset have exported raw material in shape of wool, mohair, &c., to English manufacturers, and have at the same time imported manufactured goods. A Cape Colonist is—and, in fact, every English colonist is, without exception—a far better customer of England than a Frenchman or a German. Statistics show this fact most conclusively, and we are forced to this conclusion that never was the sum of £50,000 more judiciously laid out than it was by the English Government in 1820. The English Government has within the space of sixty years received back this paltry sum a hundredfold, as a plain and simple result of the expansion of the colony.

But the first days of these 1820 settlers were hard and evil. There was an ever-present foe

to deal with along the east and north-east in the shape of the Kafir clans. Notwithstanding all its drawbacks, the wealth of the Eastern Province within fifty years of the landing of the settlers has been estimated at £20,831,606. This calculation is taken from Mr. Wilmot's book describing the landing of the 1820 settlers, and is based on the census returns. Fixed property was valued at over eight millions, stock at over eleven, and produce over one million. Here is a tangible fact in colonial history, and any schemes which provide for State-aided emigration should rest upon accredited results. The struggles and trials of the early settlers form a complete chapter in themselves. The task of building up their society was as difficult as that of the Israelites of old, who had to restore their temple with a spade in one hand and a sword in the other. The North American Indians in the Western Continent, or the Maories in the Australian settlements, were never such serious foes as the Kafir clans. The latter have constantly proved, in kloof and donga, their inherent valour and tenacity. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, in his "Excursions in Southern Africa," vol. ii. p. 268, says that the Kafirs were game to the backbone, never crying out, however badly wounded, or even demanding quarter, but merely pronouncing the name of their chief "ere

they gave up the ghost. Some cut their own throats with the assegais rather than be slain by the Fingoes, the black allies of the Europeans." The losses, however, which accrued to the white settlers may be gathered from one or two quotations. One of them is from the *Government Gazette* of January 22nd, 1835, where Sir Benjamin D'Urban writes:—

"Already are seven thousand persons dependent upon the Government for the necessaries of life. The land is filled with the lamentations of the widows and fatherless. The indelible impressions already made upon myself by the horrors of an irruption of savages upon a scattered population, almost exclusively engaged in the peaceful occupation of husbandry, are such as to make me look on those I have witnessed in a service of thirty years, ten of them in the most eventful period of wars, as trifles to those I have now witnessed; and compel me to bring under consideration, as forcibly as I am able, the heart-rending position in which a very large portion of the inhabitants of the frontier are at present placed, as well as their intense anxiety respecting their future condition."

In the first years of their distress, the colonists had absolutely raised a subscription for the purpose of gaining information about Brazil and

the Australian colonies with a view of migrating thither. A more detailed description of their woes is found in a public address of the colonists to the Colonial Secretary, in which it is stated that 3,227 persons had been reduced to destitution, 239 farm-houses destroyed by fire, 262 pillaged of all their furniture and property, 30,140 head of cattle, 964 horses, and 55,554 sheep and goats stolen, &c. It can scarcely be wondered that out of these border feuds has arisen a bitter class hatred which has lasted so long. The dangers have not been lived down yet by any means, for native complications seem to arise in South Africa with the regularity of recurring decimals. Philanthropists at home, who know little of the traditions of a frontier home, its struggles and privations, its constant annoyances, are surprised at the callousness and indifference with which their doctrines of the equality of all men are received. There is no intention to question the genuineness of their feeling and the sincerity of their motives, but they should remember that frontiersmen, like other men, are at the mercy of their surroundings and the impressions they bequeath. The good that philanthropists at home have done is to curb that feeling of "wild justice" which springs up unrestrained in a settler's heart and

makes him long for cruel reprisals; the evil it has done has been in its connection with politics and political parties. The fountains of pure charity have been fouled by turbid and random currents of party feeling.

However, the first settlers of Albany lived long before the phrase of a "Kafir policy" meant what it did in the days of a responsible government. They were simple, brave, and enterprising men, sent out from England to act as a buffer between the other colonists and the savages. The policy of the Imperial government had been to set up a strict line between black and white. This proving impossible, the idea of soldier emigrants occurred to Colonel Collins and others, and was acted upon. Mr. Wilmot has been the picturesque chronicler of the doings of the early settlers from the day they had to battle with the surf on the shores of Algoa Bay. They have fought, worked, and conquered as few men could. They have left behind them peaceful homesteads and flourishing towns, in a land where peace and prosperity could only have been attained by the trying ordeals of patience and privation. These men have been fortunate not only in possessing a chronicler but a bard. One of the most remarkable and sturdy men of this (1820) expedition

was the poet Pringle, who has written of the romance of the veldt and depicted African life. He was a stout-hearted man, and had to face the wrath and anger of Lord Charles Somerset, one of the most autocratic governors at the Cape in autocratic days, for upholding the liberty of the press. Mr. Pringle was a poet of no mean capacity, and attracted the attention of our English Lake poets by his vivid description of wild nature in the veldt.

To realise the first picture of our settlers' history it is necessary to carry ourselves back to the month of April, 1820. There are many stages in every enterprise: there is the halting beginning, the doubt and uncertainty, then the development, lastly the consummation. It is interesting to trace the first attempts and struggles of a rising community. There is the infantile beginning, the effort, as it were, to walk in new ways and under new circumstances; presently there is the assurance and audacity of growing strength, sometimes grief, losses, vicissitudes, with alternations of hope and despair; at last a rest and a confident ease. A potentiality has become an actuality, the scarce-breathed aspiration a reality, the infant Hercules a strong man armed with club and lion's skin ready for all the toils impressed by a severe task-master, and rely-

ing upon the spirit and nurture of a well-trying youth. The interpreters of myths have seen in the wanderings of Hercules nothing but a history of an enterprising race, with its toils, privations, triumphs, illustrated in the attractive form of personal adventure. Could such a record be handed down in this guise of the explorations and triumphs of the Anglo-Saxon race, the modern Hercules might be found to have reached, or even surpassed, the fame of the ancient.

The first two vessels that came to Algoa Bay with settlers were the *Chapman* and the *Nautilus*. They had left Gravesend on the 3rd of December, 1819, and they dropped anchor in the Bay on the 9th of April, 1820. The voyage had been a long and perilous one, over nearly 7,000 miles of sea, from the region of temperate zone past the equator to the sub-tropical region, from 51° north to 34° south. Now the voyage is done in twenty days, and so it may be seen how much real hardship emigrants had to undergo. For days the sailing ship might be tossed about in the Bay of Biscay, for days they might lie sweltering in the calms of the tropics, or be driven off their course far to the south when in the stormy latitude of the Cape itself. The arrow flight of the mighty steamers men travel in now was un-



known and inconceivable. However, all the vicissitudes of a long sea voyage had been safely passed, and the emigrants from the old country had seen with safety that new land they had heard and dreamed of. First the tall summit of Table Mountain came in view over the trackless waters; face to face they saw this mighty sentinel of the southern seas, which for more than 3,000 feet rises up from the ocean, famed for its storms and winds as much as the fabled isle of *Æolus*. Thence past *Agulhas*, with its deep and shifty banks, where is the meeting-place of those two mighty currents, and where, too, many a sailor has found a grave; past the sloping shores and forest country of the *Zitzikama*, where the curves of wooded valleys sink down into deep and solemn kloofs, and over which there rests the charm of perpetual verdure. From the sea the land seems strange and beautiful. Travellers can wander through this lonely district by *Plettenburg Bay*, left untenanted and untilled along the coast, and wonder why the settler has passed it over. The *Kafir* and the *Bushmen* have gone, but the elephant and buffalo still remain nearly the sole occupants of the forest domain.

But the pastoral districts to the north and east were better for the settler than the picturesque

forest between the "Long kloof" and the sea, for though the country was green the herbage was sour, and so the settlers went onwards, past Cape St. Francis, to Algoa Bay, where Bartolomeo Diaz had anchored first in 1486. Here was the island of St. Croix, with its symbol of the Cross, facing the open roadstead. The ancient explorers took their religion with them when they sailed about the world. The island of Ascension was so called because it was discovered on Holy Thursday, and Natal was so named because it was reached *die natali* of our Lord. Although Algoa Bay had been discovered so many years ago—the date of 1486 takes us back to the reign of Henry VII.—little use had been made of the discovery; and, in truth, the bay itself is not a very beautiful place to look at. It would have been far more attractive had it possessed such picturesque surroundings as those of the Knysna Harbour, farther west. Efforts have been made to build a pier, but they have failed, and Algoa Bay is still an open roadstead. When the steamer drops anchor there now, and swings and strains upon her cables, especially if a south-east is blowing, there is a feeling to the traveller of only half security. The foam from the breakers dashes continually upon the island of St. Croix, the billows themselves rush past the creaking

ships shorewards, and fall with dull roar and with jets of spray upon the white sandy strand within. Here and there bare, broken ribs of vessels, half imbedded in the sand, show that sometimes the anchor drags and that ships will part company with their cables. To the first settlers the unoccupied shores of Algoa Bay must have seemed very dreary and uninviting. Of the shores of False Bay—a far less desolate place—one of the settlers, a Scotchman, whose words have been preserved by the poet Pringle, observed, “Hech, sir, but this is an ill-favoured and outlandish-looking country. I wad fain hope that these highland hills and muirs are no a fair sample o’ our African location.”

The landing was a dangerous one, and was made by means of surf-boats, and all those who have landed in an African bay in a surf-boat will appreciate what this operation means. But there was one circumstance which gladdened the hearts of the new arrivals. Many of them were Scotch by nationality, and on the shore they could see an old fort, and the tents and houses of a division of the 72nd Regiment. Of course the Highland soldiers came down to meet the colonists and help them; and Pringle says in his narrative, “Approaching the Highland soldiers, I spoke to them in broad Scotch, and entreated

them to be careful of their countryfolk. 'Scotch folk, are they?' said a weatherbeaten corporal with a strong northern brogue. 'Never fear, sir, but we sal be careful o' *them*.' And dashing through the water as he spoke he and his comrades hauled the boats rapidly, yet cautiously, through the breakers; and then surrounding the party and shaking them cordially by the hands, they carried them, old and young, ashore on their shoulders, without allowing one of them to wet the sole of his shoe in the spray."

There is something affecting in this incident. One touch of Highland nature made the whole little world there kin; and should an artist arise amongst the descendants of the old settlers, there is no more fitting subject for his canvas than this, when we take into consideration the wild scene, the circumstances, the point of history, the touch of Highland nature. Within two months of their arrival the settlers were visited by the acting Governor, Sir Rufane Shaw Donkin, and were able to be present at the laying of a foundation-stone of the first house of the new town, called "Port Elizabeth," after Lady Elizabeth Donkin, of whom the record on the Pyramid, erected on the hill in her honour, says that she was "one of the most perfect of women, who gave her name to the town below." But the first excitement

and the first ceremonies over, the hardy immigrants had to part company. Henceforth they were divided into parties with leaders, and were told to mount the hills beyond, strike across the Zuurberg kloofs, and seek their allotted homesteads and locations. The history of these pioneer parties deserves a separate notice. They have left a monument behind them in a flourishing and active seaport town. Port Elizabeth has earned the name of the Liverpool of South Africa.

#### IV.

### THE NATIVE RACES.

#### THE BUSHMEN AND HOTTENTOTS.

THE first South African natives with whom Europeans came into contact were Hottentots and Bushmen. These were the true aborigines of the country, and it must be recollected that they are totally distinct, ethnically speaking, from the Kafir races of the eastern frontier. In stature they are diminutive, and to the first explorers they seemed scarcely like human beings, and to the linguist the curious clicks in which their language abounded recalled the description given by Herodotus of the Troglo-dytæ, who gibbered like bats. The question has been raised whether the Hottentots were Egyptian or Phœnician, Jewish or Moabitic.

An examination of the forms of language points to a Coptic origin, and Mr. Adamson has stated, "That the signs of gender were almost identical in the Namaqua and the Egyptian

languages, and that the feminine suffix might be regarded as being the same in all of them, viz., Namaqua, Galla, old Egyptian." Dr. Bleek remarks, in his introduction to "Hottentot Fables and Tales," that the Hottentots were probably driven from a more northern home, and that their presence in the extreme southern corner of Africa may be accounted for by the pressure brought to bear upon them by more powerful races.

At the present moment there are but few of the original Bushmen left. These are to be found principally to the north-west of the Cape Colony, and along the outskirts of the great Kalihari desert, where they live, according to the ancient tradition of their race, the nomad life of hunters. Their skill in spooring, or following up the track of animals, their knowledge of herbs, their quaint drawings and grotesque fables, their cave life, language, and customs, have excited the curiosity of savans and travellers rather than the serious attention of politicians. Moreover, the pure type, such as the first settlers found, has been almost completely adulterated by admixture with other races, and the time is not far distant when the Bushmen of South Africa will become an extinct species. When Europeans landed in Table Bay these aborigines became

subjected to pressure from both sides, from the marauding Kafirs on the east and the settlers on the west. They became the serfs of both, and their clan and tribal system being broken up, they amalgamated with their conquerors.

Ethnologists and linguists have regretted this speedy absorption and extinction before philosophic purposes could be served. Dr. Bleek came to the conclusion "that all those sex-denoting languages which were known to us in Africa, Asia, and Europe, are members of one large family, of which the primitive type has in most respects been best preserved to us in the Hottentot language." Professor Max Müller adds his testimony to that of Dr. Bleek, whom he terms "a most learned and ingenious scholar," accepting the statement that the Hottentot is a branch of the North African class of languages, and that it was separated from its relatives by the intrusion of the second great division, the Kafir, or, as Appleyard calls them, "alliteral languages." As a curious coincidence it is recorded that when Dr. Moffat gave specimens of the Namaqua Bush language to a Syrian who came from Egypt, he was told by him that he had seen slaves in the market-place of Cairo of a lighter colour than the other natives, and speaking a language resembling that of the Namaqua race. In these



days of exploration, when European and British influences are extending to Khartoum and Abyssinia on the north, and along the Congo in Equatorial Africa, more light may be thrown, in course of time, upon ethnological questions.

With regard to the origin of the word "Hottentot," Dr. Th. Hähn, in an article contributed to the *Nineteenth Century*, says that it was given to the natives by the original Dutch settlers on account of the curious clicks and harsh sounds in their language, and that the term signifies, to describe it by a periphrasis, "one who stutters or stammers." These so-called "Hottentots," however, call themselves by a much grander name, "Khoi Khoi," that is, Men of men, and they are very careful to draw a line between themselves and the Bushmen, whom they term "Sän," and reckon lower than the dogs. Nevertheless Dr. Hähn is convinced that the Khoi Khoi and the Sän were originally one race and spoke originally one language, but while the former led a pastoral life the latter always remained as nomads of the desert. The custom of bestowing a very derogatory title upon a kindred but slightly inferior race is illustrated by the Kafirs, who term as "Fingoes," or dogs, a neighbouring clan ethnically the same as themselves.

Consulted as to their own records, the Bush-

men have very little to say. Fragmentary evidence of their history and beliefs meet us in the few Bushmen tales and in the folk lore which have been diligently collected and examined. The distinction between the Hottentot and Bushman is shown in the following fable, translated from a German original in the Grey Library at Cape Town, and so it may be concluded that the Bushmen themselves acknowledged to the fact of an ethnical variation.

“In the beginning there were two. One was blind, the other was always hunting. This hunter found at last a hole in the earth, from which game proceeded, and killed the young. The blind man, feeling and smelling them, said, ‘They are not game but cattle.’ The blind man afterwards recovered his sight, and going with the hunter to this hole saw that they were cows with their calves. He then quickly built a kraal (fence made of thorns) round them, and anointed himself, just as Hottentots are still wont to do.

“When the other, who now with great trouble had to seek his game, came and saw this, he wanted to anoint himself also.

“‘Look here,’ said the other, ‘you must throw the ointment into the fire, and afterwards use it.’ He followed this advice and the flame, flaring up into his face, burnt him most miserably, so that

he was glad enough to make his escape. The other, however, called to him : ‘ Here, take the kirri (a knobstick) and run to the hills and hunt there for honey.’ ” It is inferred from this quaint story that the hunter was the Bushman and that the Hottentot was the more civilised man, who lived by fencing in cattle inside the kraals.

With regard to the question of the true *γῆγενεῖς*, or sons of the soil, the Bushmen say that an older race than themselves inhabited the south of Africa, and a hint is supposed to be given of this in the Bushman fable accounting for the presence of the sun in the heavens. With these Bushmen “Phœbus Apollo” was originally a man from whose armpits brightness came. He lived formerly on the earth, but he only gave light round his own house ; but some men, children of the first Bushmen, who lived before the “Flat” Bushmen, were sent to throw the sleeping sun up into the sky. Since then he shines over the whole world.

From such scanty material and quaint stories it is impossible to reconstruct even the outlines of history. With regard to their worship, it is ascertained that the most prominent of their mythological figures is the “Mantis,” or praying insect, around which a large number of fables have clustered. Yet it does not seem that the

Mantis is the object of true worship, or that prayers are addressed to him. The heavenly bodies, the sun, moon, and stars, are subjects of adoration, and thus the Bushmen must clearly be reckoned amongst those nations who have attained to a sidereal worship. They paid particular attention to "Canopus," the well-known Bushman "rice-star." Moreover, their star worship was curiously mixed up with animal worship. "Aldebaran" was personified as the male, "Alpha Leonis" as the female, hartebeest. "Procyon," was the male eland, "Castor and Pollux" the eland's wives. The "steinbok" represented the "Clouds of Magellan," the male tortoise on a stick "Orion's belt." Enough, therefore, has been revealed to us to show that the Bushmen personified the stars, that they worshipped them as either men or animals living in a kind of sidereal apotheosis, and that in a certain sense they possessed an imaginative religion of a rudimentary description.

With regard to the specific differences now existing between the Bushmen and the Hottentots there is little to be said from one point of view, for the simple reason that one type has virtually disappeared without receiving any sort of modification of thought and life from the European settlers. The Hottentots numbered about

ninety-eight thousand, according to the last census of 1875. Of the Bushmen proper, living as the ancient cave men in Europe, and preserving their distinctive life, there were only a few hundreds. Having a wider range, originally, than their conquerors, they have been driven back, little by little, till they have sought the friendly protection of the wilderness in remote corners and lonely kloofs. According to the evidence of Dr. Moffat, there has never been an instance of a civilised Bushman. Of the Hottentots, a certain percentage can read and write, and they have served the white man as labourer, artisan, and even soldier. On some occasions in Cape history the Hottentot levies have formed a useful corps. The Hottentot has survived, because in the first place his pastoral life was a better one than that of the Bushman, who lived simply by hunting, and because he has surrendered himself to new conditions of life. Both of them endured, in early days, the bitterest persecution from the frontier farmer, whose conduct in this respect was often inexcusable. The usual course of proceeding is described by Mr. Theal. "Complaints were lodged with the land-drost or magistrate of a district that cattle had been stolen by Hottentots or Bushmen; this official reported the matter to Government, and requested a supply of

powder and lead, which was usually granted ; the farmers of the district were then called together and proceeded to attack the nearest kraals. No mercy was shown to adults, but the children were spared to be parcelled out as servants among the members of the commando. Many of the reports made by the commanders of these expeditions to their land-drosts have been published from time to time, so that it is not alone from the statements of travellers that we are made aware of their proceedings. They themselves made no attempt to conceal or gloss over what had been done, for most of them readily believed that they were doing God's service by extirpating the heathen (as they termed them) root and branch." These statements apply to the last century, and it must not be concluded that this picture is a true one of frontier life at the present time. Much has been done in the Cape Colony itself, by education and enlightened legislation, to improve the state of the aborigines. There is one law for black and white in this "the old colony" of the Cape, and the investigation of the "Koegas" atrocities, a well-known case, proves that philanthropists and their agents are lynx-eyed ; but what are Englishmen, or for the matter of that colonists, to think when they cast their eyes, now in 1884, farther north to

Bechuanaland and read of the atrocities practised by white marauders on the Transvaal borders? The spirit of cruelty is still rampant, since well-authenticated instances reach us of parties of natives being shot down in cold blood. It will be a lasting disgrace to the young South African Republic that it allowed recruiting for border raids to go on in the streets of Pretoria. Men of all descriptions, whether at home or in the colonies, whether English or Dutch, must see in the Bechuanaland raids a recrudescence of that savage and unjust feeling of the last century, against which the voice of philanthropists has been so often raised. South Africa for the South Africans is an impossible cry when their heritage is abused.

The distinction really to be aimed at and insisted upon in this country is not an artificial one between Africanders and Englishmen, but between educated men and uneducated men. It is incumbent on all colonists to recognise the fact, that the strongest bond of union throughout South Africa is that gained by respect for social order, love of humanity, and an intelligent perception of the duties of the white man towards the black. Let law reign, but not the law of marauders.

However, the Bushmen are gone, and they

afford the instance of an aboriginal race that lived without a record, and died without a sigh from men. Their crafty pitfalls, rude drawings of birds and animals, wonderfully preserved upon the walls of ancestral caves, meet the eye of the traveller in South Africa, as he wends his way through such inextricable forests as that of the Zitzikama—that strange and comparatively unexplored belt of country by the south coast—or climbs among the krantzes of the inland mountains. His eye may vainly endeavour to trace in the wide circles and squares some design, some obscure meaning expressed in these hieroglyphic characters on the rock.

Both the traveller and the settler should grieve with intelligent regret over the extinction of a clan or race before it has given up what secrets it may have to impart to philologists, or has subjected itself to the influences of a better civilisation. The stern law of evolution that bids the lower types disappear even before its own beneficent working can be applied to them, seems hard and cruel at times. Professor Sayce has said that their inarticulate jargon, their clicks and uncouth sounds, lead us back to the very commencement of speech, and serve to assist us in bridging over the gulf which separates the inarticulate cry of the infant or the animal from the



articulate utterances of the man: But the very quaintness and grotesquerie of the Bushmen, in proportion as they are interesting to the scientific man, so have they been repugnant and inexplicable to the "voertrekkers" of South Africa. They have seemed to them not worth preserving, and the most active men in the difficult work of ethnological research have been, besides our own men, Bishop Callaway, Moffat, and others, the members of the German Rhenish Missionary Society in Damaraland and Namaqualand; and, if an additional claim for annexing Angra Pequena were needed by Prince Bismarck, it might be found in the intelligent efforts of German missionaries to understand the customs and language of the natives among whom their lot has been cast.

## V.

### THE NATIVE RACES. (*Continued.*)

#### THE KAFIRS.

IN the south-east of Africa a race of men very different from the Bushmen and Hottentots live and thrive. These are the Kafirs, an important branch of the great Bantu division, which has ramified through large areas of the south-east of Africa up to the equator. The Zulus constituted the noblest of those savages the English have encountered on the borders of Natal and the Cape Colony; and how bravely they fought against the resources of civilisation, the fields of Isandlwana and Ulundi can testify. To the casual reader of South African history the tribal distinctions of the Kafirs have always been most puzzling. He hears and reads of Gaikas, Gcalekas, 'Slambies, Tambookies, Basutos, Pondos, Zulus, &c., until the very nomenclature has disgusted and repelled him from further inquiry. For brevity sake, it may be remarked that there

have been two, and only two, remarkable centres of Kafir power. Both these centres have threatened the existence of the South African colonies from the east. Kreli and Sandili, at the head of the Gaikas and Gcalekas, in recent times represented those hostile clans whom the English have met and vanquished in many weary wars since 1806. The Zulus, under Cetywayo, were a "standing menace" to Natal in recent times. Farther north, the Basutos constitute a separate nation, and provide our colonists with exceptional difficulties. It was the policy of the late Sir Bartle Frere to break up these two great Kafir organizations, of one of which Kreli was the head, and King Cetywayo the despotic controller of the other. This he succeeded in doing; and there is no native chief now, unless it is Umquikela, in Pondoland, who can boast of an organized clan-system culminating in himself. Puppet kings of Zululand can be set up and dethroned at pleasure by the Boers or any other adventurers, the unity of that "man-slaying machine" having once been destroyed. To particularise the present points of contact—there are three where the Imperial Government are brought into contact with this great Bantu race: in Zululand, where English troops encamp at Etshowe and guard the Reserve; in Basutoland, where Colonel Clarke is endeavour-

ing to maintain, comparatively unaided, Imperial influence ; and in Bechuanaland, where Sir Charles Warren has gone as their champion and protector. In each instance the Imperial Government seem to be throwing the shield of protection over Zulus, Basutos, and Bechuanas.

But, generally speaking, the native policy of England in South Africa is now *an arrested policy*. Previous responsibilities are ignored, and Lord Derby's decided answer, given over and over again, to the effect that Zululand would never form a part of her Majesty's dominions, is an obstacle to further development. But England's position cannot be limited by the Kei or Tugela, or even the Vaal or Limpopo rivers in South Africa. And the Kafir races must still continue to interest the English public for a long time, and from many points of view, unless the Imperial decision is to abandon South Africa altogether. Excepting India and Ceylon, there are more natives under British rule in this country than anywhere else. It is calculated that in Natal itself there are nearly half a million, and in the Cape Colony and the border territories under Imperial and colonial control more than a million. According to a late calculation of the Cape population, the proportion of natives to Europeans is nearly three to one, there being

only 340,000 of the latter out of a total of 1,240,000. In Natal the natives outnumber the settlers by more than twelve to one. In the Orange Free State the number of settlers and natives is more evenly distributed, the European population being 62,000, native 74,000. But in the Transvaal there is a large and growing preponderance of Bechuanas, Swazies, and other branches of the teeming Bantu race; here there are 800,000 natives, and only 60,000 Europeans. The Dutch republics practically assert that complete assimilation is impossible, the Kafir being reckoned as the equal of the Boer population neither in Church nor State. The English system, as carried out in the Cape, Natal, and their borders, admits of the possibility of assimilation by graduating forms of government. Wherever there is a reserve territory or a partially independent country governed by head men, chiefs, and white magistrates combined, there is to be witnessed the workings of a transition stage. Complete assimilation in the end seems to be the goal. Meantime a provisional state of government, with the incidental and civilising influences of traders and missionaries, is in vogue. In the great reserves of Natal the Kafir lives almost entirely *more suo*, and under the acknowledged sway of his chief. He is allowed to revel in his

“utywala,” or orgies, in his barbaric rites and polygamous customs; and the only check to his freedom is the tribute to Cæsar in the shape of a hut tax. Still his clan system, with its recognised head, the chief paramount, is put on one side, and his real independence is gone. Such savage rites as he loves are endured rather than sanctioned by the supreme authority. It is left to time to show to the native himself that polygamy is inexpedient and evil.

In Basutoland is another picture, and it is one of a Kafir race that has fought its way back to the semblance of a tribal existence. Rescued in the first instance by the power of Sir Philip Wodehouse from annihilation at the hands of the Boers, they were placed first under direct Imperial control, then transferred to the jurisdiction of the colonists. When they resisted successfully the enforcement of the “Disarmament Act” of the Cape Colony they were taken a second time under the wing of the Imperial Government.

There are many chiefs in Basutoland, and although the tribal system has received a shock, still it is maintained under such acknowledged chieftains as Masupha, Lerothodi, and others. At present the administrator of this country is Colonel Clarke. The government of this territory is distinguished for the remarkable institution of the

"Pitso," or representative council of the Basutos, where public matters are discussed with the greatest gravity and debates enlivened by a considerable display of rhetoric and logic. It is unfortunate that a mutinous spirit was ever aroused in the breasts of these Basutos, as they were a prosperous community and well advanced in the arts of civilisation. They paid for their own government and were most profitable purchasers of manufactured goods. The story of the "Disarmament Act" is a long and complicated one, but, matters having once come to a duel between black and white, it is to be regretted that party divisions and party misrepresentations, combined with other causes, prevented their formal acquiescence in the requirements of European law.

What will be the ultimate aspect of the native difficulty, and what the last phase which the process of fusion will take, it is hazardous to conjecture. The native clans under British protection soon overflow the narrow boundaries of the "Reserve" territories. The fecundity of the Bantu race, which was checked and corrected by a process of internecine warfare in former times, will provide the social legislator with some vexing problems. At some no distant time overpopulation may be the evil of South Africa.

Moreover, the process of absorption of the native into the community is not an easy one. Bishop Colenso's ideal Zulu is as exceptional as the "*Flos regum Arturus*" was amongst the common swashbucklers of his age. The triumphs of Bishopstowe and of Lovedale are, comparatively speaking, but small ones. "*Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret,*" is a truth which is often illustrated in the history of Kafir education. The traditions of the old free life, the sense of an unlimited possession of the open veldt, the clinging attachment to the clan organization, nay, even the extravagances of the kraal existence, form part of the natural inheritance which belongs to every Kafir. There is a tendency amongst these barbarians to return to a barbarous life, even if recalled for just an interval.

A story often comes from the mission-house, how a promising pupil has gone back to his hut and red blanket, donned the "*kaross*" and celebrated the "*utywala*." At the breaking out of a border war it is hard to say which Kafirs will prove themselves loyal.

One of the most quaint and suggestive commentaries upon the effects of native training was found in the diary of an educated native named Nathanael Umhala, who turned rebel in the late



Gaika-Gcaleka war. His entries consisted of a record of facts interspersed largely with devout wishes and ejaculations, in which he appealed to the God of the Christians to save his clan from their unnatural enemies, the English.

Among the more highly educated Kafirs such men are met with as Tiyo Soga, the well-known native missionary, who received an education in Scotland, and married a Scotch lady. At Lovedale Kafir artisans, at Bishopstowe Kafir typesetters and bookbinders, and at Grahamstown a Kafir choir, can be brought forward as standing proofs and examples of what the Kafir is capable of in the mechanical crafts, and in the æsthetic domain of musical art. Here and there, too, a Kafir policeman of exemplary character can be found attached to a Civil Commissioner's office, understanding his duty and loyal to the new *régime*. Often he is a polyglottous individual, and therefore very useful, being acquainted with English and Cape Dutch, besides his Kafir dialect. The duties of policemen are keenly appreciated by the Natal Kafir, who can be seen in the streets of Durban or Pietermaritzburg jauntily waving his symbol of office, in this instance the national knob-kirri or staff, and ready to enforce at a moment's notice the behests of the law under which he has enrolled himself. He is inordinately proud of his

office, and makes a great parade of his "brief authority." He is generally the coadjutor of a white policeman, and in this capacity most invaluable. Kafir missionaries and Kafir schoolmasters are abroad and doing some work, although it must be confessed that the delegation of pedagogic powers to coloured men over coloured men seems premature, judging from the results obtained by the "kraal" school system at the Cape. Natal has been called the land of "samples," that is to say, a number of articles of commerce can be raised from the soil and brought to a state of great excellence, but at this point individual enterprise exhausts itself. Colonists are content to exhibit to the world specimen growths, not cargoes in bulk. In the same way there is a danger in the educational world of colonists—and, be it added, Englishmen as well—contenting themselves with the exhibition of specimen Kafirs educated beyond the ordinary limit. Educational reforms should soar beyond the ambition of producing exceptional cases; they should aim at producing a more widely diffused standard of excellence, lower it may be and less attractive to the ear of the enthusiast, but more adapted to the circumstances of the case. It is more useful to the colony that ten Kafirs should be sent from an educational centre

as wheelwrights and carpenters, than that there should be one swarthy critic of "Macaulay's Essays."

The Kafirs in their savage state have no religion worth the name. No temples, no rites, no ceremonies, no creed, give a colour and consistency to their spiritual life. They have scarcely any strong belief in the existence of a higher power. To the spirits of their forefathers they seem to assign a greater activity than to any conceived Creator of the Universe. The very word Kafir means "unbeliever," and is the title given to the race by the Mohammedans. The tendency of their migration has been from north to south, as the movement of the Matabele in 1820 under Silikasi, one of Chaka's generals, and the conquering progress of the Zulu Chaka himself prove.

A fanciful theory, which may be given for what it is worth, connects the Kafirs by origin with the Semitic races, and especially the Jews. It is maintained as probable that a mixture of the Jewish and South African aborigines took place at a time when the gold-fields of Ophir—identified to suit this theory with the present gold-fields of Transvaal and Swasieland—were worked by King Solomon's miners. These men would come by sea, and form a separate and permanent

community, owing to the nature of their occupation. What, therefore, more probable, in the eyes of the supporters of this theory, than the amalgamation between the invaders and the aborigines? There is just this much of fact to give colour to the theory, viz. the fact of physical resemblance. A traveller in Kafirland and Zululand is often struck with a native face which recalls the Hebrew or Semitic type. Such resemblances of feature and profile cannot be accidental; they are the result of a well-known process in nature by which an original type is constantly reproduced after long intervals. Moreover, the custom and rite of circumcision, particular regulations with regard to cleansing and purification, may impart a probability to the theory of an intimate connection between Jews and Kafirs in distant ages. At any rate, if the story of King Solomon's miners be not accepted, a connection with the Semitic race may have been formed through the Arabs, who for centuries have been found on the eastern littoral of Africa.

But it must be confessed that, as far as religion and the substance of religious belief are concerned, the Kafirs have very little in common with the Jews. Not even has tradition left them an account of the attributes of the God of Sinai,

or the barest notice of the Mosaic code. From this brief description of their religion, as given by Mr. Theal, it can be gathered that they have a kind of positive belief in a Supreme God, whom they term "Qamata," to whom they sometimes pray, but never offer sacrifices. "In time of great danger a Kafir will exclaim, 'O Qamata, help me!' and when the danger is over he will attribute his deliverance to the same Supreme Being. But of the attributes of Qamata he knows nothing more than that he is high over all, and that though he has helped him, in general he does not interfere with the destinies of men. In fact, he cannot himself explain what he does believe and what he does not. He thinks as little as he can of such matters, though the influence of the unseen world is ever acting upon him. Far nearer than the Qamata or the spirits of his chiefs is a whole host of hobgoblins, water-sprites, and malevolent demons, who meet him, turn which way he will. There is no beautiful fairy-land for him, for all these beings who haunt the mountains, the plains, and the rivers are ministers of evil." It has been the experience of the writer to know Kafirs who were afraid to pass a "drift," or ford of an African river, because they feared the presence of a water-sprite, called by them "Tickloose," whose malignant object was to

drown them. To appease these demons of evil sacrifices are often offered up. The workings of natural religion in the breasts of these savages may be an interesting study. For instance, a "school" Kafir was asked to give a reason for the roundness of the earth. His answer was, "God made the sun round and the moon round, therefore he made the world round."

Perhaps this was an unconscious argument on the part of the reasoner for the uniformity of nature.

But there is little of positive belief to be gathered from the untutored Kafir as he is first met with in his kraal life. He is in many respects a most thorough materialist, thinking nothing of the future, but without fear of death or annihilation. He possesses neither the fierce religious fanaticism of the Malay nor the dreamy speculations of the Buddhist, nor has he the slightest knowledge of or taste for the subtle perplexities of a philosophic religion. Physically a splendid animal, he basks in the rays of his African sun with all the joy and ecstasy of a natural life. Nor has he the faults and mulish viciousness of the half-caste. He loves the freedom of the veldt life, his tribal unity, and the person of his chief. At the bidding of their hereditary rulers the clansmen will hurl them-

selves in hundreds upon impregnable positions and certain death. The charge of the Zulu "impis" at Gingholovo and Ulundi, when, armed for the most part simply with ox-hide shield and assegai, they rushed upon the ranks of disciplined white men only to wither and shrivel up again and again before the fire of rifles and "Gatlings," provides us with an example of splendid and heroic bravery.

The system of witchcraft is one which of all Kafir rites must be emphatically condemned *ab initio* and without any modification. Polygamy and "utywala" may be endured for a while, but not witchcraft. The witch-doctor is a well-known personage at the court of a Kafir chief. In person he is as grotesque a sight as can be imagined. Decorated with tails and hair of different animals, bladders, charms, and endless amulets, he wields a terrible influence through his power of "smelling out" the enemies of his royal patron, and occasionally his own. No man, least of all a rich man, is safe from the intrigues of the witch-doctor, whose counsels are as inscrutable and as arbitrary as those of a "Chamber of Ten." But even his position is a precarious one, for a more powerful wizard may arise and depose the favourite by means of more potent charms. An extraordinary instance of the power of witchcraft in

Kafir history happened during one of the Kafir wars. Umlangeni, a Kafir doctor, made his clansmen believe, during the rising of 1846, that he had the power of turning the English bullets into water, and could give "the faithful" certain sticks which would render them invisible. He appealed to the general Kafir belief in spirits by affirming that he inherited the spirit of the famous prophet Lynx, who lived in 1819. But a still more remarkable instance of the exercise of the witch's power occurred in 1856, when a Kafir prophetess, Nongquase, the niece of Umhlakasa, a councillor of Kreli, ordered, on the strength of her spiritual mission, all the stores of "mealies" and of cattle to be destroyed by a certain day throughout Kafirland, promising that when this was done there would be a resurrection of departed warriors, and the white man would be swept into the sea by the force of their overwhelming numbers recruited from the shadowy realms beneath. So her tribesmen acted upon her advice, slew their cattle and their fatlings, and gathered themselves together in one place to witness the resurrection of all those mighty warriors of old. Like the prophets of Baal, the words of the Kafir priestess fell dead upon the ears of unresponsive powers. From this date the Kafirs, "the unbelievers," have



believed still less in the unseen world. What use, they say, to trust to the nerveless arms of ghosts and the unsympathising hearts of forefathers? It was a case of national suicide through faith. The oxen being killed and the mealies destroyed, the Kafirs ran the risk of being starved to death, and surrendered themselves to the charity of the white man, whom they and the shadowy hosts proposed to drive into the sea. And so the war was brought to a speedy close.

The customs and habits of these brave and superstitious people have been so often and so amply described, that it is hardly necessary to allude to them in detail here. Polygamy is regarded by many as their great social sin, but the custom is so bound up with their life that it is difficult to eradicate it. In the colonial legislatures the question has occasionally been raised whether polygamy could be checked by prohibitive enactments; but the opposition, for instance, which the natives in the large locations in Natal might offer to the enforcement of any Act directed against their ancient and immemorial customs by the Natal colonists, might be even greater than that offered by the Basutos to the Disarmament Act of the Cape Colony. Apparently polygamy must have its way until

time and circumstances provide some corrective. When the conditions of their life become harder than they are now, the Kafir will probably find that one wife will be as much as he can generally buy. Matrimony is almost purely a commercial transaction with these practical savages. Immediately a young Kafir has earned enough, either as a navvy on the railways, or a digger at the diamond fields, or a labourer, it may be, on a farm, wherewith to purchase oxen, his matrimonial prospects are assured. The commercial transaction that ensues is often of a complicated nature. The swarthy lover treats with the father-in-law, and haggles in a most ungallant fashion over the price of his daughter, who, by the way, has little to say herself. The father not unnaturally "puffs" his own daughter; the buyer, in a sententious and diplomatic fashion, states advantages on his side. The bargain is often made on the condition that part of the price should be paid up at once, in the shape, of course, of oxen, and then the rest given at some subsequent date. Such a bargain opens the door for prevarication and delay. Often the union turns out to be an unsatisfactory one, and the husband repudiates the debt still owed on the score of his wife's incompatibility.

The nature of verbal promises, not being like that of Shylock's bond, is productive of inter-

minable law suits in a Kafir court. The eloquence that can be expended on a knotty point of indebtedness for a wife whom a husband has partly paid for and then abjured is absolutely interminable. The mother-in-law is occasionally subpoenaed as a witness to a transaction, and maintains her proverbial character of loquacity. In the temporary courts of justice Chief Dunn set up in his territory across the Tugela, more than half the law suits arose out of the complicated and long-standing debts for wives.

Another point must be alluded to in connection with polygamy. No doubt exists in the minds of every one that the custom degrades the women and lowers their nature. In fact, a Kafir wife is nothing more nor less than the slave of her lord, doing all the hard work for him, as hoeing the mealies, gathering the sticks for the fire, whilst he lolls in luxurious ease. But some missionaries have underrated the immense power of a national custom when they require converts, women and men, to abjure it at once if they wish to be Christians. For a Kafir woman to abjure it is particularly difficult, as she has to give up her clan, her family, her belongings, together with the traditions of her race. The evil itself not being of such a flagrant and harmful sort as "witchcraft," might be dealt with in a

temperate and progressive spirit, rather than peremptorily.

This brief account of Kafir customs cannot be ended without some reference to the system of government built up and brought to such perfection among the Zulus by Panda and Cetywayo. In its character the system was essentially military, and it culminated in the despotism of the king. In the strict discipline of the young from an early age, in the enforced celibacy of the men up to the age of thirty years, in the erection of a military caste, a resemblance may be traced to the Spartan ideal of government, as embodied in the legislation of Lycurgus. Young Zulus were, and are still, taught to suffer hardship, privations, carry heavy burdens, and run enormous distances on foot in a short time. Their commissariat is light when they are on an expedition, and they have proved themselves in warfare the most easily mobilised force in the world. A few mealies, with draughts of water from the streams by the way, are enough for the savages, who, in their natural state, possess great hardihood and wonderful constitutions. And these masses of warriors, the "man-slaying machine," under the rule of such despots as Panda and Cetywayo, were ever ready at a moment's notice to "wash their spears" in an enemy's

blood, or, if need be, die themselves at the word of command. The tendency of the Kafir native is loyalty to a head or chief. At the bottom of his nature there is a strong leaven of hero-worship. He will transfer this worship from a black to a white chief. There have been Europeans who have commanded the devotion and adherence of these savages. Such men could guide them on for weal or woe. If they are chivalrous and generous, they can call forth chivalry and generosity in the breasts of Kafirs. Cannot we supply men who can elicit this hero-worship, or, to put it less poetically, this respect for and devotion to persons and individuals? Abstract principles of government are barren things for a Kafir to worship just yet. The tortuous evolution of colonial government by party is a marvel to him. He wants a person, a great man, a paramount chief to look at and obey. In his transition state cannot we give him the advantages he asks for—the wise and firm administration, instead of empty privileges—intelligible laws rather than too pernicious a liberty—the crust of bread rather than the stone? As a nation the Zulus are capable of much devotion and chivalry. They are not like the “sneaking redskins” of America. Once beaten, they accept the inevitable loyalty and unreservedly.

After the battle of Ulundi, it is a well-known fact that small parties of Europeans, and even single travellers, could move about the country unmolested. The die was cast on that fatal field. Fate decreed against them, and the Zulus as a race submitted. They acknowledged it, and their nature forbade retaliation by surprise, ambuscade, and fraud. Cases of savage cruelty during the prevalence of a border war are frequent; how could they be otherwise? But is the white man merciful? With truth it may be stated that the Kafirs are not as a race vindictive. Strange as it may appear, these barbarians make gentle nurses for white men's children, and in Durban and Pietermaritzburg a Zulu "boy" may often be seen carefully dandling in his arms with the greatest care the children of that race who have broken up his clan and humiliated his chieftain. And the race, themselves hearty, good-tempered, laughing, are like grown-up children themselves. They easily forget a whipping, but are ready for mischief again. To pet and punish them alternately; to show the strong and, be it added, cruel hand, then the weak and vacillating; to treat them at one time as noxious animals who cumber the earth, at another as full-grown men of like passions, thoughts, and training as ourselves; to crush them now with the iron heel of the soldier,

then to caress them with the hand of the philanthropist—is to spoil them and ruin their nature. Chivalrous, faithful, impulsive, the South African Kafir deserves a better fate than the one which seems to await him as the result of conflicting policies.

## VI.

### KAFIR WARS.

ONE Kafir war is so like another that the recapitulation of details in each case becomes wearisome. There are generally three distinct stages in them. The first, when the angry mutterings of war are heard and the native mind is in an unsettled state. Border raids become numerous, thefts of stock are heard of along the frontier, the clans collect their fighting men, send their wives to distant kloofs and "pit" stores of mealies for their war commissariat. Then comes the second stage, when bodies of natives face the European and the flames of open war burn fiercely in veldt and mountain kloof. Rarely have the Kafirs risked all in a general engagement, as the Zulus did in their war. Small predatory parties range the country, intercept supplies, and cut off stragglers. The last stage is reached when the clans, worn out by the superior resources of the white man, stripped of their herds of cattle, and



driven back to some impenetrable fastness, live the life of fugitives and outlaws. The last embers of war may smoulder for a time in such glens as those of the Amatolas and the Waterkloof, but the tribal unity is broken up when a price is put upon the head of the chief, whoever he was, who headed the struggle. Presently an amnesty is granted, the loyals are rewarded, frontier farmers receive lots on the conquered territory, and the rebel clan is cooped up within the limits of a "Reserve." White magistrates step in, a frontier village is laid out, and the barbarians are pushed back farther east. Such, in its main details, has been the nature of Kafir wars. A more minute study of the cost of one will convince the reader that English blood and English treasure have been most lavishly expended in South Africa. Should a foreigner question the prescriptive right of England to rule in this country, he should be referred to the records of our South African wars. Sir W. Molesworth once stated in the debate which took place in the Imperial Parliament on South Africa, in July, 1855, that our military expenditure at the Cape then amounted to between £400,000 and £500,000 a year. Moreover, expenditure for a series of frontier wars during previous years had cost England a million of pounds annually. In addition to all this it

should be recollected that the British Government had voted large sums of money for the purpose of State-aided emigration, by means of which they hoped to secure settlers on the Kafir frontier to serve as a neutral zone. For instance, in 1819, on the motion of Mr. Vansittart, a sum of £90,000 of the public money was voted for the well-known "Albany settlers." Later on, after the Crimean war, 2,300 men of the German Legion were settled at King Williamstown and the neighbourhood, at an average cost to the state of £100 per head. Since 1855, the date at which Sir W. Molesworth speaks, our expenditure has been even heavier, taking into consideration the cost of Sir G. Wolseley's expedition against Secocoeni, the Gaika-Gcaleka wars, and finally the Zulu war; moreover, the expedition of Sir Charles Warren has yet to be paid for. In March, 1883, Mr. Gladstone, speaking on the subject of Bechuanaland, calculated that the Kafir wars had cost England twelve millions of money. He frankly confessed, moreover, that the South African difficulty had been, for the last fifty years, almost an insuperable one for the Colonial Office. What then is to be the result of the expenditure of all this national money? Is England to step aside and let the "Afrikander" nation, if such there be, hoist its own flag to the exclusion of her own?

Or is Germany, slowly encroaching on the West Coast, to step quietly into a heritage of which she is sick and weary? After the toil and moil of conquest, is England to fold her hands and let Cape Colony and Natal, the best bases of future enterprise in the interior, be cut off by a few Boer intriguers on the north? Such a contingency is possible only if England is careless. England has a right to be considered the predominant power in South Africa, and in company with loyal colonists there and by aid of her Imperial resources should maintain this right.

A brief sketch of the actual progress and expansion along the eastern frontier may be best made in connection with the history of the various Kafir wars. A study of the origin and development of these will show that the Imperial power has never engaged in a systematic war of ambition and aggression. Over and over again her generals and administrators have been engaged upon the work of delimitation, acting in obedience to the strictest orders from home. England has been forced by circumstances to advance, and a formal annexation has been the last, not first stage. In 1809, three years after the British occupation, Colonel Collins made a tour along the frontier, endeavouring to fix a

limit and maintain it between farmers and Kafirs. Under Dutch rule non-intervention, as far as the officials had been concerned, was the policy, and so was it with the English. How impossible the wish and thought in a country where there exists a large and floating element of unsettled nomad farmers and Boers, may be judged by the late proceedings in Bechuanaland. If border anarchy is possible now, in the full light of the later days of the nineteenth century and in the face of such a recent and solemn Convention as that of London, 1884, what could be expected then at the Cape?

In 1817, Lord Somerset, the Governor of the Cape, had a conference with a Kafir chief called Gaika. Wishing to have a head man to deal with diplomatically and otherwise, he acknowledged this chief as the paramount power of Kafirland. But other Kafirs did not approve of his choice, and attacked Gaika at an historic place called "Debe Nek." The native *protégé* had to be supported, and war arose. On this occasion the Kafir hordes were bold enough to appear in force before Grahamstown, and were with difficulty repulsed by the small European garrison of 350 Europeans under Colonel Wilshire. The Kafirs were led by the famous prophet Lynx, or Makana. Lord Somerset abandoned in despair the original

line of demarcation, which was the Great Fish River, and fixed upon the Chumie and Keiskama, with an intervening territory of neutral ground. The policy of the Imperial Government was directed distinctly to the separation of the races. The amalgamation of one into the "body politic" of the other was never thought possible. The doctrines of Wilberforce and Clarkson and other philanthropists were not accepted in those days of slavery, nor did the idea of a colony of black and white men, living side by side, and gradually losing national and ethnical distinctions, find favour with the early administrators and governors.

The act which probably involved Imperial responsibility more than any other was the planting of the British settlers along the Kafir borders in 1820. These men were meant as a buffer between natives and colonists, and were expected to keep a neutral zone. The idea of neutrality was impossible, as the result proved. Their scattered farm-houses were so many tempting baits held before the marauding Kafir, and what was termed the "reprisal" system was begun, by which colonists were allowed to trace the spoor of stolen cattle to the nearest Kafir kraals, and demand their return. Depredations were of constant occurrence, and no less than

four Burgher Commandoes, or compulsory expeditions of colonists for the purpose of punishing Kafirs, took place in 1819, 1823, 1829, 1830. If danger to the colonist arose, he immediately claimed protection as a British subject, placed there by the British Government.

The first really formidable rising of the Kafir clans took place in 1834, during the government of Sir Benjamin D'Urban. No fewer than 30,000 Kafirs of the Gaika tribes, under their chiefs Macomo and Tyali, attacked the whole line of English settlements, from the Winterberg to the sea. Within a week fifty farmers were killed, hundreds of farm-houses burned, and a large amount of property destroyed. An energetic soldier, Colonel, afterwards Sir Harry, Smith, rode from Cape Town to Grahamstown in six days, a distance of 600 miles, proclaimed martial law, and put down the rebellion. The territory of the defeated chiefs was brought under European control, and four European magistrates placed amongst them to introduce law and order. The idea of governing savages by means of white magistrates is a good one, if it can be made definitely plain to them that the white man is not the rival of any surviving chief. Original chiefs must take lower rank, and be simply head men. The savage cannot understand an *imperium in*

*imperio*. Here, too, a great deal depends upon the personal character of the white man.

But a new feature is introduced about this time into Cape history. That new influence of philanthropy to which allusion has already been made was at work, and the field of philanthropic enterprise lay in such quarters of the globe as the West Indies and the Cape Colony. The current idea respecting the native was such as is deducible from the pages of "Uncle Tom's Cabin." The emancipation of the native was an article of faith amongst Englishmen. Every one knows how strong and deep were the sentiments on this one great social topic. The fiftieth anniversary of the passing of the Emancipation Act (1834) has just been celebrated, and no one could read the speeches of those who joined in the proceedings of the jubilee without feeling how deep were the impressions then made, and how strong is their present vitality. There is no diminution in England of that protest against slavery. But in South Africa the movement had a distinctly political effect from the very first. It caused a complete reversal of border policy. Lord Glenelg (Charles Grant) disapproved strongly of the war-like promptness of Colonel Smith; he rebuked the Governor of the Cape, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and sent out a special Commissioner, called

Stockenstrom, to undo what he had done. The territory which had been taken under British protection was disannexed, and force given to the despatch by a startling declaration to the effect that "the original justice was on the side of the conquered, not of the victorious party," and that "the Kafirs had a perfect right to hazard the experiment, however hopeless, of extorting by force the redress which they could not expect otherwise to obtain."

Since this time the history of Kafir wars has been a history of reversals of policy and of Imperial repentances, and the establishment of an *imperium in imperio*. Mr. Stockenstrom, in his own person, represented different principles and a different policy from that of the Governor at Cape Town, and his place has been filled by many successors, amongst whom *pseudo*-philanthropic and political intriguers have played no small part.

But such a state of things as that brought about by Lord Glenelg's policy could not last. The breeze of philanthropic zeal fell, and the natives themselves created a difficulty by showing that they did not completely understand the full nature of the kindness bestowed upon them. Like many other theorists, Mr. Stockenstrom would follow the whole theory to its absolute conclusions. He would not deviate a hair's



breadth from the principle that all men were equal, and this, too, not in the sense of being treated equally in the courts of justice, but as complete and enfranchised citizens *in every sense of the word*. Against the *anticipatio naturæ* underlying this position the voice of logicians and of anti-sentimentalists has been a protest continually.

Sir George Napier succeeded Sir Benjamin D'Urban. After four years' experience of the Stockenstrom treaty he observes, "So far as the Colonial Government and the colonists are concerned, never were treaties more strictly or pertinaciously adhered to; but not so on the part of the Kafirs, for they commenced from the first to plunder the colonists." Events were leading up to a second severe struggle, and in 1846 the "War of the Axe" began.

A Kafir had stolen an axe from one of the tradesmen's stores in Fort Beaufort, and when arrested was sent with other prisoners to Grahamstown for trial. On the way he was rescued by his clansmen and the ends of justice defeated. The war conflagration thus begun lasted for some years, until peace was procured by Sir George Cathcart in 1853. In this war the previous policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban was completely carried out, and that of Lord Glenelg discredited.

Sir George Grey succeeded Sir George Cathcart in 1854. He had been an explorer in Western Australia, and subsequently Governor both of South Australia and New Zealand. He had advanced and intelligent ideas on a native policy. He wished to conciliate the natives and turn them into friends. He asked the Imperial Government to help him by employing them on public works, educating and reclaiming them. He saw that the Kafir tribes must and would increase, and that they would have to be reckoned with as an important and necessary part of the community. Above all he strove to gain the cordial co-operation of the Imperial and Colonial politicians. In Kafirland itself he endeavoured to break up the tribal system, put down witchcraft, and introduce the authority of white magistrates. The chiefs were pensioned off, European immigrants were introduced, and proper measures of frontier defence taken. In its general features the "Grey" policy resembles closely the "Frere" policy. Both were framed with the understanding that the white man should occupy the native territory, and endeavour, whenever necessary, to *administer*. The philanthropy of Sir George Grey was not of a sentimental or yielding description. He was anxious to do what he could for the black man, and raise him little by little, but there was to

be no toleration of rebellion. He was a strong man, and the representative of a strong power placed in South Africa to govern, in every sense of the word, and he tried to act up to his position. His task of governing was made easy by that remarkable national suicide of the Kafirs in 1857, who were persuaded by a prophetess to destroy all their cattle and burn all their corn, under the belief that miraculous aid would come to them in the form of the spirits of their forefathers. It has been calculated that no fewer than 200,000 cattle were slaughtered. The savages were reduced to such a state that 20,000 died of starvation, and 100,000 left their country for the colony and elsewhere.

Sir Philip Wodehouse came to the colony in 1862, and was anxious to act up to the philanthropic and administrative plans of his predecessor. The field, in fact, was clear for administration, the Kafir power being effectually broken, for the time at least, in 1857. The Imperial Government were then, as before, averse to extension of British authority. They wished to preserve the limit of the Kei River. Sir Philip Wodehouse was not an advocate for unnecessary annexation. He wished to consolidate where and when it seemed expedient, and he was anxious to bring the large district known as "British

Kafraria" within the Cape Colony itself. Generally speaking, however, he acted upon his own authority, and was at no great pains to secure colonial co-operation, so essential to success. Sir George Grey, and to a still greater extent Sir Bartle Frere, were desirous of making native administration proceed from the colonists themselves. It has never been an easy task to accommodate Imperial and colonial prejudices, especially as the Colonial Office in England has so often proved itself careless and indifferent. The main object of every Governor in South Africa should be to cultivate the sense of responsibility in the colonists, instead of presenting an unyielding policy of home manufacture. In a Crown colony the initiative lies, of course, with the Crown, but even here the colonists should be allowed to formulate their own policy.

Sir P. Wodehouse was never afraid of personal responsibility. He took over the Basutos when nearly destroyed by the Free State, and is to be admired for that manly act, although the Basutos have not shown themselves very grateful recipients of Imperial favours. It was about this time that the Basutos and many other natives in South Africa became possessed of the idea that the Government of the Queen was one thing, that of the colonists another. The confusion arose pro-

bably out of the separate powers of the Governor as High Commissioner in South Africa. It has often happened, as in the case of the Basutos, that the natives have been taken over first by the High Commissioner and then transferred to the Government of the colonists. This is a process they do not quite clearly understand. It is so different from the "one chief, one word" theory.

When Sir Bartle Frere came to South Africa, he settled, almost permanently, the native difficulty as far as subduing resistance went. His ideas upon administration were not given a chance of development. They were framed with a view to the moral subjugation of the native. With the overthrow of Kreli and death of Cetywayo perished the two great centres of Kafir power, and there is left now only the independent state of Pondoland, with its paramount chief, Umquikela. The population of this country is about 200,000. A single glance at the map will show that the area of Kafir resistance is getting very small. The two territories of Basutoland and Pondoland still intervene between Natal and the Cape, but it cannot be long before their distinctive names will disappear, and the two colonies touch upon one another's borders. The Pondos although numerous are not warlike, like the Zulus, and the Basutos

may be won to obedience possibly by kindness and a recollection of former benefits—although this is not certain. Still the barbarians are in a state of disintegration and must inevitably fall under complete control, in a comparatively brief period, from Delagoa Bay southwards. Had Sir Bartle Frere been able to carry out his policy, the natives, including the Basutos and Pondos, would probably have been brought under the Disarmament Act and made subservient to British magistrates. This state of things has been deferred, but it cannot be deferred long. It is necessary and expedient that the natives themselves should know the outlines of the Imperial policy, which have been very indistinct of late. There is a lack of initiative and foresight in the present Government which has worked deplorable results in Bechuanaland and Zululand. England has a great duty and a great work to do in South Africa. She has to civilise and elevate the native as far as she can. She wants a firm, bold, and consistent policy. The task is a great one, and it can only be done by enlisting the cordial sympathy and co-operation of the colonists, by listening to their advice and giving them credit for right judgment. For instance, the Natal colonists have most persistently backed up their Governor in his declarations that Zululand,

to be properly and fairly governed, should be brought under the Imperial control. Month after month, year after year, representations have gone by unheeded. Such ignoring of colonial views, both in Zululand and Basutoland be it added, coupled as it is with a most unpardonable forgetfulness of manifest responsibilities, can only bring about the most disastrous results. It is calculated that there are in South Africa 2,524,000 natives under the control of Europeans, both in the British and Dutch States. The colonists only number 492,000. The power of open resistance is nearly gone from the native, and his kingdoms have been shattered by wars that have raged more or less since 1806. What a work awaits those with whom the control of the destinies of South Africa lies ! Lord Grey, whose lengthened experience in colonial matters entitles him to attention, has lately raised the cry indiscriminately of "no confidence" in colonial rule of the natives. He has alluded (*Times*, December 23rd, 1884) to "the injustice and cruelty of placing uncivilised tribes under the authority of popular Assemblies in which they have no voice, and of which the members are too apt to forget what is due to them, whilst seeking the favour of those to whom they owe their seats." Lord Grey brings a severe indictment against

South African colonists, but the view he takes is a wholly unjustifiable one. The settlers of the Cape Colony are, as a body, as humane and as merciful as Englishmen. The allusion Lord Grey makes to the Basuto war is an unfortunate one, as the disarmament of the Basutos was a measure of political expediency, and sanctioned as such by the philanthropic party at the Cape. The destinies of South Africa must rest with the South Africans. English statesmen who condemn colonial action *in toto, without reservation and without discrimination*, are raising up the very worst feelings in the colony towards the mother country. Sir Bartle Frere would have said, "We have conquered these savages, now let us have peace, and, hand in hand, colonist and Englishman, let us do our best for them." Such a mutual trust and confidence as this would always keep the South African empire loyal and the natives peaceful. If the burdens of the great and increasing British empire are to be borne, all loyal colonists must be allowed their due share in deliberation and action. Then, and not before, the quotation "*vires acquirit eundo*" will have its force and truth as applied to that colossal heritage the Anglo-Saxon race has received in its wealth and possessions all over the world.



## VII.

### THE DUTCH REPUBLICS.

#### THE FREE STATE.

THE Slave Emancipation Act of 1834 has affected South Africa, directly and indirectly, more than any other Imperial measure. It created a separation between a portion of the European settlers and the Imperial Government. Attention had often been drawn to the state of the natives in South Africa in the writings of such travellers as Sparrman and Barrow and others, but no one was found to champion in a practical way the cause of philanthropy in the country itself before Dr. Philip, a missionary who made South Africa the scene of his labours in 1828. He turned his attention chiefly to the Hottentots, and procured for them equal rights with the European settlers. Six years after this emancipation was general throughout the British empire, and the slaves of the Cape Colony obtained the boon of liberty. Their number amounted to 35,745, and their value,

as assessed by their owners, was £3,000,000. The House of Commons voted £1,200,000 as compensation, but a very large portion of this sum never reached the hands of the Boers. Not being business men—in fact, elementary education was practically unknown amongst them—the very process of obtaining payment was unintelligible to them. To be paid in London for a slave in South Africa was a transaction beyond their understanding. Moreover, unscrupulous agents, acting for the Boer owners, made private gain out of the claims, and the Boers felt that they were, somehow, victims of injustice and usury. They identified the British Government with these agents, and hated both accordingly. Mr. Noble, in his “History of South Africa,” remarks: “The slave compensation money was made payable in London, and agents had to be employed to draw up the requisite forms to obtain it. Many of the Boers disposed of their claims to these agents for paltry sums, and others, in simple ignorance, considered the whole thing a fraud, and refused to sign the documents which would entitle them to the compensation, of which £5,000 remains unclaimed to the present day.” Again, the other side of the question, the purely philanthropic, was a perfectly new and unintelligible one to the Boers. Englishmen at

home, whose passions were wrought up to white heat at the terrible atrocities revealed to them during the parliamentary investigations preceding the Emancipation Act, and who were, besides, carried away by a sudden fit of repentance, could hardly be expected to place themselves in the position of the patriarchal Boer, who read nothing and discussed little, but dwelt in the midst of his broad and lonely acres as an Israelite amongst the Canaanites, with a full and firm belief that the Land of Promise was intended for himself to occupy, and that the natives were placed there by Divine Providence to work for him. Moreover, it must be recollected that the movement of which Wilberforce and Clarkson were the prominent leaders swept over England very quickly and impetuously. No compromise in principle, no gradation in method, was allowed for an instant. One generation condemned, in what appears an agony of remorse, and without the slightest reservation, what their fathers had most complacently sanctioned. The Boers in South Africa could not be expected to keep pace with the sudden turns of this philanthropic frenzy in the quiet isolation of their kloofs and valleys.

Smarting, therefore, under a sense of injustice inflicted, as it struck them, from a sentimental as well as from a purely commercial point of view,

and perfectly unable to discern to the full the meaning of the humanitarian movement, no less than 10,000 Boers left their homesteads and passed the Orange River, in every sense voluntary exiles. Here, in the erection of the Orange Free State, must the germ of Boer independence be looked for. To many people this grievance of theirs—almost the sole one of importance they have—may seem but a small one when the reason why they emigrated is taken into consideration ; but in describing an historical grievance it is as well to imagine what it meant to these people and how deeply they felt it, and not to start from any theory as to what they ought to feel. If their real feelings on this point can be gauged properly, the contradictory, stubborn, and apparently unreasonable character of their subsequent lives may be better understood. National distinctions, as such, have not created a gap between the Dutch and French settlers on one side and the English on the other. Such a distinction is almost untraceable in the curious amalgam of races South Africa can show ; it was chiefly a disagreement between the two, the Colonial Government and the Boers, on the subject of the position of the black races which made them part asunder, or rather, to be more correct, made one portion voluntarily remove itself from the sway of the other.

The tenor of the Imperial control was always in the direction of favouring an especial view, and backing a selected class of philanthropists who had a great deal of undue influence through this Imperial favour. Harebrained advocates sprang up in the colony itself, and gained, after a space of time, political notoriety by riding to death this philanthropic hobby. The theory itself was overdone. In the discussion over the Constitution ordinance the doctrine of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" was asserted in its baldest and most extreme form. Philanthropic societies in England gave their powerful advocacy and their parliamentary influence to chosen representatives in South Africa. By so doing they were constantly keeping open a sore in Cape political life and erecting in the midst of the local government a kind of *imperium in imperio*. Local politics and Imperial philanthropy became mixed up, with the inevitable result of the deterioration of both. More often than not the philanthropic party in England have helped petty intriguing in the arena of Cape politics, and that without knowing it.

It was, therefore, as a rough and rude protest against the Imperial conception of the rights and position of the black man that the nomad Boer drove his flocks and herds across the Orange and Vaal Rivers. Upon this act of voluntary expatri-

ation too much sentiment need not be expended, when it is considered that the uprooting of house and home does not mean the same thing to men of a roving spirit in love with a pastoral life as it does to those who have lived for generations, perhaps centuries, in valleys and hills endeared by countless associations, and sanctified by the records and reminiscences of their forefathers. The veldt of South Africa is broad and alluring, the air is free and pleasant, and even in the days of the Dutch East India Company the voertrekkers were always roaming onwards, overstepping boundaries and expatiating in a peculiar liberty of their own, changing their pasture and their homes every summer and winter. Perhaps the truer word would be "expatiating," not "expatriation," as applied to this movement of the Boers. Granted that their grievances were even more burdensome than they were, they could not have been enough to drive them from their homes unless they had felt a latent fondness for trekking. Within very recent times the Boers of the Transvaal made a trekking expedition to Lake Ngami, purely on their own account. The British Government have been always undecided how to treat these nomad Boers and their descendants. At one time the maxim of "*nemo potest exuere patriam*" was applied to them, and they were

brought back violently to the fold. Then they were given independence, as in the case of the Orange River sovereignty and the Transvaal. Whether to treat them as fellow-subjects or as neighbours has been the question before English statesmen. Unfortunately they have never been consistent in their views, and the result is the chaotic state of politics in South Africa. In the days of autocratic governors the question of the proper treatment to be administered to Boers depended very much on personal caprice. But behind the Governor, and occasionally checking him and reversing his policy, were the Imperial statesmen, at the mercy, occasionally, of periodical waves of popular sentiment. As a notable instance of this the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban at the Cape was reversed by Lord Glenelg, and this policy was in turn again changed. In 1880—81 the policy of Sir Bartle Frere was reversed by the Gladstone Government and matters allowed to drift. But in the numerous expeditions and enterprises of greater or less note the lines of a Frere policy are again beginning to show themselves in Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Zululand.

At first the emigrant Boers encountered little serious opposition from the unwarlike tribes of Baralongs, Mantatee, and Korannas, but as they

journeyed eastward they fell in with the terrible Matabele and Zulu clans. The latter were ruled over by the bloodthirsty Chaka, an ancestor of Cetywayo, who had raised the Zulus from the condition of disorganized tribes to be the paramount power amongst the natives of East Africa. From the Limpopo to Kafraria all subordinate Kafir clans bowed the knee to him. The Boer emigrants travelling along the uplands of the interior came to the ridges of the Drakensburg. From this natural barrier they looked down upon the wooded kloofs and rolling veldt of what is now the colony of Natal. In the distance lay the Indian Ocean and Port Natal, the harbour of Durban, where more than three hundred and fifty years ago the Portuguese had cast anchor.

Here was a seaport and an opening for commerce! Here a fertile land lying on the borders of subtropical regions, and abounding in the elements of wealth! Here the descendants of the old Dutch mariners and the French Huguenots might again touch the sea and develop an independent life!

They hastened to seize the country, but they had to encounter the hostility of Dingaan, the brother and successor of Chaka. The treachery of this Zulu king furnishes us with one of the most terrible episodes in the history of pioneering.



A Boer leader, named Retief, accompanied by about seventy followers, went to the king with the object of persuading him to adopt a treaty by which a tract of country between the Tugela and Umzimvooboo would be ceded to them. Dingaan showed himself favourable to the advances of the Boers. With much seeming cordiality he granted their wish, and lulled them into a state of false security. On the last day of their visit he persuaded Retief and his party to witness, unarmed, a national war dance of the Zulu warriors. The unfortunate men fell into the trap, and consented to leave their arms, partake of the Kafir beer and refreshments, and be spectators of a performance ostensibly provided for their amusement. At a given signal the Zulus, in the midst of their evolutions, rushed upon them, and plunged their assegais into them as they sat on the ground or attempted to escape.

Not a man survived to tell the news, and Dingaan followed up his treachery by sending his regiment to attack the Boer "laager," or encampment, which he did with great success. The township Weenen bears testimony to the havoc dealt by Dingaan and his myrmidons. No fewer than one hundred widows were left to mourn their husbands killed by an act of treachery which is unprecedented in the annals of Cape history.

As a rule the Kafir clans have seldom stained their hands by deliberate acts of murder.

Vengeance was vowed against Dingaan, and the Boer community was strengthened by the advent of a leader called Pretorius, who stimulated the zeal of his followers in the same way that Cromwell did his followers. While on the expedition the Boers held religious services regularly both morning and evening. On December 15, 1838, they met Dingaan and experienced that well-known Zulu rush by which savages hope to grapple with white men and neutralise the advantage that firearms give them. But the Boers kept within the ring of their defences, or "laager," made of waggons drawn up and linked together in a square, and proved, what was proved again and again in the late Zulu war, that the most impetuous valour has no chance against men armed with guns, and keeping behind the shelter of some defence. The Zulus were repulsed, and the repulse was finally turned into a headlong flight by a charge of cavalry from the laager. The tactics of Ulundi triumphed again, and more than three thousand Zulus bit the dust. The Boers followed up their advantage and took Dingaan's kraal, where they found the skeletons of their comrades and the body of Retief, with his hunting bag still strapped to it, containing the docu-

ment which ceded to the Boers the tract of country between the Tugela and the Umzimvooboo.

Dissensions amongst the Zulus themselves aided the Boers, as they have aided them recently. Panda, a brother of Dingaan, revolted from him, and on February 10th, 1839, was crowned by the Boers as the king of the Zulus in the name and on behalf of their Volksraad at Pietermaritzburg. This was the most important struggle that the "Trek," or emigrant Boers, had ever engaged in, and their ultimate triumph is due chiefly to the fact that they were able to divide the Zulu nation against itself. History repeats itself, and the Boers are doing now in 1884 what they did in 1838. Again have they descended into Zululand and set up a protégé in the person of Dinizulu. Moreover, they have taken a large tract of the country under their protection, and proceeded to establish themselves as regular settlers in three million acres of Zulu territory.

But to resume the narrative of 1838. Now comes the story of British intervention. The news of the massacre of Retief and of the disturbed state of Zululand had reached the Cape Colony. Sir George Napier considering the occupation of Natal "unwarrantable," directed the ports to be closed against trade, excepting that which was sent by the Cape Colony. It was

thought inexpedient that a rival colony, with a trade of its own, should spring up on the flank of the Cape and along the eastern shores. Throughout all the official proceedings the emigrants were regarded as British subjects who had left the colony against the wish of the Government, and had set up an independent Volksraad. In other words, they were looked upon as rebels. The dislike to English sway and negrophilist principles amongst the Boers was an undoubted fact, and immediately they received communications from the British Government they answered that they were Dutch South Africans by birth, and were entitled to form a South African commonwealth. This was equivalent to a declaration of war. Whether the "Voertrekkers" were really right in separating themselves from the Government of the Cape may or may not be the subject for a fair and legitimate discussion. Any decision that may be given must be arrived at upon broad and general grounds, and with reference to South African history. In the days of the early history of Natal one sovereignty, and one alone, was necessary for the progress of the whole country. And what was true then is true now. One power must be dominant in South Africa. The conditions of the land at present will not bear two. America could not brook separation, and had to

fight for her unity. The coloured class question entered largely into political considerations there as it does in South Africa. At present South Africa seems likely to reproduce South America. It happened also that at this time a vessel from Holland with supplies was anchored off Durban, whose captain and supercargo extended to the Boers promises of help and sympathy from the King of the Netherlands. These promises formed subsequently the subject of an official correspondence between the King and the English Government. In a despatch, dated November 4th, 1842, and coming from the King, the Secretary of State is informed "That the disloyal communications of the emigrant farmers had been repelled with indignation, and that the King of Holland had taken every possible step to mark his disapproval of the unjustifiable use made of his name by the individuals referred to above." This despatch is deserving of present notice, as it proves once again that there has never been any really strong tie of kinship between the Boers and the Netherlands.

But with regard to Natal, the Boers would not readily abandon the idea of an independent republic. They addressed a memorial to Sir George Napier, praying "the honoured Government of H.M. the Queen to recognise their settlement as a free and independent State under the

name of the republic of Natal and adjoining countries." The British Government were really averse on this occasion, as on others, to extending the territories of the Cape Colony to Port D'Urban, but they were worked upon by the merchants of the Cape and the representatives of the Aborigines Protection Society. When some difficulties arose with the Boers the English forces took possession of the Bay. The Boers answered by an attack upon the position, inflicting a temporary loss, and proclaimed Natalia an independent republic under the protection of the King of Holland, who had just stated in a despatch to the English Foreign Secretary that he would have nothing to do with them.

The British commander was hemmed in for a while and reduced to great straits. As he was completely isolated on all sides there was no chance of speedy relief, and had it not been for the adventurous ride of a Mr. King, who rode many hundred miles in ten days through the heart of Kafirland and carried the news to Cape Town, he would probably have been compelled to surrender. Reinforcements were speedily sent by sea, and the siege was raised.

The Boers dispersed, their national flag was hauled down, and at the Volksraad held July, 1842, a formal submission was tendered to the

British Government. The republic of "Natalia" had a very brief existence.

This account, however, of the Boers' first occupation of Natal is interesting now because some chapters of colonial history seem likely to be reproduced. The Boers, as already noticed, are involved in disputes in Zululand, and are playing off one section of this nation against the other now as then, and they have set up Dini-zulu as they set up Panda. They are ambitious of setting up an independent republic in Zululand and are possessing themselves of large tracts of land now as then. Moreover, now as then, they are filled with an idea of a South African Republic, and at present it must be confessed that their aspirations are far wider than they ever could have been in 1838. Natal is certainly a British colony, but the growth of Boer influence there, owing to late events, is a matter of history. But were this independence wooed or won back, and the Afrikaner flag to float over D'Urban, the full results of this severance from the British empire must be contemplated. In these days, when a colonial policy seems to have seized the phlegmatic German as well as the restless Frenchman, would a Dutch Afrikaner Republic on the eastern littoral of South Africa, inherently weak in itself and constantly menaced by threats of

native uprisings, without any command of the sea, be left alone to work out a precarious destiny? Probably the young communities, abandoned by England, would fall into the hands of Germans or Frenchmen. The Boers of 1842 trusted to the help of Holland, but they leaned upon a broken reed; the Boers of 1884 may trust to princes like Bismarck, statesmen like Ferry, but find, after all, that all the European sympathy they can raise, either at Amsterdam, Berlin, or Paris, will not be the means of giving them a paltry loan for a South African railway. There is, moreover, another prospect for the Afrikaner patriots to consider. If England surrenders her Imperial position in South Africa, and if some other naval power steps in and occupies it, will it be more lenient to them? Sir Bartle Frere wrote, in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of November 26th, 1883, "Experience only can show our Afrikaner fellow-subjects what is the thickness of the little finger of German administration as compared with the thigh of the English Colonial Office." Will a stern Continental bureaucracy be more tolerable than our Colonial Office? In the Old Testament there is a story and a parable which the Boer should appreciate if he is as well acquainted with Bible narrative as he is supposed to be.



## THE FREE STATE.

To return to the sequel of the history of the Boer Voertrekkers. One part of them had gone, as has been pointed out, eastwards, in their effort to escape from British rule and emancipation doctrines, and had made a futile effort to found the colony of Natalia. But Natalia was declared (May 12, 1843) to be a British colony, "for the sake of the peace, protection, and salutary control of all men settled at or surrounding this important position of South Africa." Rather than submit to this "salutary control" some of the Boers went north to the hitherto unexplored region of the Transvaal and others retraced their steps to the country known as the "Orange Free State." The history of the beginning of the Free State is simply a record of border feuds, surprises, and ambuscades between the Boers on the one hand, and the Griquas, Mantatees, and Bushmen on the other. The difficulties of the position of the British Government with regard to these feuds were great. On one occasion some British dragoons and the soldiers of the 91st were ordered to the front. Their task was to fight the battles of the Voertrekkers against the natives, the Voertrekkers being at the time disloyal and indifferent. Sir Peregrine Maitland, then Governor of the Cape,

arrived. His object was simply to settle existing disputes, *without extending British dominion*. But how could he do this unless he transported these Voertrekkers back again? This police duty was doubly hateful. It could please neither party. In this case, as before in Natal, the whole controversy turned upon the question whether the Government could allow large bodies of colonists from the Cape to "trek" across the frontier, set up republics for themselves, and treat the natives as they pleased. By way of a compromise, Sir Peregrine Maitland wished to divide off the land held by the Griquas from that held by the Boers. He set apart one tract of ground and called it the "alienable," and alongside of it he delimited the "inalienable territory," reserved expressly for the Griquas. Unfortunately the same thing happened here as had always happened elsewhere. The line of demarcation was an impracticable one to draw, and equally impracticable to maintain. In a recent letter addressed to the *Times* (November, 1884), Sir George Campbell has endeavoured to show that the best policy for the Imperial Government to adopt in South Africa is to create a Crown colony of natives—in this case along the south-east coast—and enclose them within a ring fence. Such a separation, theoretically possible, is difficult in practice. The history

of South Africa is full of instances of its impracticability. In this very Free State difficulty, the claims of settlers and squatters in the "inalienable" territory, or reserve, were continually being brought forward. Sir Harry Smith tried to smooth over matters by making an arrangement in accordance with which the farmers should leave the "inalienable" territory at the expiration of their leases, but the Griquas pay the value of the buildings and improvements. And with regard to the "alienable" territory, Sir H. Smith forced Adam Kok, the Griqua chief, to surrender the right in perpetuity to all the leased land for an annuity of £300 a year. The chief argued that he had no right to sell the property of his people—and he seems to have spoken reasonably—but the English Governor, seeing that the only way out of existing difficulties between Boers and natives was to persist in his decision, replied that unless the agreement was signed before sunset the chief would be hung on the nearest tree. A certain rude compromise, therefore, was effected by very rude means. The same difficulty of adjusting claims between roving Boers and natives may again meet us presently in South Africa, both in Bechuanaland and in Zululand, where the Boers have settled themselves. As it is invidious for the Imperial Government to be

always arbitrating in these base transactions it might be advisable to create an Arbitration Board in South Africa itself, made up of representatives from the Cape Colony, the Transvaal and the Free State, and Natal. Such a Board might lay down some common, just, and well-defined rules, and pledge themselves individually and collectively to maintain them. The Transvaal Government would gain in reputation if they distinctly dissociated themselves from the cause of freebooters and proved amenable to the rules of an impartial court.

President Brand of the Free State might, through his superior sagacity, aid and further an idea which would be productive of mutual good understanding between the Colonial and Imperial Governments. Moreover, such an Arbitration Board might form the nucleus of a society whence the lines of a common native policy—that great desideratum for South Africa—both in education and general administration, might proceed.

In the difficulty with the Free State Sir Harry Smith probably did what was best to do at the time. He threw the ægis of British protection over the whole territory.

With regard to the farmers, Sir H. Smith asked of them to perform so much of the duties of the State as consisted in paying an annual

quit-rent, and giving their services in defence of her Majesty and her allies when required ; in other words, he asked of them simple burgher service. •

To the natives Sir Harry Smith was explicit enough in his peculiar way. Addressing two of the most powerful of the chiefs, he said, " Maroko, you and Moshesh are two of the greatest chiefs under her Majesty. Keep peace, attend to your missionaries, then your cattle will grow fat, and you yourselves will get to heaven." Although Sir Harry Smith had sacrificed the rights of the Griquas to the Boers, by making their chief Adam Kok sign away his right to the "alienable territory," the Boers themselves were not satisfied. Their leader was a man called Andries Pretorius, and in general type of character he resembled one of the Transvaal Triumvirate, Paul Kruger. He was obstinate and tenacious, clinging to his purpose long after the possibility of success seemed removed. His treatment by Sir Henry Pottinger resembles closely the treatment of the Dutch burghers and Paul Kruger by Sir Owen Lanyon, the recent administrator of the Transvaal during the British occupation. Both Governors treated the burghers with that air of military superiority and official hauteur which are so distasteful to them. However, whether from

personal pique or from a sense of historical grievances, Pretorius began to intrigue, designing either to "trek" farther north or contract an alliance with the Zulu Panda. Sir Harry Smith, who had exhausted all his arts of conciliation, was alarmed at the signs of rebellion, and sent what has been fitly termed by Mr. Noble in his "*History of the Cape*," a remarkably melodramatic proclamation to the Boers. To make his manifesto more effective he procured a commission from the Synod of the Dutch Church to remind them of their duties. An appeal was made in impassioned language, and submission preached as a religious duty. Sir Harry Smith protested, prayed, and threatened. If he could not be their "faithful, generous friend," he swore he would be "the avenger of evil."

Pretorius, however, was moved by neither adjuration nor menace. He appeared before Bloemfontein and addressed a letter of timely warning to Major Warden, which contrasts most favourably with the recent dastardly behaviour of the Boers at the affair of Bronker's Spruit, when the 94th were shot down by their ambushed foes. The letter of Pretorius ran thus:—

"To Major Warden, British Resident,—As we have been true and sincere friends to each other, and that for five years, and whereas Sir Harry

Smith is obstinate as regards the majority being on our side, I consider it my duty to shed as little blood as possible. I shall, therefore, give you one hour to consider whether you will give up the country. Many parts of the country have been purchased by the emigrant farmers from natives, who do not feel at all disposed to come under British rule. I have, for the accomplishment of this object, brought with me into the field only a thousand of the many thousands of my ready and willing people."

Major Warden was compelled to capitulate in consequence of his defenceless state, but the rebellion itself was subsequently brought to an end by the battle of Boomplaats, where, after an extremely severe skirmish, the Boers were completely routed, and Pretorius, their leader, compelled to fly. His last words to his comrades, as he rode off, were, "If you are overtaken, submit to the British authority. As for you there is safety, for me there is none. All is lost!"

The Orange Free State, or "The Sovereignty," as it was called, came then under the complete control of the British. How to keep it; that was the next thing. Complications arose with the natives, and British troops were presently fighting with Basutos at tremendous expense, and at a considerable risk to themselves, in order to pro-

tect Boers. A chief of the name of Moshesh had refused to make restitution of property, and it was necessary to punish him. The Boers would not give burgher service, because they were not allowed to carry on the conflict in their own peculiar way. At this juncture there might have been room for a policy of conciliation and compromise. The Sovereignty might have been still kept under the supreme control of the Imperial Government, but granted at the same time the most complete local autonomy. The Boers might have elected their Volksraad and President, and thrived under their own laws. Possibly concession on these terms might have satisfied the Transvaalers more recently, in 1877, just after the annexation.

Suddenly Sir Harry Smith's active policy was reversed, and it was decided by Sir George Cathcart "to make peace with the Basutos, repudiate any interference on the part of Government in native quarrels, to allow the 'commando' system," and in all respects permit the Sovereignty to work out its own destiny. The document which handed back the Free State can be found in the publication, on the 8th of April, 1854, of a Royal Order in Council, and a Proclamation, in which her Majesty did "declare and make known the abandonment and renunciation of our dominion over



the said territory and the inhabitants thereof." By the second article of the Convention England endeavoured to cut herself off from native responsibilities. It runs thus—

Article 2. "The British Government has no alliance whatever with any native chiefs or tribes to the northward of the Orange River, with the exception of the Griqua chief, Adam Kok; and her Majesty's Government has no wish or intention to enter hereafter into any treaties which may be injurious or prejudicial to the interests of the Orange River Government."

The tenor and spirit of this stipulation agrees with Article 3 of the Sand River Convention (1852), entered into between the British Government and the Transvaal emigrant Boers; and it runs thus—

"Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners hereby disclaim all alliances whatever, and with whomsoever, of the coloured tribes to the north of the Vaal River."

These two Articles—one with the Free State and the other with the Transvaal Government, agreed upon in 1854 and 1852 respectively—prove that the policy of England was at that time to check expansion to the north.

The Free State has now had an independent existence for thirty years. It is not a wealthy,

neither is it an enterprising community. The feature of society is a patriarchal conservatism, in accordance with which the principles of Church and State are stoutly maintained. The President himself, Sir John Henry Brand, is honoured with an English title, and rules the country in harmony with the ideas of the burghers. Homely in manner, unconventional in dress, the worthy President moves about his domains just as if he were a simple burgher, only elevated for the time to do official work in a simple fashion, holding himself ready to lay aside the "fasces" at any moment when required. Official dress, manner, and language are hateful to the Boer. In his primitive ideas of citizenship he wishes to meet official superiors as if they were always upon equal, and even familiar, terms with himself. He has ruled his homestead and a large retinue of dependants; why, therefore, should he not talk and protest even *coram Cæsare*? Not being an educated or a reading man, he loves a long conversation and a gossiping chat in the quiet corners of his country dorp. The character he can best understand is one of the early Roman type—a Fabricius or a Curius Dentatus, who can be summoned from his farm to head a commando against an enemy. But he cannot sympathise with militarism or the prejudices of a military caste.

To be a land-drost or a church elder, such are the objects of the Boer's earthly ambition. His religion is a comfortable one, because it is not disturbed by speculation nor the burning fever of obstinate questionings; on the contrary, he resigns himself peacefully to the traditions, beliefs, and dogmas of his forefathers, nor does he wander far from the fold of the Dutch Reformed Church. The articles of the Synod of Dordrecht provide him with the body of his belief, and the voice of his pastor reminds him with authority every Sunday of his Puritan faith. Placed in a black man's country, he feels somehow that the distinction between himself and the aborigines is a real one, and the constitution of his State is drawn up with distinct reference to this demarcation. Neither in the eye of the Church or State can the black man be held equal, and he refers to the Old Testament as an authority for this distinction. Such a constitutional, and at the same time legal, disability is regarded as the natural consequence of colour, and no Free State legislator would venture to stand up and advocate a "nigger" vote. Many of the Voertrekkers denied a soul to the Kafir, and were often sorely puzzled to answer the casuistical question as to whether the half-castes were entitled to whole, or half, or none of the ethereal properties they attached to their own souls.

Fundamentally, therefore, the Free State as well as the Transvaal differs from the Cape Colony, where equal constitutional privileges are lavished upon all indiscriminately. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the Cape Colony is not as lavish as the two independent republics are chary in bestowing their civil rights. As might be expected, the Free Staters, although republicans, are in many ways intensely conservative. The presence of the natives makes the Boers look upon themselves as a superior caste, and it would be more proper to describe them as an oligarchy of white men placed in the midst of African natives to possess their land and govern them. Having only one broad distinction, *i.e.* between black and white, they cannot comprehend the gradations and differences between white men themselves in a crowded and civilised country.

Education has made but slow progress amongst them, and they often mistake a superficially sharp, or as the Yankees would term 'cute, and they themselves term "schlimm," man for a profoundly wise one. Itinerant Jew traders, unscrupulous "Smousers," fraudulent quacks in medicine as well as in other professions, have not given them examples of ingenuousness. To be an adept in the art of turning and twisting, to bargain closely and to speak with a double sense,

to keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the hope, to regard a mental reservation as of equal sanctity with the spoken word, such are too often the failings of these doughty Voertrekkers. Brought up during their childhood in the company of black servants, they imbibe from them that cunning and tergiversation which is the natural defence of the inferior race. The Hottentots and Kafirs excel all other native races in the dialectical skill with which they will pervert an argument, if so minded. They are often generous and chivalrous in their treatment of the white man, but they cannot be expected to possess and fearlessly practise the catalogue of all the virtues. It is an unmixed evil for a white man's child to be brought up in the company of black servants. There exist no good "dame" or infant schools in South Africa to counteract this evil of their early associations.

Moreover, the taint of slavery still survives in the land. To hold slaves is almost as bad and as degrading for the master as the servant. The moral nature must suffer by being placed in contact with this social evil, and doubtless the Boers' moral nature has suffered considerably. The recent violation of the London Convention, the countenance given to marauders in Montsioa's territory, unofficially, but denied officially, the

lying pretexts by which native lands are "protected," the whining affectation of virtue assumed by many Transvaal public men, the half-truths thrust forward to hide disingenuousness, prove that the Boer Republicans, "the Puritan descendants of Puritan ancestors," have not yet formed a national character deserving the praise of honest and candid men. It would have been much more to the credit of the Transvaal Government had they placed a force of armed burghers on their western borders and stopped every adventurous thief they suspected, instead of sitting still and allowing recruiting to go on openly in the streets of Pretoria for illegal purposes. The Boers have always made much of the value of treaties, notably the Sand River Convention of 1852, but they have by their recent actions completely cut the ground from under their feet. In the eyes of the civilised world they have forfeited what respect they once gained. Perhaps the visions of an Afrikaner empire have been too great for them to resist, and have started them in their half-formed state upon a career of aggression, but history will always record against them the violation of the London Convention and the contemptuous insolence with which they treated concessions from a great power.

. Happily the Free State is free hitherto from

public charges of fraud, and on more than one occasion in history have the "Free Staters" differed from their brethren in the Transvaal on questions of policy. At the time of their restoration the Boers in the Free State acknowledged that "their independence was got by the noble magnanimity of her Britannic Majesty; and while other nations sacrificed years of struggle and torrents of blood for this precious gem, we obtained it merely by accepting what was offered us." Their territory is so situated, and so confined by natural boundaries, that they need not be troubled by visions of expansion towards the equator or towards the ocean. Their native difficulty, owing to the fewness of the natives, has been practically solved, and their credit in the European markets is better than that of their ambitious brethren, who were unable to raise a railway loan recently either at Paris or even Amsterdam.

Over this independent and solvent little community President Brand has held a benignant sway for some years. Whenever his natural term of office expires he is elected again as a matter of course, and he is undoubtedly the most popular as well as able man in the State. He is of Dutch extraction, but he has received a legal education in England. His knowledge of the Roman, Dutch,

as well as of the English code of law has given him a particularly good opportunity of arguing from the Dutch as well as English and more cosmopolitan point of view. He is of a patriarchal disposition, and has a patriarchal family, in itself a considerable recommendation to the family-loving Boer, who often values his friend by the number of his "kindern," as well as by the size of his flocks and herds. Those who have seen him quietly making an unostentatious progress from village to village, from farm to farm, greeting the burghers, and frequently their "vrouws," by name, without the aid of a nomenclator, inquiring anxiously after sons and daughters, flocks and herds, will see in him exactly the man to rule this primitive race of peasants, and extract from them the exercise of their best qualities.

The population of the Free State is not large, and probably does not exceed 62,000, with a native population of 74,000. Such at least is the estimate given by Mr. Merriman, a late Cape Minister, in a paper read on the subject of South Africa before the Colonial Institute (November, 1884). The chief town, Bloemfontein, is a quiet little place, where an English mission flourishes, and English education prevails to a great extent. In fact, there is as much English spoken in the streets of Bloemfontein as Dutch. A Scotchman,



Mr. Brebner, has charge of the education department, and, with the peculiar adaptability of Scotchmen, has pleased foreigners and Free Staters alike, and is therefore doing a good work. A Scotch minister has little trouble in obtaining access to the pulpits of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Presbyterianism of the one race resembling that of the other.

The Free Staters, of course, have their grievances. What individual or nation would be perfectly happy without them? Briefly speaking, the Free Staters find fault with the English Government for the manner in which they "protected" or "annexed" Griqualand West and the Diamond Fields, and also for their conduct towards the Basutos.

The discovery of the Diamond Fields was a great event in South African history. A tract of barren country was found to be immensely valuable, and unfortunately it happened to become a bone of contention between the English and Dutch. A chief called Waterboer preferred a claim to the site of the mines, and placed himself under British protection. In October, 1871, the country was proclaimed British territory under the name of Griqualand West. The Free State objected, saying that the mines had been opened under the Free State magistrate, and that the

annexation was in direct violation of the Convention of 1854. The dispute turned entirely upon the validity or otherwise of Waterboer's claims. The transfer of the sovereignty to the Free State had complicated the question of the chief's claims, which probably would never have been heard of or mentioned by either side had the mines never been discovered. The strongest argument the Free Staters had was, that they had been ruling with a kind of half-recognised jurisdiction in the land for fifteen years. The dispute caused much irritation, and was alluded to by Mr. Froude in his report to Lord Carnarvon, January 10, 1876, as one of the impediments in the way of confederation. At last a compromise was arrived at between President Brand and Lord Carnarvon in 1876. The British Government agreed to pay down £90,000 in full settlement of all claims, and a further sum of £15,000 was advanced for railway construction in the Free State. Much has been said about the nature of the transaction, and the usual charges have been brought against the British Government of greed and rapacity; but even if the Free State had possessed the Diamond Fields could they have ruled it? The digger population is notoriously rough and unruly, and, all told, they might have numbered at one time half of the whole popu-

lation of the Free State. It might always have been in their power to upset an obnoxious government, especially if it endeavoured to impose restrictive regulations and mining licences of which they disapproved. As it has turned out, the Free State burghers have benefited immensely by the presence of a large mining population on their borders without being in any way responsible for the expenses of their government. If the policy of the Transvaalers towards the gold-miners of Leydenburg is any example of what the Boers would have done at Kimberley had they kept the Diamond Fields, it is a very fortunate thing that the British Government took over Griqualand West when they did.

With regard to Basutoland, the Free Staters resented the act of Sir Philip Wodehouse, which at once protected the remnants of a scattered race and deprived them of the fruits of their victory. But in both these cases it is as well to let bygones be bygones. It is quite possible that, before an international tribunal, the action of Sir Philip Wodehouse would have been not only condoned but praised; and, in the case of Waterboer, this may be said, that, after all, there was a considerable doubt over the whole question from a legal point of view. But the affair is settled and is a matter of history. The Free Staters are more

peaceful, happy, and probably more prosperous now than they would have been had the working of the Diamond Fields—possibly a *damnosa hereditas* to them after all—been conducted under their auspices.

The question of confederation has presented itself to this small State more than once. In 1858 Sir George Grey actually procured from the Volksraad the following resolution: "That the Council (Raad) feels itself in union with a large number of burghers who have already approached the Council by memorial, convinced that a union or alliance with the Cape Colony, either on the plan of federation or otherwise, is desirable, and resolves that His Honour the President (Mr. Boshoff) be requested to correspond with His Excellency the Governor on that subject, in order thus to ascertain whether the Cape Parliament will declare itself inclined for such a union, and whether the Colonial Government would receive a Commission from the State, if possible, at one of the towns of the Eastern Province, who, together with that Government, or with a Commission to be appointed by it, shall draft the preliminary terms of such a union, to be afterwards submitted for the approval of both Governments."

This was a great and important step to gain;

and in 1859 Sir George Grey, who had worked hard and indefatigably at the project, laid before the local legislature of the Cape the resolution of the Volksraad. But matters were not allowed to go any farther. A message from the Imperial Government, who feared further responsibilities in the Free State, came to the Governor, with strict injunctions "not to resume British authority over the Orange Free State in any shape." Thus was allowed to slip away a possible opportunity of confederating the Free State, Natal, Cape Colony, and the Transvaal under the British flag. The idea of a federal union was again placed before the South African world by Mr. Froude and Lord Carnarvon in 1876-7. The speeches and official proceedings in connection with this movement serve to mark an epoch in Cape history, and are found more fully remarked upon in a separate chapter on Mr. Froude's mission. Mr. Froude was diligent in impressing upon the colonists that Africa existed for the Afrikaner. This was the burden of his remarks in the Western Province, in such Dutch centres as "The Paarl," and Stellenbosch, also in the Eastern Province and in the Free State. Of course he meant confederation under the British flag, and never thought that Afrikanders would dream of their own flag and severance from the empire.

He could not be expected to foresee the Majuba Hill defeat, the British surrender, and the inevitable sequel—contempt for British authority. Addressing himself particularly to the Free State Boers at Bloemfontein, he went so far as to flatter their national vanity, and instituted a comparison, favourable to them, between their own hardy stock and the Diamond Field population. They were, he said, the *mascula proles docta ligonibus*, who had earned the heritage of the soil. Such flattery in the Latin tongue was not understood by the worthy burghers, who, if the truth must be told, do not deserve all the praises due to industrious agriculturists. Their national vanity has been increased more by the prowess of their brethren over the Vaal than by the compliments of the English traveller. It is to be hoped that the fiery cross which is occasionally sent over their borders will be unheeded as long as possible, that their historic grievances about the annexation of Griqualand West, the protectorate of Basutoland, and the Emancipation Act will be peacefully buried and cease to vex the quiet routine of their village life. At the present moment there is a movement on the part of Transvaal and Free State branches of the “Afrikander Bond” to secure the union of the two republics. A customs union and a defensive and offensive alliance

are suggested as feasible at once. The destinies of the Free State would be greatly altered by such an alliance. Assuming that the British Government raised no objections to such a step—a most unlikely contingency—the Free State would lose its distinctive life, which is at present prosperous and attractive. Leagued with the bolder and more unscrupulous settlers of the Transvaal, it might be hurried into ambitious projects and fall a prey to the stronger party whoever it might chance to be. Perhaps it might be Germany, and German sympathy may inspire the Transvaalers at the present moment with audacity; but will it always guarantee them their independence? The Free Staters have recognised their own independence as a “priceless jewel.” The best way to keep it is to confine their efforts to the area of their own territory, which is plainly and definitely marked. Immediately a weak State becomes ambitious it exposes itself to imminent risk of extinction.

## VIII.

### THE DUTCH REPUBLICS. (*Continued.*)

#### THE TRANSVAAL.

It will be seen, therefore, that the emigrating Boers, after 1834, parted into two waves upon the assumption of sovereignty in Natal by the British Government, and the extinction of their hopes of a separate republic there. One of them was rolled back westward, and founded, as has been shown, the Free State, across the Orange River; the other was rolled northwards beyond the Vaal. The origin of both these republics is the same; they sprang from the same large emigration movement, and they both settled down where they did, across the Orange and Vaal Rivers, with precisely the same intention, viz. of ruling the country and the natives exactly as they chose, free from British control and the working of the Emancipation Act. It must be noticed here that the



Boers, as a body, in objecting to the abolition of slavery, set themselves against the common voice and decision of the whole civilised world. They may not have been treated fairly to begin with, as far as compensation went; but about their dislike to the philanthropic movement in itself, and its principles, there can be no manner of doubt. Throughout the whole of South African history there has been a struggle between rival systems of governing the natives. Sir Bartle Frere, in a letter written in April, 1883, and published in the *Times* of December 5, 1884, has clearly put the differences between the systems. Of the Dutch system he says: "It is seen at its best, not in the rough border life of the States of South Africa, but in Java and other Dutch colonies. It is founded on views like those prevalent in England in Queen Anne's time, or in the Southern States of America before the late war. It regards the native races as helots or serfs, to be humanely treated, but not by nature capable of being placed on any sort of practical equality with the white races. It consequently does little to educate or raise the natives from their existing condition of barbarism. . . . The English system . . . recognising the essential legal equality of all races before the law, and their indefinite capacities for improvement—moral,

social, and political—for which it is the duty of the State to find free scope," &c., &c.

Although the two Dutch Republics have had the same origin, and received the charters of their existence about the same time—the Free State in 1854 and the Transvaal in 1852—the resemblance between them is not very marked. The Transvaal has had a more eventful and chequered existence, as might be expected in a State where the native difficulty is so great. It is calculated that there are at present about 800,000 natives in the Transvaal to 60,000 Europeans, but only 74,000 in the Free State to 62,000 Europeans. Again, the internal history of the Transvaal has been one of confusion and anarchy, that of the Free State one of fairly uniform progress. Peace within—peace without! Such has been the record of the Free State for the last twenty years. Exactly the contrary holds good with the Transvaal. At the present moment (December, 1884) there are factions in Pretoria, one political party being led by Mr. Joubert and another by Messrs. Krüger and Dutoit. The Free State is solvent, and is able to raise a loan upon the security of the country; the Transvaal, with all its gold mines and mineral wealth, cannot get enough money lent to it in Amsterdam, or Paris, or anywhere else in

Europe, to construct a railway. It has been a bankrupt State once, and simply exists now on the enterprise of the gold-mining population of Leydenburg: The gold industry is worked chiefly by foreigners, and the Boers, by a short-sighted policy of granting concessions and checking the growth of a mining population, are doing the best to deprive themselves of the advantages they possess. They hope by legislation to keep off the inevitable rush of strangers which would follow upon the expansion of the gold mines. They are in fear and trembling lest an irruption of Goths and Vandals—in their estimation—should outnumber and outvote them and control their politics. But, whilst dreading an access of population, they wish for European sympathy, as long, be it added, as it is not British. Their position close to Delagoa Bay renders them liable to intrigue. Although they have no chance of being a naval power, they wish to touch the sea. They do not consider how they may possibly risk their prosperity and even national existence by courting an alliance with a strong naval power. The Free State is an inland power and self-contained. It is by its very position beyond the region of intrigue. To return, however, to the early history of the Transvaal.

The first successful attempt of the emigrant

Boers to found a community north of the Vaal River was made under the leadership of a Voertrekker named Potgieter. The policy of the emigrants with the natives was the same then as it has always been, and acting upon their well-known principles they sowed dissensions amongst the Matabele clans. The native tyrant called Moselekatse had ruled the country round Potchefstrom with an iron hand, and some of his subjects who were victims of his cruelty welcomed the Boers as deliverers. The latter, strengthened by these natives as well as by bodies of their own countrymen, asserted their dominion and founded the town of Potchefstrom, establishing a rough sort of government under commandants, land-drosts, and field-cornets. Of course they treated the natives as a subject race, bound to render Gibeonite services; they confined them within certain areas, inaugurated vagrancy measures, and prohibited the sale of fire-arms and ammunition amongst them. For themselves they claimed the most absolute independence.

But the British Government, acting here again upon the principle that no man, once made a British subject, could break off from his allegiance to the Crown, followed them up to Potchefstrom with a proclamation that all offences committed by British subjects up to 25° south could be

punished in a court of law. The Boers, therefore, removed still farther away from the hated control, and, leaving Potchefstroom, settled at Zoutspanberg and Leydenberg with the object of communicating with Delagoa Bay. This Bay is one of the best, if not the best, on the south-east coast, and was claimed at one time by the British Government. The island of Inyack, or "English Island," marks an original if not still-existing proprietorship of the channels around the coast. It will be remembered that in an arbitration case on the subject of this Bay, presided over by Marshal Macmahon, a decision was given in favour of the Portuguese, who have certainly done little more for this outlet of trade than they have at the Congo. In the recent Berlin Conference the claims of an unprogressive and impoverished State like Portugal, sitting at the receipt of custom and levying taxes upon the industries of other nations, have been treated with the contempt they deserve. Mr. Stanley has pointed out epigrammatically that although the Portuguese have occupied the mouth of the Congo for a space of four hundred years, they had done little else but import red wine for the consumption of their officials there.

However, the Boer Government of the Transvaal have made some attempts to open up com-

munications with the Portuguese station, develop a trade route, and construct a railway from the sea to the borders of the Transvaal. President Francois Burgers endeavoured to raise a loan before the annexation of 1877, but the disturbances under his rule prevented the completion of this idea.

The Boers, therefore, of Zoutspanberg and Leydenberg placed themselves beyond the reach of British proclamations by the single act of trekking farther north, just as in the early days of the Cape the western farmers had placed themselves beyond the range of the placats of the Dutch East India Company. But a connection with the Free State brought them again into contact with the British in the days of Sir Harry Smith, as has been already pointed out. The well-known leader Pretorius, in company with a Mr. Joubert, raised the standard of revolt; but the battle of Boomplaats crushed their pretensions, and the whole of Boerland lay at Sir Harry Smith's feet. Here, as in the case of the Free State, was an opening for a policy in accordance with which the greatest possible local autonomy might have been given to the Boer republics consistent with Imperial supremacy and with the honour of the British flag. But Earl Grey was Secretary of State at the time, and was

determined upon a complete change of policy and a thorough reversal of all that Sir Harry Smith had done. He wrote in 1851 that the ultimate abandonment of the Sovereignty was a settled point in his policy, and the strictest injunctions were imposed upon Imperial officers not to make further extensions in our South African empire. These categorical assertions of ministers with regard to South African policy must always be received with suspicion, as the irresistible pressure of circumstances often compels them to take measures they deprecate. Earl Grey himself, in a letter to the *Times*, December 23, 1884, is a strong advocate for Imperial extension in South Africa, and for *a firm and decided policy*. Again, the present Gladstone Government have made the most emphatic and categorical assertions about responsibilities in South Africa, repudiating the smallest desire for extension; but at the present moment a large British force is in Bechuanaland, Colonel Clarke has been despatched to Basutoland, a country returned upon the Imperial hands, and in Zululand it is more than probable that Lord Derby will have to exercise an interference and annex the land in spite of previous distinct asseverations to the contrary.

Earl Grey in 1851 endeavoured to be drastic in his policy. The rebel Pretorius was par-

done, a meeting took place at the Sand River, and a treaty was signed there between the Boer and English plenipotentiaries. This document is known as the "Sand River Convention," and is regarded by the Transvaalers as the official charter of their existence. Whatever arrangements have been entered into by them of late with Mr. Gladstone and Lord Derby, they still look upon this original charter as their birthright—only so far, be it added, as suits their own peculiar views—for the clauses relating to slavery and free trade have never been fully and conscientiously acted up to by a community slaveholders at heart and protectionist in their financial policy. The Convention itself is worth perusal, although it may be regarded by some as an antiquated document never faithfully adhered to by either Boers or British; it serves to throw light upon the flagrant indifference with which the Boers have treated the terms of Lord Derby's Convention. In both these treaties they probably thought that they were getting less than their legitimate share of power, especially after Majuba; but their violation of these treaties cannot be in the least degree excused; and, as has been pointed out elsewhere, the countenance given to Goshen and Stellaland freebooters, and even to the Zululand



marauders, has effectually proved the charge of persistent bad faith on the part of the Transvaal.

Mr. Noble, in his *South African History*, has clearly put in what sense the Sand River Convention was first accepted by the Boers, and what position they took up in the interior of the continent. He says: "The Sand River Convention of 1852 was interpreted by the emigrants as placing all the country north of the Vaal River, and inland as far as the Equator, under their control, and they were very jealous of any encroachment upon it, especially by British subjects. To such an extent did they carry this feeling, that they adopted a policy of isolation. They had little intercourse with the parent colony, or even the adjoining Free State, and scarcely ever saw any of their countrymen, whose superior character or intelligence might influence them. It happened, however, that the discovery made by Owen and Murray and Dr. and Mrs. Livingstone of Lake Ngami, gave a stimulus to travelling to the interior. Several parties started—some in pursuit of game, some for purposes of trade, and some for geographical discovery. The Boers were apprehensive that the English Government would again follow them up if they did not stop these proceedings. They also feared that the numberless natives to the north of them

would be supplied with arms and ammunition. For these reasons they attempted to block up the path, refusing any passage through the republic, and in some instances ordering the expulsion of visitors across the Vaal."

One of the most influential books written on South Africa was that containing an account of the travels and missionary enterprises of Dr. David Livingstone. Through it the British public may be said to have been introduced to a first study of South African history and made acquainted with the peculiarities of blacks and Boers. There had been other travellers in South Africa, generally scientific men, either botanists or astronomers, as Thunberg, Lichtenstein, Le Vaillant, and others, who had written, but their discoveries aroused more particularly the interest of savans and the attention of esoteric circles. Descriptions of Boer customs and native peculiarities were given in the guise simply of incidental narrative, the first place of course being reserved for scientific discoveries. But in the story told by Dr. Livingstone, and in the unadorned simplicity of his narrative, there was something which aroused the attention of the British public. The missionary, working against almost insuperable difficulties in a foreign country, has always a host of sympa-

thetic admirers in England; and in addition to the ordinary virtues a missionary claims, Dr. Livingstone possessed in a marked degree the intrepid courage of a traveller and a pioneer. He has been called the greatest Voertrekker South Africa ever knew, going farther than the Boers themselves as far as simple travelling went, and when a niche was found in Westminster for his remains—the story of their recovery from the dim and unknown regions of the interior furnishes a notable illustration of the chivalry and devotion of the African native—all Englishmen thought that no one of their national heroes deserved the honour more. With this man the Boers of the Transvaal were brought into contact, and in a way most discreditable to themselves. Afraid of his influence with the natives and disliking his pioneering zeal, they destroyed his little station at Kolobeng, the principal town of the Backwains, who were ruled over by a chief Secheli, and burnt every article he possessed. Giving an account of this uncalled-for atrocity the old Voertrekker says: “I do not mention these things by way of making a pitiful wail over my losses, nor in order to excite commiseration; for although I do feel sorry for the loss of lexicons, dictionaries, &c., which had been the companions of my boyhood, yet, after all, the

plundering only set me entirely free, and I have never since had a moment's concern for anything I left behind. The Boers resolved to shut up the interior, and I determined to open up the country ; and we shall see who have been most successful in resolution—they or I." The same issue between the Boers and English seems to be raised now as then. The Transvaal Government and the Boers are determined to block up the trade route, or at any rate to hold it in order to impose what tribute or tax they may choose. The British Government are determined to keep it open. It is not hard to guess who will be successful, Boers or English, if the latter are resolved to follow the example of intrepidity set by David Livingstone. Nor are certain features of atrocities wanting now just as they were never wanting in Livingstone's time. Englishmen were excited by the news of that unprovoked attack on Kolobeng and the burning of the lonely mission station ; the national conscience is aroused now by the recital of those reiterated attacks upon loyal chiefs, and of the cold-blooded murder of Christopher Bethell who stood by the side of these chiefs.

It has been asserted that internally the Transvaal never presented such a picture of unity and content as the Free State. There were no

less than three separate republics in the Transvaal at one time, one at Magaliesberg under Pretorius, a second at Leydenburg, and a third at Zoutspanberg. Pretorius, who was the most able and enterprising man amongst them, recognised the value of unity. He was a thorough "Afrikaner" in his professions, and seems to have set a definite political aim before himself. He had fought at Boomplaats, was defeated and exiled, then pardoned, but throughout all of his life continued an implacable enemy of the British Government. When offered the presidency of the Free State he wished to unite both republics under one Government, but he was prevented from doing so by the action of her Majesty's High Commissioner, who stated that such an action would, *ipso facto*, annul the Sand River Convention of 1852 and the Free State Convention of 1854. The union scheme did not find much favour with the Free Staters themselves. They had lived for some years under a fairly settled government, and had few native difficulties to contend with. Moreover, the Transvaal was swarming with restless spirits of all nationalities, who hated taxation and disliked government simply because it was government. The declaration of her Majesty's High Commissioner to Pretorius may, however, be a useful document on some future occasion,

should the Boers of the Free State and Transvaal desire to unite in spite of British protests. If any value is attached to the Sand River Convention, an equal value must be attached by the Boers to the official statement of the Commissioner ; that is, if they desire to treat all official documents made in past times with equal respect.

In 1872 the Rev. Thomas Francois Burgers, a clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church, was induced to exchange the *rôle* of a minister for that of State President. Such an appointment, curious as it may appear to us, was not looked upon by the burghers as unusual or inconsistent. The new President had a difficult post to fill. He found the treasury empty and a paper currency in vogue. Education did not exist in the State at all, laws were inoperative, the very roads of the country were without superintendence, and land beacons and boundaries generally out of place—an instance of dangerous carelessness in a black man's country. But Mr. Burgers made a bold effort to better his country. He negotiated two loans, one in the Cape Colony and one in Holland, the latter for the purpose of constructing a railway. But he could only raise £90,000 out of £300,000, which was the sum required. He endeavoured to reform the law and inaugurate a system of education ; he engaged land surveyors to correct

the beacons, and, last, not least, designed a new flag. Under his auspices it was imagined that new life could be infused into the State, and taxes would be paid. But these hopes were shortlived. A native war arose with a chief called Secocœni, and the cause was a disputed piece of territory. The Boers based their claim to it upon "a deed of sale executed by Umswasi, King of the Zulus, conveying to the Dutch South African Republic possession of the land inhabited by Sequati, Secocœni's father, in consideration of a payment of one hundred cows." But the forces of Secocœni held their own, destroyed property to the estimated amount of £30,000, and even threatened Leydenburg. The Boers having made a futile attempt to storm the chief's stronghold returned to their homes, nor could they be persuaded to turn out on "commando" again. Moreover, the financial state of the country was desperate, and the burghers refused to pay the tax of £10 which was assessed on each farm. In 1875 the revenue was £69,928, and the expenditure £69,593. The liabilities of the State amounted to £250,000, and five hundred farms were hypothecated to Holland. The branches of the Cape Commercial Bank in the Transvaal stopped discounting, and no drafts were obtainable upon any place. Ships arrived at Delagoa Bay with railway plant, but

there was not a penny wherewith to pay the freight, and even civil servants had to go without their salary. With regard to the war, one of the leading Transvaal patriots, of whom more is heard afterwards, Mr. Paul Kruger, said "that the President, Mr. Burgers, confessed that he went to war without the blessing of heaven, hence the failure, but that he had since then sought the Lord."

On the south-east were the Zulu nation under Cetywayo, whose military system with its 40,000 warriors was at that time complete, ready and willing to take advantage of the Transvaalers' difficulties. A dispute about land had irritated both sides for a considerable time, and was only terminated by the decision of Sir Bartle Frere just before the Zulu war.

In August, 1876, there had been a Conference in London, held with the object of discussing Lord Carnarvon's scheme of South African Confederation. Although it was not a representative one,—in fact, President Brand would not enter into the subject on behalf of the Free State—still its object concerned deeply all the colonists of South Africa. It was evident that the crux was the treatment of the natives, and after what had happened in the case of Secoceni it was absurd to expect that the Transvaal Boers could settle it



single-handed. They had not been able to deal with Secoceni, a comparatively insignificant chief, and how, then, could they deal with Cetywayo, ruling despotically at the head of his complete military system? Moreover, the wars that the Transvaalers were stirring up could not but affect other parts of South Africa, notably the English colony of Natal. Lord Carnarvon, therefore, in the despatch of October, 1876, writes—

“Her Majesty’s Government deems it necessary that the President of the Transvaal should be informed without delay that they cannot consent to view passively and with indifference the engagement of the Republic in foreign military operations, the object or necessity of which has not been made apparent, and they desire that he should be strongly warned that in adopting an aggressive policy he is subjecting her Majesty’s possessions to the danger of very great evils, for which, if they arise, the Transvaal Government must necessarily be held responsible. . . . The freedom and independence conceded by her Majesty to the two Republics in South Africa have necessarily been limited by considerations affecting the welfare and possibly even the existence of these British communities. Her Majesty’s Government have had no desire to interfere with their absolute independence and freedom of action within their

boundaries." In answer to this despatch and to Sir Henry Barkly's remonstrances, President Burgers defends the right of the Republic to the land, and fails to see the connection between native successes in the Transvaal and the apprehensions of invasion lately felt in some parts of South Africa. On more than one cardinal point of South African policy the Dutch President differed from the British Commissioner. In January, 1877, Lord Carnarvon's Permissive Bill to bring about confederation was received and published in South Africa, and in February President Burgers delivered a speech in the Transvaal Volksraad to the effect that to accept confederation under the British flag was the only way out of their difficulties. Personally he seems to have objected to actual annexation involving complete internal control, as he is reported to have written to the land-drost of Utrecht that if he should fail to be re-elected the English would come in, and this was an event to be deprecated. "For God's sake," he wrote, "keep out the English if you do not elect me." Meantime Sir Theophilus Shepstone crossed the Transvaal border, and immediately received an address to the following effect: "In our present Government we have no confidence; with danger surrounding us, and with disunion and anarchy

threatening us, we pray you to take prompt measures to unite us to the colonies of South Africa." The Volksraad itself at Pretoria declared against either confederation or annexation; and although President Burgers submitted a scheme by which he thought the Transvaal would be saved, the burghers would not accept it. In fact, the Boers were a very stubborn and impracticable set of men. They had failed conspicuously in their attempt at government, and would neither fight against Secocœni nor pay taxes. Nor would they accept the scheme of their President, who probably was right in sanctioning *confederation* and deprecating *annexation*. Perhaps the best thing would have been to have left them to work out their own destiny a little longer. For instance, they might have been left to try conclusions to the bitter end with Secocœni and Cetywayo. As it is, Englishmen have fought their battles for these braggarts, when Sir Garnet Wolseley stormed Secocœni's "kop," and Lord Chelmsford broke up Cetywayo's strength at Ulundi. Yet Englishmen have earned only ingratitude and contempt from them. But animated by a desire to fulfil his mission, and not having the gift of prophecy, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, at the head of a few men, hoisted the British flag in Pretoria on April 12, 1877.

On March the 31st Sir Bartle Frere had arrived at Cape Town by the *Balmoral Castle*, and could have had very little to do with this official act. The letter in which President Burgers enters his protest is worth reading. It runs as follows :—

“ I, Thomas Francois Burgers, State President of the South African Republic (Transvaal), have received a letter dated 9th April, 1877, from her Britannic Majesty’s Special Commissioner, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, giving me notice that his Excellency has resolved, in the name of her Majesty’s Government, to bring the South African Republic under the authority of the British Crown by means of annexation ; and whereas I have not the power to draw the sword with a good result for the defence of the independency of the State against a power so strong as England ; and besides that, having an eye to the well-being of entire South Africa, being unwilling to bring the inhabitants of the country into ruinous hostilities by any act of mine without having tried to ensure the rights of the people in a peaceful way ; I, therefore, in the name of and under the authority of the Government and the people of the South African Republic, do hereby enter my solemn protest against the aforesaid annexation. Given under my hand and seal of State at this Government

office at Pretoria on the 11th day of April, 1877. Signed, Thomas Francois Burgers, State President of the South African Republic."

This document, although expressed in rather an uncouth and tortuous fashion, is explicit enough; and when the President enters his protest against annexation, it must be observed that he says nothing to commit himself about confederation. He had told the Boers in the Volksraad that the only way out of their difficulties was confederation, but probably the Boer mind could not or would not distinguish between annexation and confederation. They would not see that the most complete local autonomy might have been enjoyed under the British flag. Subsequently, Sir Bartle Frere took the greatest pains to elaborate a scheme of government that would commend itself to the Boers, and he asked for the co-operation and advice of President Brand and many leading Dutchmen at the Cape; but circumstances, drifting on from one disastrous stage to another, had made the chances of the acceptance of such a scheme more remote in 1880-1 than in 1877. The President himself, after his formal protest, retired into private life as a Government pensioner, and this state of a less dignified existence was not without its advantages. The full coffers of Great Britain were a pleasing spectacle to the eye of this official, who

had been accustomed to look into the empty exchequer of his Republic.

The question of the justice or injustice of the annexation has been most freely canvassed. By some it has been stigmatised as a high-handed and oppressive act, of which the English people should always be ashamed. It has been defended by others as an act which was, to say the worst of it, certainly premature, but rendered very imperative by the general state of affairs. It is well to consider what would, in all probability, have been the fate of the Transvaal if England had not thrown her shield of protection over it. It is probable that Secocœni and his clans would have continued to offer a serious and prolonged resistance to the impoverished burghers. The Basutos have since furnished us with an example of what armed natives can do behind entrenched positions in mountain fastnesses. Secocœni's "kop" might have been as impregnable to Leydenburg Boers as Thaba Bosigo, in Basutoland, has been to Cape Colonists. Behind Secocœni was King Cetywayo, with his 40,000 warriors burning to get at the Boers, and only restrained by the most urgent remonstrances of our officials in Natal. It is only too likely, then, that the Transvaal Boers, after a few years' experience of war and bankruptcy, would have asked of their

own accord to enter into a scheme of confederation under the British flag, if it were simply to save themselves. But what misery and want, to say nothing of black deeds of reprisal, might have been witnessed along the eastern borders!

Then Natal and its well-being deserved a thought. Had Cetewayo established his claim against the Boers with any success, the half million of Natal Kafirs might have become unsettled. A sudden and successful foray across the Tugela into Natal might have made the wave of war roll right up to the coast regions about Durban. British interests were deeply involved in keeping the peace along the border, and as the Boer Volksraad would not confederate even as their President proposed, the only course left was to annex. Moreover, many Transvaalers welcomed this annexation, especially the merchants and townsfolk, who brought money into the country and helped to develop its resources. The proportion of those who did not wish for annexation has been stated as five or six to one, but in this country it is impossible to arrive accurately at the number and nature of these protesting lists.

One mistake the British Government most certainly made was in placing a military governor over the Transvaal who had little sympathy with the Boer population. Had a civilian of the type

of President Brand been sent into the country, with the authority of the Queen, and carrying in his hand at first a fairly popular constitution, the British flag would in all probability still be floating over Pretoria.

It may be interesting to note the various expressions of opinion throughout the country after the annexation had become an accomplished fact. The *Volkstem*, a Dutch organ, remarked that the conditions on which the country had been taken over were most liberal, and that it was the best thing to accept the inevitable; but the *Zuid Afrikaan*, a Cape Town paper, encouraged the Transvaalers to keep up their independence; and the *Free State Express* professed to be so shocked at the act of Sir Theophilus Shepstone that it refused to believe any longer in the honour and straightforwardness of England, and said that the time had come to call out a commando to protect their own borders. As the editor of the *Express* was burnt in effigy in the Free State for his offensive articles against Great Britain, there was evidently a party who disagreed with him. Again, the *Friend of the Free State* congratulated the Transvaal on the change that had come over it. In the Cape Colony itself there were occasional expressions of disloyalty. Speeches were made in some of the small western villages, such as Malmesbury,



against it, and a memorial was published against annexation in the columns of the *Standard and Mail*, a Cape Town paper. In the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Fuller, a well-known politician, expressed an opinion, which was afterwards embodied in a substantial resolution, that the annexation of the Transvaal by Great Britain or some other power was inevitable, but that the Chamber itself could not travel into the question of politics involved. The Natal Chamber of Commerce was more explicit, and passed a resolution asserting that "the late condition of affairs in the Transvaal was injurious to trade, and that the annexation would tend to the prosperity and welfare of South Africa."

That Sir Henry Bulwer approved of annexation is conveyed in the following extract from an opening speech, delivered in Natal (June 7th, 1877), by his Excellency before the Natal Legislature:—

"The hostilities which broke out last year between the Government of the Transvaal Republic and the natives living on their north-east boundaries brought about a very serious and critical condition of affairs in that State, which could not but greatly compromise the position and interest of the colony and the neighbouring countries. Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the dangers which are likely to ensue

from an extension of these hostilities, appointed Sir Theophilus Shepstone, for many years the Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal, and a member of the Council, to proceed on a special commission to that country for the purpose of inquiring into the origin and circumstances of these hostilities, with a view to the adoption of such measures as might seem most expedient for the termination of the existing disturbances. . . . The result has been the establishment of her Majesty's authority and rule in the Transvaal, a change which has been effected to the satisfaction and relief of the great bulk of the inhabitants, and accepted as the best remedy for the calamitous condition into which the country had fallen. The substitution of strength, security, and order in the place of weakness, insecurity, and disorganisation, cannot fail to have the most beneficial effects upon the country, and to contribute largely to the welfare of the people and the development of their resources."

It has been stated that Sir Henry Barkly was opposed to the annexation, but those who have made the statement could scarcely have studied the letters patent to appoint Sir Theophilus Shepstone. It is there laid down that unless the circumstance were imperative, no proclamation was to be issued by the Special Commissioner unless

as follows: "Let us examine by the light of official documents how far the righteous and sensitive mind of Mr. Gladstone was influenced by the struggles of the Boers for independence. The voice of the man in office is very different to the voice of the popular orator on the hustings. In the speech from the throne (January, 1881), when we might have looked for some intimation of that righteous spirit of repudiating dishonourable transactions entered into by an unholy Government, the following paragraph occurs: 'A rising in the Transvaal has recently imposed upon me the duty of taking military measures with a view to the prompt vindication of my authority, and has of necessity set aside for the time any plans for securing to the European settlers that full control over their own local affairs, without prejudice to the interests of the natives, which I have been desirous to confer.' No wonder that General Joubert, speaking in the flush of victory at Mount Prospect (March, 1881), might ask, with telling irony, why the Prime Minister had not carried out his promise of restoration."

This General, as well as the other Boers, definitely stated again and again that they would like to know why Mr. Gladstone had not carried out his promise to restore the Transvaal to its rightful owners, because he considered the

annexation a disgraceful act. They could not understand how it was the Prime Minister of England could make a promise publicly and then refuse to stand by his word. A telegram to Sir Owen Lanyon, the military governor, would have been sufficient, and nothing appeared to the Boer minds—simple and unsophisticated, no doubt, and unversed in the turns of party warfare and the devices of an electioneering campaign—more easy than the simple act of restitution from one they believed to have been really their champion.

In the whole vexatious story of the Transvaal annexation there is no more pitiful episode than these electioneering promises of Mr. Gladstone. Sir Theophilus Shepstone might have made a mistake or exceeded his instructions in hoisting the British flag prematurely at Pretoria, and Sir Henry Barkly might have been misinformed as to the attitude of the Boer population ; Sir Henry Bulwer might have thought too much of the safety of Natal and the security of her borders when he endorsed what Sir Henry Barkly had done ; even Lord Carnarvon might with prudence have held his hand and allowed his scheme to work down into the minds of the African population, and might therefore have regretted that he thrust the idea of confederation forward too soon ; but one and all of these men, acting and speaking

in their official capacity, really seemed to take an earnest and statesmanlike view of the whole question, and to consider what was expedient for South Africa generally.

But no such excuse can possibly be found for the great Radical leader, and the very climax of contradiction was arrived at when he discovered, after the final disaster at Majuba Hill, that he had exposed himself to a charge of bloodguiltiness in South Africa. Then followed the surrender, the peace with the fiction of suzerainty, invented for the purpose, ostensibly, of protecting the natives. How the Boer conventions were broken is a matter of history. Month after month gloomy records have come from South Africa of the gradual extirpation of two loyal chiefs, Moshette and Montsioa, until public opinion was aroused at last by the murder of Mr. Christopher Bethell.

Of all the causes, therefore, that operated to bring about the Transvaal uprising, the sympathy of prominent official and unofficial persons in England herself was the most important. Such a sympathy strengthened the Boers in the belief that they had a grievance, and they borrowed this belief from the highest authority they could see. Moreover, a certain national and Afrikaner sentiment was diligently fanned into life and activity by a knot of politicians living at such places as the

Paarl and Stillenbosch, villages in the western province of the Cape Colony. Nor was the usual figure of the Irish Fenian absent, since an agitator, in the person of a certain Mr. Aylward, took care to strengthen the notion amongst the Boers that they had a great national grievance. At the same time England's difficulties elsewhere seemed to be the Transvaal's opportunity. Her hands were full in Europe in 1880, and the outlook north of India was gloomy and depressing. In Zululand the disaster of our troops at Isandlwana had a bad moral effect, and the Boers resolved to throw down the gauntlet by treacherously waylaying and shooting down the 94th at Bronker's Spruit, in December, 1880.

The Transvaal Republic has now virtually gained its independence by the convention of London in 1884. The nominal authority supposed to have been exercised by England over the country by virtue of her rights as suzerain power have been removed, and there has been a very widespread idea that England, weary of her South African difficulties, would be desirous of retiring from the continent altogether, and abdicating her position as paramount power. Fortunately the recent declaration of Lord Derby has reassured both Englishmen and colonists; and the creation of an "Empire League" in South Africa

itself, amongst English and Dutch alike, is a wholesome sign that there is no desire on the part of many loyal colonists to separate themselves from the British empire. The Transvaal State itself has scarcely had time to make the steady progress of the sister Republic of the Free State, but it has made up for its want of material growth and internal development by an exceedingly ambitious programme. It has been the desire of its rulers to take the lead in an "Afrikander" movement which shall enlist sympathisers from the Zambesi to Cape Point. One of the cardinal points of their policy would be to remove from South Africa the influence of the English Colonial Office, develop a protectionist policy, and pursue a separate treatment of the native races. The idea of an "Afrikander" flag is also distinctly put forward. To all those who are acquainted with the history of South Africa it is evident that while the "Afrikander" party have certainly some grievances to complain of in their treatment by English politicians, these cannot be considered of sufficient weight to warrant the establishment of an African empire on its own basis in South Africa. In the first instance, such an empire, having no command of the sea, would inevitably fall into the hands of such a power as France or Germany, in case they wished to take it. It would

have no position as a power in Europe, and would be unable to borrow money from older and richer countries for the purposes of improvements. Nor is it at all likely that such an "Afrikander" empire would ever be at peace and harmony with itself. There is a very large admixture of English people in the population, and although they do not compose much more than a half of the whole white population of South Africa, they constitute the most adventurous and enterprising element, and their numbers are every day being recruited by immigration. It is certainly true that immigration into Africa does not assume the colossal aspect it does in America and the Australias, but that which does exist will in course of time diminish the present inequality between the later English element and the old Dutch-French settlers.

Another great objection to a proposed Afrikaner empire under the Afrikander flag lies in the fact that the indebtedness of the Cape Colony to the English bondholders amounts to about thirty or forty millions. It is hardly likely that England will surrender any part of an empire in which she is so deeply interested from a pecuniary point of view. The lucky sharpshooters of the Transvaal have every reason to be congratulated on the easy way in which they won their



independence, but it depends very much on how they use it in the early stages whether it can be asserted that it is an unmixed benefit for them. When the Transvaal delegates were haggling with Lord Derby in 1884, they seized the opportunity of paying a visit to most of the European capitals, and in the month of April they were entertained at Paris by the Geographical Society. M. de Lesseps presided, and toasted the Presidents of the French and South African Republics. He pointed to a large map of Africa, and called attention to the growth of France on the African continent. She was, he said, firmly installed in Tunis, Algeria, and Senegal, and was pushing down by the Congo, and also in the east at many points on the Red Sea and Madagascar. She might soon give her hand there to the South African Republic to make its way to the coast. Now the only way the Republic can make its way to the coast is *viâ* Delagoa Bay, and this is a Portuguese possession, and the French could hardly help the Dutch republicans except by some act of annexation. At this meeting a good deal was made of the national sentiment supposed to be existing between the two countries, and allusion was made to the French Protestants who settled in Africa after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. A Frenchman of the name of Myre

de Villers became so enthusiastic over the sentimental connection and the firmer bonds of "parity of governmental institutions," that he promised that, as Holland was furnishing railways to the Boers, so France would give them steamboats, quite forgetting, or more probably still being in complete ignorance of, the fact that there is not a single navigable river in the Transvaal. *En passant* attention may be again drawn to the fact that the attempt in Holland to raise a paltry sum for railways in the Transvaal has completely failed. It would be as well for Frenchmen and Hollanders to state how much, in the sense of pecuniary aid, they love the Transvaalers.

At Berlin another cordial reception awaited the Transvaal delegates, and both Kaiser Wilhelm and Prince Bismarck showed them marked attention. The Prince was at this time maturing his colonial policy, and casting his eyes upon Angra Pequena and the west coast of Africa with a view to that annexation which occurred shortly afterwards. He, too, probably entertained the Boer delegates with a view to finding whether anything could be made out of them, not through "the parity of governmental institutions," but through their position as colonists of Holland. A great deal, therefore, was made of the blood tie between Germans and Hollanders for obvious

reasons. The Boer delegates were evidently so pleased with their first reception in Europe and the chorus of sympathy they attracted to themselves from the "nationality" point of view—it made little difference whether they were in Holland, France, or Germany, the nationality cry was just as loud in one country as the other—that when they returned to South Africa the idea got abroad amongst their officials that England could not or would not interfere between Boers and natives, as the whole official feeling of Europe was on their side. By the light of the "annexation" and "protectorate" craze that has swept over Europe, it may be advisable for the small community of 60,000 Transvaalers to reflect whether they may not be protected as fellow Germans by Germans, or fellow Frenchmen by Frenchmen. To be considered simply as a colony of Holland is not what the Transvaalers have fought for.

As it is, there has been something miraculous in the progress towards independence which the Transvaalers have made of late years, and they believe that their future is being worked out under the special protection of heaven. On one occasion lately their President called upon his brethren to discern the finger of God in the following coincidences. On the 27th of February,

1881, the battle of Amajuba was fought; on the 27th of February, 1884, the Convention was signed by the deputation in London. Again, August 8th was the day on which Natal was surrendered to England forty-two years ago; also on which the retrocession of the Transvaal took place in 1881; also on which the Convention of London was presented in 1884 to the Volksraad. With regard to these coincidences and the conclusions deduced therefrom by the worthy President, the thought occurs to an ordinary mind, just tainted with rationalism, that the faithful observation of the Convention of 1884 would be their most fitting and appropriate sequel. Such a faithful observation would prove that the Puritan republicans were alive not only to the grace of the miraculous interposition they claim, which after all may not be confined to any particular age or people, but also to the universally accepted rules of international good faith.

## IX.

### MR. FROUDE AND SOUTH AFRICAN CONFEDERATION.

It is a somewhat melancholy task to touch upon the subject of confederation in South Africa. The policy is a wrecked one, and the Permissive Bill of 1877 is dead and buried. The recollections are, then, of sorrow and regret varying in their emotional intensity according to the degree men hoped good things of the movement. Many distinguished men were connected with it, and chief amongst them the conspicuous figure of the late Sir Bartle Frere, whose fortunes seemed to be so closely bound up with the successful ending of confederation, rises up before us with all the pathos of vanished greatness. He was the chosen instrument by means of whom Lord Carnarvon hoped to weld together in a compact mass the scattered and disorganised communities in South Africa. Such a programme has been rarely entrusted to a colonial governor. The South

African difficulty had been a thorn in the side of the Colonial Office ever since 1820. Could not it be finally settled by the efforts of intellect and statescraft, and the personal qualities of the very best men procurable? If Lord Carnarvon, by reason of his former success in North America, and his wide views of Imperial requirements, was the very best author of a confederation scheme, who could be a better coadjutor and expounder of this scheme than the illustrious Froude? No man could question his literary fame or his achievements in historic research; and it seemed that no more eloquent expounder of a great idea to a young nation could be found than the man who had written so much upon the growth and progress of historical ideas in past time, and so vividly realised their meaning. Great as Sir Bartle Frere was both in his life and antecedents, he might have, on the face of it, been considered fortunate in this position of a chosen opifex of a confederation scheme devised by the wit of Lord Carnarvon and advocated by the eloquence of Mr. Froude.

In the first instance and upon the first showing, no confederation scheme could have been brought to the light under fairer auspices than this South African one. The time chosen for its introduction was apparently a suitable one, the

governorship of Sir Henry Barkly having been a comparatively peaceful one, and coming after a tolerably peaceful period—as peace goes in South Africa. Full constitutional government had been given to the Cape, and the gratitude of these colonists presumably secured; Natal, being a Crown colony, was necessarily at the beck and call of the Imperial Government; Griqualand West and the Diamond Fields were prosperous and amenable; and the only states to be wooed and won were the Dutch Republics of the Free State and the Transvaal. The latter State seemed to be drifting into an utterly impecunious and hopeless condition during the Secocœni wars, and might not unreasonably be thought likely to welcome the ægis of British protection. The Free State was a successful and well-governed community, ruled over by a sensible President in the person of Mr. Brand, who himself had received an English education and an English legal training in London, and so might be persuaded, at his instigation, as well as that of other men of light and leading in the Republic, to fall in with a statesmanlike plan of South African unity.

Such, at least, might the state of affairs have appeared to many English politicians, who, without the means of calculating the force of local influences, concluded that, beyond the shadow of

a doubt, confederation was the thing for South Africa. . Even now, at this distance of time, such observers and reasoners may be excused if they never cease to wonder over the failure of the Conference and the scarcely decent sepulture of the Permissive Bill.

Moreover, in 1867, by means of the British North American Act, a large number of French and English settlers had been welded together into a fairly homogeneous whole, and the Dominion of Canada might have been taken as a standing example of the value and efficacy of colonial confederation. It might be argued, therefore, that if English and French settlers could be united in a dominion in one part of the globe, why could not English and Dutch be united in another part of the globe? There was a plausibility about the analogy which was particularly attractive. Again, supposing that some opposition might be encountered at first from the independent Dutch States in South Africa, had not a similar opposition been encountered and disposed of in the case of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick? The hostility of the maritime provinces was a notable feature in the history of the North American Act, but it had been entirely overcome, and the conversion of the New Brunswickers had been an almost inconceivably sudden



one. Of course it is a platitude to maintain, in the face of this form of parallel reasoning, that historical analogies in history are very untrustworthy, especially when the diversities of race, temperament, and general conditions were so faintly marked, and constituted in themselves at least an unknown danger in South Africa ; but this platitude will bear reassertion, because in all the discussions on South African confederation men were loth to recognise *real facts and cardinal distinctions*.

Again, the very magnitude of the idea of confederation, its obvious advantages, its external symmetry, and its logical completeness, recommend themselves to the superficial observer who has not taken the trouble to look below the surface and calculate with any exactness the working of local prejudices. At the present moment it may seem surprising, perhaps even disappointing, to many that one most important colony of Australia—New South Wales—should stand aloof from her sister colonies (in 1884), and decline to discuss for the present the preliminaries of confederation ; but in the elaboration of a colonial confederation scheme, or even in the preliminaries leading to a conference, there are so many local views to be considered and prejudices of all kinds to be conciliated, that nothing can possibly be gained by

precipitate action, whilst every advantage waits on delay. The confederation of a group of colonies must resemble in its growth a plant which may be fostered and encouraged by a friendly hand, but can never be forced to develop beyond its proper and normal rate. It must be a healthy endogen, not an exogen, with a growth from within and not from outside.

In South Africa, the story of the negotiation in the country itself about a conference, and the outdoor discussions on the general subject of confederation, is a very complicated and at the same time a very extraordinary one. The gentleman chosen by Lord Carnarvon to familiarise the colonists with the idea of confederation, and to persuade them to take a part in a conference in London, was Mr. J. A. Froude. There seems to have been from the very first a considerable amount of doubt about the character of his mission, not completely cleared up even now, although the perusal of transactions, speeches, and proceedings would warrant the conclusion that although Mr. Froude was not an official emissary in the strictest sense of the word, he spoke and acted very much like one. He certainly held a brief for Lord Carnarvon, and brought all the rhetorical skill of a special pleader to further his case, but apparently with-

out holding publicly a letter of instructions. In a certain sense praise, and in a certain sense blame, was awarded to Mr. Froude in the statement given before the House of Commons (August, 1877) by Mr. Lowther, when he said, "It would be unbecoming to him, nor did he feel inclined to justify the whole of Mr. Froude's proceedings to the House of Parliament. While that gentleman had rendered most valuable services to the Colonial Office, and to that country in which he had performed a patriotic and thankless task, he (Mr. Lowther) could not accept the obligation of accounting for all the proceedings of this eminent man during his absence from the country. Mr. Froude was in no sense a representative of her Majesty in South Africa. He was not a governor, but was employed in a special service without remuneration, and the Colonial Office was not called upon to be responsible for all his movements." Further on, with reference to the fact of Mr. Froude's attending a political dinner at Port Elizabeth, he says, "While Mr. Froude was no doubt performing great public services, he was quite as much justified in attending a dinner at Port Elizabeth as he would have been at home in attending a dinner at St. James's Hall." This latter remark was an answer to the Cape ministers who, at one stage of the conference discussion,

“brought to the notice of the Secretary of State the inconvenient and, they ventured to think, unprecedented course adopted by an Imperial delegate or commissioner in agitating a colony against the Ministry.” What Mr. Froude did say at Port Elizabeth, September 10th, 1875, was, “That very exceptional reasons had made him speak out and adopt a different course than that of reserve. He thought that the people of the Cape Colony were with him. He said that the Government of the Cape had put themselves out of court in consequence of a hasty resolution pushed through the Assembly in twenty-four hours.” He alluded to the reception of the dispatch of Lord Carnarvon in May, 1875. He further said that the conference might be held at Pietermaritzburg, in Natal, and that he would suspend it for a few weeks to find out the feeling of the people. It cannot be denied that if Mr. Froude was not deputed to act as a plenipotentiary, he was disposed to act very much like one.

It must be recollected that Mr. Froude paid two separate visits to South Africa. He first arrived at Cape Town on September 22nd, 1874. He left on the 25th for Natal, and returned to Cape Town on January 8th, 1875, and took his passage to England on January 10th. He spent therefore a very few days at Cape Town and in the Western

Province—not more than five—the rest being spent in Natal and the east.

On the second occasion he landed at Cape Town on June 18th, 1875, having been absent a little over five months. He followed Lord Carnarvon's dispatch very quickly, and was much surprised to hear that it had been treated cavalierly by the Cape Government. Here it was that he was probably irritated and induced to change his attitude of a mere expounder of Imperial views for that of a bellicose advocate.

In his first speeches addressed to the colonies in 1874 he had ostentatiously disclaimed a political character. At the Diamond Fields he said, "I am travelling about your country as an Englishman of letters for my own amusement. I have come to see the English of the future." In the Free State, before a crowded audience who hung upon his words, he reiterated his object in nearly the same words, and said, "I am but a private man of letters travelling for my private amusement." Further on he is reported thus: "I see that it is insinuated that I have some official connection with the Home Government. If any word or action of mine has created such an impression, I am the most arrant impostor." Colonists themselves did not quite know what to make of the man of letters travelling for his own amusement. They

admired his literary genius ; they paid him all the homage his great fame demanded ; his antecedents were emblazoned before him, and his literary fame in the world of letters paraded in the forefront of every address presented to him by the delighted inhabitants of every village and town. But this political rôle—what of this ?

The *Cape Argus* of November 17, 1874, says, "That learned gentleman (Mr. Froude) came to the Cape, as he will proceed to the other colonies afterwards, not as an agent of Mr. Disraeli's Government, not as an emissary from the Colonial Office in any respect." But the *Natal Witness* of October 27, 1874, says, "The colony does not seem to have realised the important changes which have taken place in our political prospect during the present month." (There was a talk of annexing Natal to the Cape, of course as a preliminary to confederation.) "A distinguished gentleman from the mother country has been amongst us, one who appears to have the confidence of the Imperial Government, and who indeed seems to be the private commissioner of that Government sent out to report on the aspect of affairs in South Africa."

The *Standard and Mail*, November 14, 1874, remarks, "We were not, however, until the arrival of the Natal post last night, aware that

Mr. Froude's presence in this land was so important and of such vast consequence. We confess having been taken quite aback when we discovered that he is here as the confidential adviser of Lord Carnarvon; that upon his report the form of adjustment of the territorial question now agitating the various Governments and States greatly depends."

Against this interpretation there are certainly Mr. Froude's own statements; but what are the facts? At Kimberley, Pretoria, Bloemfontein, and Port Elizabeth he was publicly entertained and fêted in a way no private man would have been. Why did he allow himself to be thus treated? Colonists do not worship genius on so extravagant a scale; and, curiously enough, the floating of certain political ideas were synchronous with Mr. Froude's advent. How did the idea of confederation come about? Also the idea of annexing Natal to the Cape Colony?

The *Argus*, on June 12, 1875, says when Mr. Sprigg spoke upon confederation in the House of Assembly (June 11, 1875), "the fault seems to be that the British Government desires to get rid of certain encumbrances in South Africa, and are using Mr. Froude as their agent in this matter." The *Argus*, in November, 1874, had looked upon Mr. Froude simply as a traveller passing through

the country for his own amusement, with the idea of proceeding to other colonies.

Such is some of the conflicting evidence with regard to Mr. Froude's mission and its nature. The Home Government said that he had nothing to do with the Colonial Office. The Cape Ministry maintained that he acted as if he were an official sent to upset themselves and convert the country. The Dutch Boers certainly thought he spoke with authority, and both Cape and Natal papers *ultimately* regarded his words and statements as of official value. The doubt that hung over the whole nature of his mission necessarily did more harm than good.

With regard to Mr. Froude's speeches delivered at various places in South Africa, they are interesting not only by reason of the permanent element of the picturesque in them—for Mr. Froude saw the picturesque where the practical colonists could not or would not see it—but as furnishing a commentary on the present state of affairs in South Africa. In many of his remarks Mr. Froude wished to emphasise the idea of an "Afrikander" nationality, and he gave an extravagant attention to the character of the Dutch voertrekkers. On one occasion he flattered them egregiously, and compared them with the digger population of Kimberley, in which the latter



suffered severely. He is reported as saying to the Dutch at Bloemfontein:—

“When I looked on the population swarming at the Diamond Fields, with those enormous piles as monuments of their *unprofitable labour*, and when I considered along with it that it was the imagined wealth which these mines were producing that had set South Africa on fire with all these new aspirations, I thought again of what Horace said of the men of progress in the age of Augustus—

‘Non his juvenus orta parentibus  
Infecit æquor sanguine Punico  
Pyrrhumque et ingentem cecidit  
Antiochum Hannibalemque dirum ;

‘Sed rusticorum mascula militum  
Proles, Sabellis docta ligonibus  
Versare glebas et severae  
Matris ad arbitrium recisos

‘Portare fustes . . .’

The men of the Diamond Fields were not men of the same stamp as those who in the English and Dutch fleets dyed the English Channel with the blood of the Spaniards of the Armada. Then, as always, the soldiers who risked their lives in defence of their country were the hardy yeomanry and peasantry and fishermen who were fighting for home and fireside. What interest have miners, and storekeepers, and speculators in the inde-

pendence of South Africa? Under any flag they can equally pursue their trade, and gain such ends as they are contending for. . . . You have the misfortune to possess a soil and climate of unexampled excellence, and a position on the globe the most attractive to every ambitious and aggressive Power. The independence of South Africa will come when you can reply to these Powers with shot and shell (vociferous cheering); and you will do that when you have ceased to turn your energies into the most immediate and easy way of making money for yourselves, and have set heartily to work to bring out the resources of your soil. I honour and admire the achievement of national independence, because it can be achieved only by courage and self-denial and hardihood of habit of life." Concluding with some practical advice, Mr. Froude bade the worthy Dutchmen "to enclose their wildernesses, plough, dig, drain, sow, and breed up a hardy population whose home would be South Africa, and whose hopes would be centred there. Then they might hope to see their own confederate flag float over South Africa."

One more extract from a letter to the *Times*, dated London, March 25, 1875, in which Mr. Froude alludes again to the Diamond Fields. He says, "Mountains of gravel witness to the toil

which has been expended at the Diamond Fields. When the diamonds are gone the gravel-heaps will remain, evidence of labour which is thenceforth unproductive. The same labour expended in enclosing, planting, draining, and reclaiming the soil, if less remunerative for the moment, would bear fruit for all future time. The entire materials of the town of Kimberley—canvas, iron, and even deal planks—have been brought from England. I was at a dinner at Kimberley where, except the mutton and the bad water, everything consumed had travelled up in waggons from the coast. Surely this is but a one-sided, unwholesome, unenduring prosperity.”

Now, with all due deference to Mr. Froude's sagacity as a traveller and acute observer of men and things, it ought in justice to be stated on behalf of the diamond industry that it came into existence at a most opportune time, when the financial condition of the Cape Colony was unusually depressed. It enabled farmers to pay off heavy mortgages by giving them a new and profitable occupation; it employed their oxen in the immense transport trade that sprung up, and incidentally, by causing a check to pastoral pursuits, gave the trampled and well-worn veldt a rest; and how much this rest was needed agriculturists at the Cape are well aware. Young

farmers went up to the fields as diggers, and were often rewarded with a lucky find ; business men speculated, and an impetus given to trade generally. Mr. Froude, therefore, was hardly just in saying that the piles of rubbish excavated from the mines were "monuments of unprofitable toil."

In a paper recently read (November, 1884) before the Fellows of the Colonial Institute by the Hon. J. X. Merriman, a Cape ex-minister, a brief recapitulation of the results of this "one-sided, unwholesome, unenduring prosperity," is given. He says that "during the last fifteen years the four principal diamond mines have turned out, at the most moderate computation, a gross value of diamonds amounting to *over thirty millions* sterling. The yearly reports which pass through the registration office amount to nearly three millions per annum, and there is only too much reason to believe that at least another half-million pounds' worth per annum of stolen diamonds found their way out of the country by means of the illicit trade. Kimberley itself is a large town of some 20,000 inhabitants, within seventy-five miles of the railway terminus, and destined, unless untoward political circumstances stand in the way, to be the *entrepôt for the interior trade* of a vast region of which we now know little or nothing. The industry itself

has assumed a settled phase, and has every promise of permanence. Twelve hundred Europeans are employed in the mines, and 8,500 natives. The weekly wage paid to Europeans averages from £4 to £5 per week, and to natives 25s., with lodging. The total paid away weekly is not less than £18,000, or at the rate of nearly a million a year," &c., &c. Mr. Froude must confess that this is a valuable asset for a colony to have, and compares fairly well with the property of the "mascula proles" of the Free State, which yields them by taxation a modest £100,000 annually. Even if the mines were suddenly exhausted the piles need not be considered "unprofitable," if the only result left were a railway to Kimberley, and a centre whence trade ventures might steer towards the interior. From a strategic as well as commercial point of view Kimberley occupies a splendid position.

Mr. Froude, however, reflects somewhat on the character of the "digger community," and insinuates that they were deficient in that native hardihood he attributes to the Free Staters and the "rustica proles;" but to those who know the character of the Diamond Fields' population this insinuation seems not to be justified. It would be possible to recruit, as it has been possible to recruit, from the Diamond Fields a body of men

equal to the Boers in every physical respect, and probably braver.

But the point of Mr. Froude's remarks and the force of his compliments were probably lost to the Boer when he quoted Horace. Poor "Oom Paul" and his sons must have wondered what this jingling of new words and phrases meant, a classical education having been a myth or at best a tradition to them—if even that—for generations. Neither could the diamond diggers have been deeply impressed with Mr. Froude's imaginative comparisons when, speaking of the "*rustica proles*," their rivals in prosperity, he remarked, "I saw young women who might have stepped down from the canvas of Van Eyck; I saw young men who might have sat to Teniers." There is nothing very romantic about Dutch Boers, whether men or women, especially in the opinion of those who know them; and recent events, from the treacherous ambushade at Bronker's Spruit and the massacre of the 94th, to the murder of Christopher Bethell, prove that whatever good qualities the race generally may have, generosity and good faith must not be included.

Again, when Mr. Froude complained of the number of tinned and preserved meats and vegetables at Kimberley, he might have reflected that it was chiefly owing to the fact that the neigh-

bouring agricultural population had neglected their pursuits and had refused to handle the "ligo" that these tinned meats and vegetables had to be imported.

But Mr. Froude might with impunity have quoted Latin to the Boers, spoken of Teniers or Van Eyck to the Kimberley diggers, have seen historical resemblances in an oratorical frenzy, and even grumbled at a bad dinner at Kimberley, and proclaimed to the world that no good could come out of a place where cabbages cost 17s. each, had he not touched another chord. As clearly as he could he spoke to the Afrikanders of an Afrikander nationality.

There was vociferous cheering at Bloemfontein when Mr. Froude said, "The independence of South Africa will come when you can reply to hostile Powers with shot and shell." And further on he wound up by alluding to the time when, after having developed the resources of their country, "they might hope to see their own confederate flag float over South Africa." But at Worcester, a village in the Western Province, where most of the population are Dutch, Mr. Froude was still more explicit. The proceedings at this place being typical, are worth citing, as they prove what kind of political rôle Mr. Froude took upon himself. Incidentally this may throw

light upon that dream of an independent South Africa which has expressed itself of late years in the creation of such a society as the "Afrikaner Bond," and the desire to separate from the British empire. Upon being introduced to the company by the Rev. W. Murray, the minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, this gentleman said, "There was one thing which, if Mr. Froude would let him, he would speak of with regret, and it was that Mr. Froude had not learned to speak Dutch. He was quite sure that many who were present would agree with him. Most of them could understand Mr. Froude, but still they would like him to learn Dutch, *not book Dutch, but the Dutch of the country.*" Anyone who is at all acquainted with this jejune, coarse, and contemptible patois, containing not more than about 500 words in its whole vocabulary, would scarcely envy Mr. Froude, the great English scholar and master of the English language, such an intellectual exercise. However, his complaisance seemed to be so great that the worthy burghers of Worcester, through their spokesman, a cosmopolitan Scotchman who occupied a Dutch pulpit, thought they might ask him to do anything, even learn their patois. In reply, Mr. Froude spoke as if he were the official interpreter of Lord Carnarvon's ideas, and his speech is noticeable in



this respect as well as some others. He said, "Let me tell you generally, gentlemen, what Lord Carnarvon desires from this country. He recognises, we all recognise, that the European inhabitants of South Africa are growing up into a great nation. It is so; it must be so. You have only to look at the map to see what a splendid position you occupy. Your resources are enormous. You have in you the vigour and energy of the races whence you are sprung. Nothing can stop you. Then what is our position towards you? If you are to grow, you must grow your way, not ours. English statesmen, therefore, wish to leave you to yourselves, to leave you the full management of your own internal affairs, whilst we confine ourselves to the protection of your coasts. . . . We protect you with our fleet and with our flag. We ask you for nothing in return but the Imperial station at Simonstown, and an assurance that if we are ever again at war the resources of this country will be at our service and not at that of our enemies."

Further on Mr. Froude says, "At present you are in your nonage, but a time will come when you will arrive at maturity, as well as the privileges of a full and perfect nationality. If you wish to leave us and the British empire we shall

regret your loss, but we shall not oppose your inclination," &c.

As far as words could express it, no more direct invitation could have been given to the Dutchmen and the Boers to break away from the British empire if they felt so inclined. When Mr. Froude remarked that "English statesmen wished to leave the Dutchmen and the colonists to themselves," it is an immense pity that they did not do so in this very matter of confederation, and allow them to develop a plan of their own without agitation, rhetoric, and outside pressure. Practically Mr. Froude approves of a Monroe doctrine for the colonists, and then asks for Simonstown. Would it be possible in the future for England to leave South Africa to the South Africans, and calculate upon holding Simonstown as a naval station, when it is well known that it cannot be held unless Table Bay and Cape Town are held too? Apparently there is no thought on the part of Mr. Froude that this land of South Africa ought to remain as long as possible a permanent and integral portion of the British empire, and that any possible severance of interest should be opposed to the utmost. Imperial unity is kept in the background, in order that the *amour propre* of an unprogressive Dutch population might be flattered, and

themselves cajoled into a confederation scheme. The sequel of events in South Africa has been a suggestive commentary on the speeches of Mr. Froude, given as though from an irresponsible agent, but really received as official in their character. Mr. Froude's hints about an Afrikander nation were as seeds falling upon fertile and well-prepared ground. Had Mr. Froude, with his love of historical studies, referred back more carefully to some events of South African history as illustrated in the Dutch Republics since 1854, he would have known and felt that he was treading upon dangerous ground when he preached to the Boers what was practically a Monroe doctrine. Ever since Pretorius led the emigrant Boers into Natalia there had been some effort to found an independent and hostile State. There had been extreme tension between the Boers and the British for more than a generation, and the grievance of the Emancipation Act had been followed by the grievances the Free State brought against the Home Government on account of the Basutos and of Griqualand West. As late as November, 1874, the year before Mr. Froude paid his first visit to the Cape, President Burgers had made a strong appeal before the Volksraad to the sentiment of unity amongst all Afrikanders, from Table Mountain to

Magaliesburg. He deprecated the barrier that prevented candidates for office coming from the Free State, and he assured the Raad that at the foot of Table Mountain itself hearts were throbbing more warmly for the Republic than perhaps even in the Free State itself. In the Transvaal War many Free Staters joined the ranks of their fellow republicans in answer to the famous nationality appeal of the Triumvirate, "Africa for the Afrikanders under an Afrikander flag from the Zambesi to Cape Point." Even at any subsequent time the war cry may be heard across the border and enlist Free Staters on behalf of the Transvaal, or Transvaalers on behalf of the Free State. *Mutatis mutandis*, the Transvaal seems actually to have carried out, or to be endeavouring to carry out, the advice Mr. Froude gave to the Free State when he said, "Show that at least there is one State in South Africa sincere in its aspirations for the establishment of a South African nation which shall be independent indeed. The contagion of your example may spread; the spirit of your national life may penetrate the veins of the entire country; and the day may come when we shall witness one new free country amongst the communities of the world."

The question arises, Did Mr. Froude really know what kind of seed he was sowing in 1875?

Did he recognise the fact that ever behind the scheme of Imperial confederation, and sheltering itself behind its convenient plausibility, stalked the phantom of an Afrikaner nationality, ready to rush forward from its disguise, and, flag in hand, assert itself, no longer as a phantom, but as a hostile and implacable reality. The time came for open assertion not immediately after the failure of confederation, although it received first nutriment and careful fostering then, but after the blood-stained fields of Ingogo and Majuba. The lucky sharpshooters of the Transvaal replied by rifle-bullets, and gained a South African and world-wide reputation; but were they to enter unchallenged upon the heritage of a South African empire, fought for and won by generations of Englishmen along the eastern borders since 1806, at a vast expenditure of blood and money? Did Mr. Froude ever dream that his words could be quoted by a hostile and alien race of men, not only as an excuse for, but an incentive to, their attempts to break up the unity of the British empire? Was the cause of confederation worth advocating at such a cost as this? The probability is that Mr. Froude laboured under two cardinal misconceptions, owing to faulty observation. In his depreciation of the mining and commercial industry, and exaltation of the Boer

or agricultural element, he proved that he could not or would not see where the real prosperity of the country at that time lay. In his partisan addresses to the Dutch themselves he recklessly introduced, perhaps unwittingly, nationalist ideas, and therefore trod upon dangerous ground.

Lord Carnarvon's despatch reached the Cape before Mr. Froude. It was dated May 4th, 1875, and got to the Cape some time about June 10th. The Legislative Assembly were discussing the budget when this important document fell into their midst almost like a bombshell. No other document had ever been sent to the Cape rivalling it in interest. Railway loans and the budget paled in interest before it. The Cape Assembly was scarcely ready to receive it, and it may be considered an unfortunate thing that Mr. Froude was not present at the time to explain its drift. As it was, the first note of dissatisfaction came from Mr. Sprigg, when he placed upon paper immediately a notice of motion in the House of Assembly, which was tantamount to a rebuke to Lord Carnarvon. The words were these: "That this House, without giving any opinion as to the expediency of assembling a conference of delegates of the various colonies and states of South Africa for the purpose of considering the several questions mentioned in the despatch of the Right Honour-

able the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated May 4, 1875, desires to express its approval of the minute of ministers upon that despatch ; and it is of opinion that, *this colony being possessed of responsible government*, it is desirable that any such proposal as that contained in the despatch should, as far as this colony is concerned, come from its own Government, acting in harmony with the Legislature, who are best able to judge of the time and occasion on which such a proposal could be considered with most advantage to the people of this colony." There was no mistake in the meaning of this somewhat verbose motion. It was seconded by Mr. Solomon, a well-known Cape philanthropist, and carried by a majority of 32 to 23. As far as the character of the despatch went, it was courteous and mild enough. It was simply suggestive in its terms, and in it Lord Carnarvon said, *inter alia*, "As I have already said, the more immediate benefit which I should look for would be some satisfactory understanding on the native question." In the Legislative Council the despatch fared somewhat better. One of the members spoke up for Lord Carnarvon's courteous despatch, although he thought that it would have been more politic if no names had been mentioned for the conference, to which observation Mr. Molteno, the Premier, said, "Hear, hear." It should

be remarked that he had been himself named for the Western Province. Ultimately a vote of thanks, equivalent to a very barren appreciation of the measure, was carried in the Upper House by 9 to 7. Therefore it cannot be said that the despatch was enthusiastically received even by the Upper Chamber.

Another incident should be noticed in reference to the reception of this despatch, as it illustrates the position of the Governor himself and that of the Cape Ministry, together with the electioneering attitude of Mr. Froude. At a public banquet given to the latter neither Sir Henry Barkly nor the Ministry were present, and for this reason—the banquet had assumed a political character, and the utterances of Mr. Froude were explicit enough and of clear political bearing. Mr. Froude's position suffers when we consider that he was a simple nominee of Lord Carnarvon in a conference that was still *in nubibus*, and the very existence of which was left to the option of the Colonial Government. Mr. Froude, therefore, seems to have been constitutionally wrong in speaking in public and agitating for a conference which the elected Assembly had already disapproved of. In fact, about this time there is no question that Mr. Froude must have had some warnings of conscience that his position was an equivocal one,



for at this public dinner he said that he was not appealing to the people against the Ministry, but to the Ministry against themselves, in order to get them to change their minds; but this was simply a quibble. The Cape Parliament might have been precipitate in its condemnation of a conference scheme, and sceptical on the general advantages of confederation, but it could scarcely have been lectured into self-condemnation. This difficulty at the outset was certainly extremely vexatious, as it seemed likely to spoil everything, and the reasons are not altogether clear why the Assembly should have so treated the despatch. Apparently, Mr. Sprigg and his adherents did not formally resist it on the broad and really true ground that South Africa was not yet ready for confederation. Objections were raised to the question of initiation and the names of delegates, to the distinctions drawn between the East and West Provinces, and to the possible presidency of Sir Arthur Cunninghame, the Lieutenant-Governor, in case Sir Henry Barkly could not take it.

There is no doubt about the disappointment felt by Lord Carnarvon at the reception of the Conference despatch. He spoke angrily to Sir Henry Barkly, and the whole tone of his despatch in reply was one of irritation.

On a subsequent occasion Mr. Froude says that

it was received very cavalierly; and in one of his lectures on South Africa, delivered before the "Philosophic Institute" at Edinburgh, he remarks: "The despatch had arrived while the Cape Parliament were sitting. There was no haste, for it was to sit five weeks longer. I was myself to follow in a few days. If there was any doubt as to Lord Carnarvon's object, I should be on the spot to explain. The Ministers did not wait; they laid the despatch on the table with the minute condemning the interference of the Imperial Government with the affairs of the colony, and the despatch itself was read amid shouts of laughter. Violent resolutions were passed, declaring that it was for the colony to decide when it was expedient to raise questions affecting the interests of South Africa. Lord Carnarvon's action was interpreted as a sinister attempt to involve the colony in a quarrel with the Free State. The Dutch were, of course, more furious than ever; the conference was peremptorily rejected; one prominent orator described the vote which they gave as a slap in the face to Lord Carnarvon, another asking who Lord Carnarvon was? He might be a Minister in England, he was no Minister in the Cape Colony."

This account given by Mr. Froude is a highly coloured one. In reading the debate there is

nothing violent about it, and the Dutch were never furious at all; in fact, they were apathetic on the subject, both in the Free State and the Transvaal, and they only became enthusiastic in the colony itself when Mr. Froude drew a picture of United South Africa. Then they thought of Africa for the Afrikanders and an Afrikander flag.

On one constitutional point the Cape Ministers were probably wrong. It was urged that the initiation of such a measure as confederation should come from the colonists themselves.

Now, viewing the position which an English colony, as long as it is an English colony, holds towards the Queen and the Imperial Legislature, such an initiation is inadmissible. Upon this question Lord Carnarvon is clear. When speaking of the South African Bill he says: "For a Bill of this sort, or even for any measure preliminary to a Bill of this sort, Imperial legislation is needed. It is a political maxim, according to precedent, that an Act of this sort can be sufficient to unite or confederate one colony with another." But the fact seems to be that the point of initiation and the precise time at which confederation is needed, and therefore practicable, is a movable one, and depends on time and circumstances.

A word about the action of Lord Carnarvon.

His lordship was, as he always is, perfectly courteous in the matter, and when he proposed the Conference Bill to South Africa it was as though he said to the colonists, "Are you ready and anxious to come under one dominion? If so, here are my nominees for a conference, and here is the scheme itself." And there is no doubt that the scheme itself had been worked out most carefully in every detail, and it scarcely deserves to lie, where it does now, in the limbo of things forgotten.

In reply to Lord Carnarvon, the Cape Ministry said, "We are not ready, because we do not understand the whole drift of it, and are not prepared to take Natal responsibilities upon us." The Free State said, "We do not wish it." The Transvaal said, "We will not have it on any consideration." But Mr. Froude said, "You shall have it, and I will agitate the country and find out the sense of the inhabitants upon it." This was a bold course to take, in spite of the ministerial opposition of the Cape. In another way he had overshot the mark and raised suspicion. He had been careful to promise the Afrikaners the full control of their internal policy, and under this would come the native question. The philanthropical part of the Cape, under the leadership of Mr. Solomon, possessed

a good deal of influence in the colony itself and also in England, where they had the full sympathy of the Aborigines Protection Society and Mr. Chesson.

This society was alarmed at some of Mr. Froude's proceedings, and in a letter addressed to him by Mr. Chesson, just before he set out a second time for the Cape, the latter remarked, "In your speech at the Westminster Palace Hotel, you were understood to praise the native policy of the Dutch Boers. We believe that if that policy is ever introduced into the English colonies it would lead to slavery and disaster of every kind."

Mr. Solomon thought that this proposed conference was simply a conference upon the native question, and undoubtedly Mr. Solomon and the *Argus*, his accredited organ at that time, *were afraid of the native question being left entirely to colonial management.* It was thought "that Mr. Froude had publicly expressed his sympathy with the native policy of the Republics," meaning the Free State and the South African Republic.

This may account for Mr. Solomon's opposition, and it is perfectly true that Mr. Froude had said to the colonists of South Africa that their internal affairs would be entirely under their own management, and under internal affairs native juris-

diction would be understood to come. Perhaps, also, Mr. Solomon and his party were influenced by a letter which Mr. Froude wrote to the *Times*, in answer to Mr. Fuller, in which he said, "Five years ago it was suggested that we might keep the peninsula of Table Mountain with Simons-town, and might leave the continent to the Dutch and English inhabitants. I have the fullest confidence in the courage and energy of the people there. I do not doubt that, if left to themselves, they would dispose of all their difficulties. . . . *They would settle their relations with the natives* under conditions which would give these natives a better chance of real improvement than they have ever yet been allowed to have."

With regard to the opinions of officials in the Cape Colony, Sir Henry Barkly, Mr. Southey, and Sir John Molteno and others were, to say the least of it, opposed to precipitation in the matter of confederation, and were perfectly decided in their objections to public agitation. Nothing, however, could quench the energy of Mr. Froude. From the Cape he had gone to Natal, and when he first arrived there was a notion that he was to be gagged, but Mr. Froude soon dissipated this notion. At first he put a little decorous restraint upon himself, but as he seemed to feel the pulse of the country he waxed more explicit. He

acted as if he were the spokesman of Lord Carnarvon; in fact, he openly alluded to himself as Lord Carnarvon's representative in a letter written about this time to the mayor of Grahamstown. On the other hand, Lord Carnarvon in one of his despatches eulogised Mr. Froude, and asserted that he was employed in no official capacity, and had written no letter to his department as an official. But the Cape Ministry could not see the difference between the work of an official writer of despatches and the rôle of a political agitator.

As a set-off against the coldness of the Cape Ministry must be taken into consideration the warmth of the reception which Mr. Froude received in various parts of the country. But beneath superficial enthusiasm ran the cold and strong current of political expediency in the breasts of the enthusiasts. The Dutch of the Western Province shouted for Mr. Froude and for confederation, because they thought, as before stated, that under a scheme on the lines laid down by Mr. Froude they would have their own native policy and a certain independence, which has since found its expression in a remarkable manner. The men of the east liked the idea of confederation because it might give them a separate province and wider internal management, a thing

many of them have had at heart for a long time. It was on the whole a separatist feeling which prompted their good will. With regard to Natal, the reasons why they should wish to confederate with an old and rich colony like the Cape Colony are almost too obvious to be quoted.

At that time Natal had a population of only 20,000 or 30,000 white men, with a native population of 400,000 in their midst and around them. The Zulu question was awaiting solution on the east. The Cape Colony had a population of 350,000 white men, living comfortably under responsible Government, with the natives fairly well under their control. Partnership with such a community as this meant profit to the Natalians. The magnitude of Natal difficulties was shown in the immense expense of the Zulu war, which took place soon afterwards. As far as the Diamond Fields are concerned, Mr. Froude had underrated their wealth and influence, and had offended them by his remarks.

The attitude of Mr. Froude towards the Cape Premier, Sir John Molteno, deserves some notice. When he could not persuade him, he determined, if possible, to undermine his influence. It was *guerre à outrance*. Mr. Froude, therefore, put himself into opposition to the Cape Premier and the Cape Ministry. His mission is a record of



failure, affording instance after instance of ill-advised rhetoric and faulty observation. The only seed that he left behind him was that which since 1875 has been slowly germinating, and has threatened, and even still threatens, to blossom into that growth known to the world as the *Afrikander* Confederated Republic, claiming South Africa as its own—a distinct nation split from England and living under its own flag.

The conference proposal, after its first cold reception by the Cape Parliament, may be described as drifting slowly down to extinction. Occasionally spasmodic efforts were made to infuse fresh life into it, and there was more than one attempt to make it assume a new form; but it was doomed and could not live. By the general election at the Cape in 1878 the country was called upon to pronounce in favour or against it, and the verdict was apparently in favour of it; but the disturbed state of the frontier, especially along and beyond the Tugela, put off a definite measure. Then came the Boer rising in the Transvaal. It has been sometimes asserted that the annexation of the Transvaal was the means of wrecking the confederation scheme; but the fact whether the Transvaal was annexed or not by the Imperial Government could not possibly have removed the objections raised in the begin-

ning by the Cape Parliament. As the Cape Colony is considerably the older and more wealthy and populous community, the fate of a Confederation Bill must always hang upon its decision. Mr. Froude complained of the Jedburgh justice done to Lord Carnarvon's despatch, but he would have done well to have accepted the decision, and not have tried to test its validity before the bar of such uncertain public opinion as prevails in South Africa.

As far as the form of the Permissive Bill of 1877 went, Lord Carnarvon took every precaution to make it complete in all respects, provision being made for every possible contingency. The Bill leapt into the world full grown and in full panoply, like Athena from the head of Zeus. The more detailed objections of the colonists prove that they would have welcomed something less complete.

At first the principal idea thrust before the colonists was that of a conference at London. Lord Carnarvon preferred, if possible, a personal interview with the members, as such an interview was found profitable in the preliminaries of the North American Act. When the Cape Parliament treated Lord Carnarvon's despatch in 1875 with such "Jedburgh justice," they objected not only to the principle of initiation, which

they thought lay as much with themselves as with the Imperial Government, but also to the fact that Lord Carnarvon had mentioned several gentlemen by name—for example, Sir John Molteno, Mr. Froude, and a representative from the Eastern Province—to serve on the conference. Such a suggestion was thought equivalent to a *command* that these men should be appointed. Again, they were afraid that, if they accepted the conference and assented to Lord Carnarvon's nominees, they would, by this very act of assent, directly pledge themselves to the whole Permissive Bill as it might stand. In the composition of the Board, the Cape Colonists might find it useless to protest when they were in the minority. With Crown nominees from Natal, the Transvaal, and Griqualand West on the Conference Board, they might find at any moment that they were liable to a diplomatic defeat. The attitude, too, of Mr. Froude, who forced discussion of the whole subject upon the country against the wishes of the Ministry, provided them with an additional argument for obduracy.

The "South African Act" became law in 1877, after a considerable amount of obstruction from the Irish members; but it was carried in both Houses either unanimously or by great majorities. The leading principle of the Bill was "to enable

some or all of the colonies or States of South Africa to associate themselves in union under the British Crown." It resembled the British North American Act of 1867, with this important exception, that it was agreed to retain the ultimate jurisdiction and supremacy of the Queen in Council, not only over the legislation of the Union Parliament, but also over all the laws which might be passed by the provincial legislatures. The executive power was vested in the Queen and Governor-General, one general legislature for the Union, called the Union Parliament, and consisting therefore of the Queen, or rather her representative, the Governor for the time being, the Upper House, or the Legislative Council, and the Lower House, or the Legislative Assembly. It was probably the ever-standing difficulty of native administration that made the retention of ultimate jurisdiction in the hands of the Queen necessary in South Africa. With regard to the Dutch Republics, in the event of their admission into the Union, "all persons therein resident were declared henceforth *ipso facto* naturalised subjects of the Queen." Also the supreme command of all naval and military forces was declared to be vested in the Queen. A great number of particulars about the distribution of legislative powers and provincial governments were added.

The objections of the colonists may be briefly summarised. (1.) They declared generally that the scheme before them, if adopted, would be the means of abolishing their existing constitution, and subjecting the colony to something little short of revolution.

(2.) They maintained that the dissimilar condition of the various territories invited to join in this South African Union rendered it impossible to lay down exact rules and provisions.

(3.) They objected to the discussion of the details of the Permissive Bill, especially with regard to the subject of provincial legislation. Such a discussion might encourage the tendency of the Eastern Province to split from the Western, and perpetuate a line of cleavage which time had almost obliterated. The Bill itself entered too much into details, being simply an "enabling Bill." For instance, it was premature to make elaborate provision for the election of a Speaker and the manner of voting in the Union Government, matters affecting the colonists only.

(4.) The heavy expenses of many provincial legislatures were dwelt upon as a strong reason against the whole scheme.

(5.) With regard to the native difficulty, "Ministers could not see how it would be possible to draw a line excluding persons from the franchise

*on the ground of colour.* In the Cape Colony no distinction has hitherto been made in the case of those who have the necessary qualifications." Upon this point the Aborigines Protection Society had spoken out in a letter to Lord Carnarvon (dated July 20, 1877). "We observe that your Lordship, in a despatch addressed to H.E. Sir Henry Barkly on December 14, expresses an opinion against the direct representation of natives in the Legislative Assembly of the Union. We have no desire to see masses of uncivilised men invested with political rights which they could not wisely use; but we venture to submit, on the grounds of policy and justice alike, that native Africans should be electors if they have the necessary qualifications of education and property." On another point connected with this subject the Cape Ministers went on to say in a Minute that the Bill which proposed to regulate the proportion of representation according to population, and at the same time omitted the natives, would act unfairly, as in the case of Natal, where white men, though few, represent larger interests, man for man, than a corresponding number in the Cape Colony. The exclusion of African natives from the electoral computation contained in clause 82 of the Bill reduced the population of Natal from 400,000 to 30,000.

In fact, the Bill itself seemed to be too fussy and prolix, and the answer of the Cape Ministers is briefly contained in a Minute following upon a review of the whole question: "The most that can be done, Ministers submit, is to provide for the possibility of a Union in *general terms*, leaving the details for local arrangement, subject to the confirmation of her Majesty's Government." Sir Bartle Frere wrote to the following effect as an interpreter of the colonial views: "The favourite idea in this part of the colony is naturally what they call unification, by which the existing Assembly at Cape Town would be advanced to the dignity of a Union Parliament, and add to itself a fair proportion of representatives for each province which might be willing to join the Union. There was an obvious risk that with two kinds of legislature—the one provincial and the other general—for the Union, there would be constant collisions in legislation. There was the practical difficulty of distinguishing the precise class to which measures of any complexity belong."

The following scheme of representation for a Federal Council according to population had been drawn up:—

Cape Colony,

with a population of 369,000 to have 75 members.

Natal,

with a population of 30,000     „     6     „

Griqualand West,			
with a population of	10,000	to have	2 members.
The Transvaal,			
with a population of	80,000	„	6 „
Orange Free State,			
with a population of	50,000	„	10 „
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	489,000	„	99 „

The Natalians objected to the scheme on the ground that they were inadequately represented. The Orange Free State would not accede to a union by which they would lose their independence, and a motion in the Volksraad was passed to the effect, "That the cherished jewel," an expression used when the sovereignty was restored to them in the Free State Convention, "bestowed by her most gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain on this State, viz. the independence of the inhabitants, is too highly prized and esteemed by them to be easily abandoned." The prospects of confederation were far brighter in the days of Sir George Grey, when, on December 7th, 1858, he procured from the Volksraad at Bloemfontein a resolution in favour of it.

Sir George Grey had worked hard at the idea, and *here was a golden opportunity* for the Home Government. But in 1859 a curt answer was given to the agitation, which was in this case



a perfectly healthy one, and came from the Free State itself. "Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to depart from the settled (?) policy of their predecessors by advising the resumption of British sovereignty in any shape over the Orange Free State." In 1877 Lord Carnarvon is, metaphorically speaking, on his knees to the Orange Free State, trying to woo her and ask her to consent. She refuses bluntly, and prefers to remain single.

Subsequent events in 1879—1882, during the *régime* of Sir Bartle Frere and his successor, made the chances of a South African union more remote than ever. Men's minds were distracted first by the Zulu and then the Boer war.

On June 12th, 1879, Cape Ministers, in answer to a despatch on the subject of confederation, assure the Home Government "that their interest in the subject is unabating, but they are unable to advise its consideration as a practical question at the present moment. Pending the settlement of the war on the Natal frontier, Ministers cannot but feel that to submit general proposals for the establishment of a South African Union or Confederation to the Cape Parliament would be to invite the Legislature to commit itself to unknown responsibilities." There was in truth very little real interest taken officially in the whole idea of

confederation after the conference proposals had been snubbed by the Cape Parliament in 1875. And the longer the Cape looked at it the less they liked it. The Zulu war, undertaken doubtless to make the way easy, proved what a serious and terrible thing this border responsibility in Natal was. The annexation of the Transvaal was managed badly. The country was annexed a little too soon, and after it was thus annexed it was ruled by a most unpopular administrator. The time for a South African federation seems a long way off now, and the chief good a recapitulation of the efforts made from 1874—1879 may do is to throw light upon some of the many difficulties that await such a scheme in the future. Neither in Canada nor Australia are the communities so heterogeneous, nor is there that standing difficulty of a native question, with all the complications of a divided native policy. Probably the less elaborate a future scheme is the better will be its fate. At present the various South African Legislatures—viz. those of the Free State and the Transvaal, that of the Crown Colony of Natal, that of the responsible Government of the Cape—are all of different types, and legislate on different lines and upon a different basis. They have not acted together yet, and they may find it difficult to be unanimous upon any one cardinal point of public

policy. As the native difficulty attracts to itself the greatest interest and affects all in some measure, a common native policy is the desideratum of the hour in South Africa. How to get this is the question. In these days of arbitration of rival claims, could not a permanent Arbitration Board be called into existence in South Africa? It would consist of such men, *ex officio*, as the High Commissioner of the Cape Colony, the Chief Justice of the Cape, the Governor of Natal, the Presidents of the Dutch Republics, together with any other fit and representative men. They would constitute in themselves a tribunal of unquestioned worth and unquestionable authority before whom rival claims of natives and Europeans might be brought and adjudicated upon. Recently such a case as the right of the men of the mock republics of Goshen and Stellaland to the property of the native chiefs, the right of the Boers in the inchoate republic of Eugenia, in Zululand, would have been presented to such a body, did it exist as a recognised tribunal, with the greatest advantage and to the interests of law and order. Pledged in the most open and official manner to maintain justice and equal rights, this board might develop from time to time some sound method for the delimitation of territory and the adjustment of the boundaries of native reserves, for this reserve

question will probably be a harassing one in the future. Possibly this board might go farther, and suggest a common system by means of which the Kafir would be educated, taught, and gradually receive enfranchisement and acquire rights to property, and work out his destiny according to some consistent plan. At present he is treated kindly in one part of Africa and roughly and cruelly in another. Moreover, the existence of this representative board, in bringing Dutchmen of the Republics and the English officials of our own colonies together, might result in mutual instruction and enlightenment. Perhaps such a body, called upon to deal at first with temporary difficulties, might widen its jurisdiction, and develop into the federal council of a united South Africa. In Australia last year (1884) the New Guinea annexation question helped largely to further the idea of an Australian council and the prospect of an intercolonial federation.

## X.

### THE FRERE ADMINISTRATION.

“ACROSS THE KEI.”

THE “Frere” administration provides the student of contemporary history with two studies, one in statesmanship and the other in melodrama. The lover of the sensational will be attracted by such events as the battle of Isandlwana and the tragic death of the Prince Imperial, together with all the lurid surroundings of unforeseen catastrophe. The philosopher will brush these aside as accidental, and endeavour to trace the lines of a policy drawn by a master hand, and with reference to the highest requirements of the case, whether in Natal, the Cape Colony, Bechuanaland, Damaraland, or any part or portion of South Africa. Therefore he will separate the fortuitous from the permanent, the unexpected from the calculable side of a policy. The lines of this “Frere” policy are no shadowy or indistinct ones. On the contrary, time continues, month

after month, day after day, to throw them into bolder relief by the passing away of prejudice and the clearing up of misconception. To many Englishmen Sir Bartle Frere's policy during those eventful years in the remote south has seemed as vague and indistinct as the shadows of a mountain or island cast upon distant waters. Brought nearer to it in time, they can see its form and appreciate its details.

A Frere policy is clearer to most men in 1884 than it was in 1877—80. It has withstood the corrosive acids of malignant criticism, and betrayed at every fresh turn its inherent excellence and permanency. In every department of the colonial world, as well as in the broader features of enlightened statecraft, Sir Bartle Frere has left a precedent which will be followed. In education and state defence, for instance, as in the wider question of native administration and confederation, Sir Bartle Frere has been a monitor and a master to the colonists.

Although a Frere policy had many aims, the supreme one was confederation. He was sent out to carry this through as far as he could. It was a good aim in itself, but there was much to be done before it could be brought finally within the range of practical politics and receive a legislative sanction. Entrusted with the grave task of for-

warding it, Sir Bartle Frere acted in no blind or haphazard fashion. He saw at once what were the subsidiary as well as the final stages of the scheme. There was no reason to think that ambition would make him careless or unscrupulous in the attainment of the result. Two questions constantly faced him: the question of the flag, and the question of confederation. Judging from the progressive and orderly evolution of his plans and the disinterested tenor of his mind, he would probably have been content to delay, perhaps postpone altogether, the final stages of the latter question rather than hurry it through the colonial Legislature by intrigue and imperil its permanent efficacy by hasty diplomacy. About the flag, and the position he as representative of her Majesty's Government took, there could be no doubt. Had he been allowed to work out his will, the British flag would have been flying in Zululand and Pretoria still, and the question of confederation might have been left for another governor or another generation. He never wished to sacrifice the interests of the colony to the grand political idea of confederation. The practical nature of his administration proves that he was no visionary. And the study of this administration is intensely interesting, whether it be regarded in its tragic aspects

or in its general political meaning. Nor is it without its moral. Standing as the reader of history does now, amidst the wreck and ruin of this policy, looking back and tracing the downfall, step by step, of British prestige, reviewing the series of strategic errors and diplomatic failures, and moralising upon the reward of sentimental surrender, he must feel that there lies before him a complete historical picture, with a beginning, climax, and an end illustrated in all its episodes with peculiar vividness and colouring. A deeper humiliation than that of Cornwallis was branded upon the annals of English history at Majuba in 1881. There is the picture, and there is the moral. No retrospect is of any good unless it teaches men something. The chief moral to be drawn from the annals of South African history for all Englishmen is this: No empire has been won or maintained by irresolution. Horace said of the Roman power—

“ Merses profundo, pulchrior evenit :  
Luctere, multâ proruet integrum  
Cum laude victorem geretque  
Prælia conjugibus loquenda.”

Sir Bartle Frere's hand never faltered. It is England herself who has been found guilty of paltering with her destiny. Her sons are as devoted as ever, and are willing to carry her flag



further and further afield. Paralysis has smitten the heads of her chief councillors, not the arms of her soldiers or sailors.

In South Africa there was no real or adequate reason for surrender to the Boers. Men know *now* that there was none. Could they not have grasped it *then*, if they had chosen to put party tactics aside and face the responsibilities of our empire?

The lines of a "Frere" policy were abandoned completely, not simply and entirely because a confederation scheme proved a failure, but because sentimental ministers at home were moved by fickle gusts of party passion. The lawful predominance of England in South Africa has been threatened, a race-quarrel seems within measurable distance, and the disintegration of our empire stares us in the face. The party who wildly denounced jingoism, imperialism, and every act of the great proconsul, have sent at this present time a force of 8,000 men to Africa to uphold, under Sir Charles Warren, the integrity of our possessions there, and in Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and elsewhere, adopted the hated imperialistic policy. Time has indeed revenged Sir Bartle Frere. He himself, the great figure who stood unmoved amid the storm and stress of an eventful period, has passed

away, but his words and wisdom abide. Party passion swept by him, politicians raved, and mob orators denounced, but the Governor adhered to his text, "The honour of England and the integrity of the empire." Boers have proved to what extent they have appreciated "retrocession after defeat;" natives who first trusted the plighted word of England have learnt to doubt it; the Zulus, who were willing to become our subjects after Ulundi, have been allowed to exterminate themselves in an internecine war, while the apostles of peace have looked on with folded hands; Basutos, who are wiser, have learnt to despise the Queen's authority.

Sir Bartle Frere's reputation was fully assured before he came out to South Africa. His Indian fame would have been enough for most men of ambition to retire upon; but he had taken especial interest in Africa. A few years previously he had been entrusted with an important mission to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and had procured from him measures for the suppression of the slave-trade, measures which the Sultan still honourably carries out. He was, therefore, the idol of the philanthropic party. Probably, too, Sir Bartle Frere felt that there was a "mission" in the highest sense to be worked out in South Africa which was not possible elsewhere. He always took an interest in the

future of the native populations; and although he felt compelled to conquer, he never failed to administer afterwards. Those men who pointed to the fields of Zululand and held up their hands at the destruction of human life there during the war, should recollect that this veldt of Zululand has reeked with native blood ever since the failure of the Wolseley settlement and the false step taken in Cetywayo's restoration. The "bloodguiltiness" of those men who suffer chaos and anarchy to work out terrible results is surely incomparably greater than that of those who, after the shock of battle, bring order and system back to a distracted land.

Sir Bartle Frere has been called a "Roman proconsul" and a Cromwell, but whether a Cromwell or a proconsul, he had the advantage of knowing his own mind, and carrying out faithfully a definite policy. South Africa would at this present moment welcome such a man. The case of Bechuanaland affords colonists and Englishmen an instance how the words and wisdom of Sir Bartle Frere can abide. Writing in April, 1838, upon the duty of England to fulfil her responsibilities in Bechuanaland, he said—

"Such excuses will not avail in face of the fact that eight years ago, when the Diamond Fields were in precisely the same state of disorder

from the same causes which afflict Bechuanaland now (that is, from the lawless proceedings of unauthorised intruders, who set aside the native chiefs and tried to set up governments of their own with a pretence of independence), Sir Henry Barkly, the Governor of the Cape Colony, sent a small force, well chosen and well equipped, under an able and experienced officer, Sir Arthur Cunynghame, and the republics, self-constituted, disappeared, and order was restored at a very small expense (I think £10,000, which was repaid by the colony), without, I believe, the loss of a single life; and the district has since been a mine of wealth, contributing in a remarkable degree to the commercial prosperity, not only of all South Africa, but of this country also. Again, there is the fact that when all South Africa was disturbed by native risings and wars, and Bechuanaland was invaded by rebels from the English colony five years ago, order was restored by Colonels Lanyon and Warren with scarcely the aid of a single regular soldier."

But what has been the action of the British Government in Bechuanaland? Month after month the evil of misrule was allowed to grow. Lord Derby telegraphed to say that the country was not worth the cost of an expedition, when £50,000 *might have sufficed for every expense.*

At length the nation is aroused, an expedition is sent out, and ministers ask the country for £750,000 *as a first instalment!* Yet these ministers were the loudest to denounce a Frere policy, which was nothing really but an honourable fulfilment of manifest duties. But the story of their repentances is a familiar one to all Englishmen now.

The fortunes of Sir Bartle Frere seemed to turn in a most remarkable and melodramatic way upon one crowning disaster—the surprise of our troops by the Zulus on that fatal January 22, 1879. Reverse Isandlwana, and the former prosperity of the late Governor might have gone on in an uninterrupted course. Instead of defeat, success; instead of defamation, fame. England's attention would never have been drawn to South Africa, nor the cry of "Imperialism" raised there, had military operations gone on smoothly in Zululand. Probably the Boers would have remained quiet in the Transvaal, and in course of time Sir Bartle Frere would have granted them that liberal constitution he was framing for them, but prevented by circumstances from offering. Isandlwana was, in its results, an extremely important battle-field. Although it would be rash to say that the fate of a British Cabinet was decided by a defeat in a remote corner of Africa,

it is permissible to suppose that it was very much affected by it. The Beaconsfield party would have escaped an enormous amount of popular criticism if Lord Chelmsford had conquered. As it was, a defeat deeply affected the position of Sir Bartle Frere. It was hard for him to miss so much, because either Lord Chelmsford or "poor Durnford" had blundered and forgotten to "laager" their waggons. Then the incidents, one by one, of that sad and ignominious sequel—the death of the Prince Imperial first and foremost! Still he himself was unchanged and inflexible, and would have fought his way through every obstacle had he been permitted. Looking at South Africa now, Englishmen might wish that he had. It was his fate, although strong, to serve the weak; although wise, to be controlled by folly. His was an arrested policy. Whilst he stood confronting the advance of treason, he saw the ground he had won so hardly slipping away from him, and the enemy occupying the strongholds. His hands and his tongue were tied, and like a trusty pilot from whose strong grasp the helm has been snatched, he was compelled to see the ship drift upon the rocks of failure. No man saw them looming upon the horizon more clearly than he did.

Sir Bartle Frere landed at the Cape March 31,

1877; he left it for England on September 15, 1880. The scope and nature of the task before him, and at which he was at work during this interval, were scarcely recognised by the people of Great Britain. Isandlwana and Majuba Hill have been the means of making them familiar with the country and its inhabitants, as well as with the magnitude of the problem which awaits every English statesman at the Cape, both as Governor and High Commissioner; but the general criticism in England of South African affairs was undoubtedly meagre and deficient in 1877, and it was owing to this fact that Sir Bartle Frere suffered. For instance, one English paper said of Sir Bartle Frere's appointment to the Cape: "The Cape of Good Hope is a mere half-way house of the old superseded road to India. It is an obsolete Crown colony, of about 200,000 whitey-brown whites and 600,000 blacks, fast sinking under economical and solstitial circumstances to the dead-and-alive condition of the Gold Coast." This may be an unusual sample of epigrammatic ignorance; but it may be quoted as typical and illustrative of that marvellously inaccurate and false view which many Englishmen less than ten years ago took of their colonial dependencies. They refused to bother their heads about their physical characteristics, their population, area,

and statistics ; still less about their inner life and social conditions. Colonial affairs have been discussed over and over again by an ignorant and unsympathetic set of officials in England, who have deemed the geography of the colonies a study below their notice. Even during the Boer war, much confusion of ideas was constantly being displayed when the Transvaal Free State and Natal and Cape Colony were mentioned. The public could not comprehend the vital distinctions between the position of the more purely English colonies and that of the independent Dutch Republics. It has been asserted without contradiction that an official telegram was sent to the officer commanding Her Majesty's ships on the African coast during the Boer war, to the effect that he should invest Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, but not bombard it ! If the land of South Africa, in its simple geographical sense, was such an unknown one, how could its problems and politics be understood ? Sir Bartle Frere was arraigned before the bar of public opinion at home for his African policy ; but how could Englishmen be expected to understand the complexities of the Zulu question and the story of the Boer uprising ? In a discussion upon these questions they were really at the mercy of any demagogue who could speak rhetorically and



draw vivid pictures. On this subject the feelings and ideas of the colonists themselves must be considered; for what manner of respect could they show for public opinion in England, so often and so glaringly misinformed? They felt insulted and irritated at every expression which proved that men were passing judgment upon them without being competent to do so. It is no matter, perhaps, if the decision of outside critics does not affect the whole political field of South Africa; but, unfortunately for the colonists, it invariably does affect them and their position. There is no nation that has ever had such an enormous empire scattered over the whole world as the British; but there has certainly never existed a nation knowing less about the details of its empire. It is not too much to urge that, in face of the growing importance of England's colonies, *their geography and history should be taught especially in every Government school.*

Sir Bartle Frere suffered from ignorant criticism far more than most British officials. To understand his position better, it will be necessary to give a short review of the political events previous to his arrival at the Cape in 1877. His immediate predecessor in office was Sir Henry Barkly, who must be held responsible for two serious political steps at least, which were not

without their influence upon subsequent events in the time of Sir Bartle Frere. He had been the means of introducing responsible government into the Cape. There was no great demand for autonomy in the colony itself, and the question of responsible government had hung for some time in the balance, depending upon the votes of one or two waverers in the Legislative Council. No doubt that responsible government, in its fullest sense, would have come to the Cape at some period or other, even if it had not come in 1872, and the only doubt about such a grave constitutional change as this in the history of every colony is whether it is premature or not. Many colonists, admitting to the full the blessings which constitutional government has already conferred upon the Cape since 1872, are not at all sure whether these blessings would not have been even greater had they come a little later on in the history of their development. The circumstances of South Africa are obviously peculiar. In the first place, the population is not homogeneous, and by the introduction of a responsible ministry the government of the whole Cape Colony was transferred to the Dutch population, who composed the majority of the voters. Practically, the Constitution of 1872 handed the Cape back to the descendants of Dutch peasants and French, and men are now

finding this out in 1884. Of course it is unreasonable to think that a minority, no matter how energetic and enterprising, should for ever continue to hold a colony against the wishes and policy of a majority; but it might have been far wiser to have waited until the two races, Dutch and English, the old and new colonists, had become more completely equalised and blended together. Secondly, the Cape was unlike other settlements, in having on the forefront of the political programme that never-ending native question, about which the English officials had been wrangling with the old settlers ever since 1834. Sir Bartle Frere, therefore, although he never actually exceeded his constitutional duties as Governor and High Commissioner, was placed in a position where a certain amount of what has been somewhat unjustly termed "high-handed" initiative was absolutely necessary. Moreover, the constitution of the colony was young, and could scarcely be expected to work without friction in 1877, when it had only seen the light in 1872.

Again, Sir Henry Barkly had been chiefly responsible for the act of the annexation of the Transvaal. Sir Theophilus Shepstone's proclamation, declaring the Transvaal British territory, was dated April 12, 1877. It was impossible, there-

fore, as stated elsewhere, for Sir Bartle Frere to have had much to do with this act, which formally took place twelve days only after his arrival at Capetown, and at a distance of more than 1,200 miles. The justice or injustice of the Annexation Act must rest upon other shoulders.

Sir Henry Bulwer, the Governor of Natal, was, from his proximity to the Transvaal, far more likely to know in Natal the desirability or otherwise of the annexation, and he approved of it. This, together with several other minor reasons, might have led Sir Bartle Frere to suppose that the annexation was a good thing. There was the fact that Sir Theophilus Shepstone rode into Pretoria, with the design of hoisting the English flag, with only a few mounted policemen, proving that there could have been little material opposition to his mission-journey from the burghers themselves. To recapitulate some facts and evidence already adduced, it must be recollected that the South African Republic was in a desperate state financially. There was absolutely nothing, or next to nothing, in the Treasury. The war with Secocœni seemed to have paralysed the efforts of the Boers. To the south was Cetywayo, with his drilled army of 40,000 men, smarting under a land grievance, and longing for a raid

into the Transvaal. Were the Transvaalers so anxious to preserve their independence? In the face of debt and powerlessness, was the name of the South African Republic worth keeping up? Banks had stopped discounting, ships had come into Delagoa Bay with railway plant, but there was not a penny with which to pay the freight; the civil servants had received nothing for their work; the members of the Volksraad had gone away from their session unpaid; Secoceni had overrun Leydenburg; the most intrepid leader against the natives, Von Schliekman, had been killed. Truly the cry of the Transvaalers may be likened to the laconic despatch of the Spartan general, "Mindarus is slain, our troops are starving, and we know not what to do." In this case there was at hand the strong wing of British authority already hovering over the land, willing to take the land and all its people under its protection. Judging from the evidence at hand, neither Sir Bartle Frere nor any other governor could have come to any other conclusion than that, as the annexation was an accomplished fact, it had better remain so. He might have said, "Let the Boers have their own way a little longer if they wish it; let their bankruptcy become more hopeless and their quarrel with Secoceni become more desperate, and let Cety-

wayo, if he wishes it, make his long-contemplated raid upon the eastern frontier; in fact, let there be bankruptcy, bloodshed, anarchy, and hatred and confusion a little longer. Perhaps then the South African Republic will wish to come under that wing of British protection which is still hovering near them. If not, let them continue to be ever a weak and struggling community, with bankruptcy at home and war on their borders, until the end come through exhaustion." Such might have been the language of cold-blooded diplomacy, and it might have been spoken and acted upon by more unscrupulous men than English governors are wont to be.

Again, the annexation seemed advisable on the broad grounds alone of confederation, that great idea which was ever before Sir Bartle Frere's eyes, and served as the goal of his ambition. In a mass of conflicting evidence it is necessary to be guided occasionally by some really broad principle. It is often wise to go straight on and be guided by the light of a definite plan which is discerned beyond the mists and prejudices and errors of the present. In South Africa, there is so often one fact *for* quoted in opposition to one fact *against*. For instance, if it were true that Paul Kruger and Jorisson were coming to Cape Town with a petition signed by 5,000 out of

6,000 qualified voters of the Transvaal protesting against the annexation, it might be equally true, as reported, that the sons of Paul Kruger himself were the foremost in the train of enthusiastic Boers who dragged the carriage of Sir Theophilus Shepstone into Pretoria; if it were true that one Dutch organ, such as the *Friend of the Free State*, spoke fiercely against the annexation as unjust, it might, on the other hand, be fairly believed that the *Volkstem* was right when it said that "the conditions on which the country was taken over were most liberal." If, again, murmurs of dissent and memorials came from the western part of the Cape Colony, the chorus of assent which came in the form of resolutions from the Chambers of Commerce both in Durban and Cape Town, and in some towns of the Transvaal itself, might be taken as evidence. At any rate, if evidence was so conflicting, it was safe to take refuge on the broad and firm ground of a wide-reaching policy. A governor must often decide in favour of a great policy, or against local jealousies or misrepresentation. Whatever was developed afterwards, the annexation seemed to be, if not wholly and entirely just, still an act of the greatest expediency, and one likely to contribute ultimately to the material progress of the greater number.

Then there was the Griqualand West difficulty,

which, although adjusted by means of Sir Henry Barkly and Lord Carnarvon, was of the nature of an inherited trouble to Sir Bartle Frere. President Brand, in the name of the Free Staters, received £90,000 from the Imperial Government as a compensation for the claims of the State to the land of Waterboer on the banks of the Vaal river; but somehow or other the Boers felt that a hard bargain had been made. Sir Bartle Frere was, therefore, exposed not only to the rancour of the Transvaal, owing to the annexation of the Transvaal, but also to the suspicious dislike of the Free Staters, owing to the assumption of British authority over Griqualand West.

To come now to the question of confederation. How had the ground been prepared here for future operations? First and foremost by Lord Carnarvon, and afterwards by Mr. Froude. The latter had, as before stated, paid two visits to South Africa, once in 1874, and again in 1875, to test the feelings of the colonists on the subject. The Permissive Bill had already seen the light, and was published in the *Gazette* of May 12, 1877. The idea of bringing all the quarrelling, discontented African communities under one flag was indeed a noble and attractive one for any statesman. Although Sir Bartle Frere had earned a title to repose and honourable retirement at home,



he did not hesitate to throw rest and inactivity aside, and accept the part of chief actor in this great political scheme. He came as the master craftsman, who with expert hand might finish work that had been already begun. "*Nec mora, nec requies!*" Such was his motto, and no craftsman strove more heartily and with sincerer purpose towards the consummation of his work than the late Sir Bartle Frere.

#### BEYOND THE KEI.

In his first prorogation speech Sir Bartle Frere alluded, in the fourth paragraph, to the question of "the union of the several States and colonies of South Africa," but in no decisive phrases. Although agitation on the subject had prevailed extensively in the country, little of a definite and practical nature had been effected. In fact, there was much to be done *before* confederation. The native difficulty was if possible to be settled, and the native territories brought as far as possible under one system. Therefore, in addition to the Bill for the formal annexation of Griqualand West, there was added one for the annexation of "Nomansland," the Idutywa Reserve, and Fingoland, tracts of territory on the eastern frontier of the colony. The two last form part of the large district known as the "Transkei," which con-

tains more than 60,000 inhabitants. In paragraph 7 it is stated that the letters for the annexation of Tembuland and the country in the neighbourhood of Walvisch Bay not being received, the question of annexation could not be discussed. The population of Tembuland is about 100,000, comprising, together with the Transkei, the whole area between the Umtata and Kei, the Drakensburg and the sea, and is therefore of considerable extent.

The neighbourhood of Walvisch Bay has, together with Damaraland and Namaqualand, been the subject of much discussion ever since the Germans hoisted their flag at Angra Pequena. To the Cape Colony Walvisch Bay was important chiefly for the opportunity it offered of stopping the gun-running towards the interior. The Germans have now proclaimed their sovereignty from the Orange River for several hundred miles northward along the shore, on the British Government having refused to undertake the responsibility of annexing the country formally, and securing protection for German traders. No complaint can be brought against the German Government for stepping in where the British Government refused to be responsible, but the interests of the Cape Colonists are considered to be somewhat imperilled by the present arrange-

ment. As the German protection does not extend for more than twenty miles inland, it is at present proposed by the Upington Ministry that the Kalihari Desert should be annexed, in order to secure the trade route to the interior. This tendency to annex is quoted to prove that protectorates and annexations were not the exclusive heritage of a Frere régime. In fact, the Gladstone Cabinet have been unusually active in carrying out this side of the imperialistic propaganda. In Zululand, Basutoland, and Bechuana-land they have been compelled to assume those responsibilities they so violently disclaimed. The Nemesis of fate is upon them, and they have been forced to take up in more places than one the lines of a Frere policy. The difference between Sir Bartle Frere and his detractors is this: he annexed with a clear and definite plan before him; they have annexed hurriedly, expensively, late in the day, and in the teeth of their professions.

Sir Bartle Frere was too deeply interested in his work to remain long at the metropolis after his arrival. Cape Town is, from its very situation, at the extreme south-west corner of the colony, an unfit place wherein to test the feeling of the whole country and to examine its more difficult problems. As soon as Parliament was prorogued Sir Bartle Frere went by sea to the Eastern

Province. He was received with enthusiasm everywhere. At Port Elizabeth he was met by a guard of honour, and was fêted by the people. All men crowded to do him honour. Sir Bartle Frere might have thought he saw in this ovation not only a tribute to his own personal qualities, but an approval of the policy he carried in his hand. In the same way, at Grahamstown, the city of the settlers of 1820, a warm reception greeted him. Compared with the modest tours of governors afterwards, that of Sir Bartle Frere was more like a pageant of a triumphant general. There was a good deal of political feeling behind all this show. It resembled, but was greater than, the welcome which was given to Mr. Froude.

Much of the Kafir territory had been formally annexed, but Kafirdom was not thoroughly subdued. A small spark of war on the other side of the Kei was the beginning of a vast conflagration, which had its climax in the Zulu war. The combustible materials were all at hand, but the proximate cause of war was a very slight one. By the banks of the river Kabousie a drunken brawl arose between two Kafir tribes, called Fingoes and Gcalekas. The Fingoes were victorious, and drove their opponents across the border. Six or seven Fingoes were wounded, a Gcaleka chief and one

of his relations were injured, and one of their party died afterwards from wounds received in the fray. The Gcalekas have no love for the Fingoes, whom they despise as of a lower caste—the word Fingo implies degradation—and this hatred and contempt were aggravated by the fact that the Fingoes were occupying land from which they had been expelled, and also by the insult they had offered them in laying hands upon the sacred person of their chief. They decided upon revenge, and so two or three days afterwards they attacked in great numbers the nearest Fingo kraals, and swept off 150 head of cattle, and 600 sheep and goats. In consequence of this act the Government sent a party of frontier armed and mounted police to support the Fingoes. And so the strife between black and white began. This act of lawlessness was not of such a character as to commend itself to Sir Bartle Frere. His policy seemed to tend towards establishing once and for all the prestige of the English name as the dominant power in South Africa. Previous Kafir wars had scotched but not killed the power of the natives. The war of 1835 was brought to an end by a treaty with the Kafir chiefs; in 1846 the basis of a general pacification was settled in a conference with Kreli; and in 1852 Sandili and Macomo were treated with

when they sent in their submission, and left afterwards with a good deal of power. But in the war of 1878 there was a certain finality. The *mot d'ordre* was "No clan, no chieftain."

Whether paramount or subordinate, all chiefs were to be done away with. Botman, Kreli's chief councillor, gave himself up to Colonel Eustace, and begged for peace. Colonel Eustace replied, "No peace until the surrender of Kreli and his son Sigani." Sir Bartle Frere was inflexible in the matter of these Kafir wars. He said, when speaking at Port Elizabeth, after eulogising those who fell and the spirit of the colonists, "We must admit of no patching up of peace in sheer weariness and dread of what the war will cost. It ought to be, and it may be, the last of these sad contests." One Kafir war resembles another so much that it is scarcely worth while to tell a story that has been told so often. Here was the usual beginning of a brawl, then occasional open fighting, then desultory raiding. The report of Mr. Maclean, in March, 1878, was that the war had degenerated into a marauding business, carried on by desperate men to avoid starvation. Through the valleys of the Chicaba and Umsingi nothing had been seen but a few scattered bands of men, and many women. To save them from starvation many prisoners were shipped to Cape Town, where

they were indentured as servants and helped to fill the labour market. It was quite time that hostilities should cease. On June 28, 1878, an amnesty was proclaimed by the Governor. It was pointed out that the forces of Kreli and Sandili had been defeated everywhere, that many of their warriors had been slain; that Sandili, Kiva, and Seyolo, and many other leading rebels, had been killed, and that the survivors were in such hard case that it was no longer worth while to persecute them. Is there any other way of ruling South African tribes than by fighting with them and subduing them first? The whole history of South Africa is before us, from the beginning of the century, and the lesson seems to be that the argument of the battle-field is really the only argument the native can appreciate at first. Humanity comes in according to the wisdom of subsequent administration. A quick and sudden blow, followed by wise administration, firm in its character and intelligible in its spirit, is the kindest policy for the South African native. Left to themselves, they quarrel and fight to the death. The fields of Zululand are witness to the deadly nature of those internecine feuds so popular with them. The Zulus in their natural condition may be said to have loved bloodshed. The young men were ever eager to wash their spears in blood. A Zulu king ruled

and was popular if he lived and acted according to a grim and truculent theory of government.

Again, if border raids are allowed to continue unchecked, and the "reprisal" system to reign, what a series of terrible atrocities ensues! The actions of the Bechuanaland freebooters are still too recently imprinted upon the memory of the public to be recounted in order to prove that the borderers and natives cannot be allowed to settle their differences without reference to some paramount power or obedience to an overruling and dominant policy.

Again, supposing that the philanthropist in despair cries, "Rule these natives by moral force," the example of Basutoland is before him. The Basutos owe their national existence, as already stated, to the interposition of Sir Philip Wodehouse and the British Government. Protected by the ægis of British authority, they prospered wonderfully. They were transferred to the colonial authority, but rebelled against the enforcement of the Disarmament Act of 1878. Their cause was espoused again by the British Government, and they were restored to the direct control of the Crown. The Basutos have double cause to be grateful to the home authorities; but, if accounts be true, Colonel Clarke, Her Majesty's representative in Basuto-



land, finds it almost impossible to enforce order and obedience by moral force, the only force he is permitted to use. Are we not, then, driven to the conclusion that the kindest way to treat these barbarian clans is to conquer and rule them one by one, according to some systematic plan? But there must be one plan, one method, and a character of firmness through it all. If a contrary policy—one of weakness, vacillation, sudden repentances—obtains favour, the sooner England leaves South Africa the better.

There is one important point to be considered before the subject of Sir Bartle Frere's Kafir wars is left. During the progress of the war a dispute arose between the Colonial and Imperial authorities with reference to the command of all the troops, Imperial and Colonial, in the field. The dispute ended in the dismissal of the Molteno Cabinet. On this act Mr. Alpheus Todd remarks, in his "Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies," thus: "On the occurrence of any difference of opinion between the Governor and his ministers for the time being as to the conduct of a war with the native tribes in South Africa, it is clear that the local administration, whilst affording to the Governor the benefit of their advice and co-operation, should not hesitate to subordinate their opinions to his; it being obvi-

ous that the successful and speedy repression of any such outbreak concerns, in the words of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, 'either directly or indirectly, the interests of large numbers of Her Majesty's subjects in South Africa, living altogether beyond the jurisdiction of any single colonial administration.'" Elsewhere it is maintained that in affairs of peace and war, which are essentially of Imperial concern, the supremacy of the Crown must be everywhere maintained inviolate. The Governor is in every colony the representative of the sovereign in the administration of the prerogative. There is no doubt that Sir Bartle Frere acted within his constitutional right in dismissing the Molteno-Merriman Cabinet rather than have a divided military command in the field. The successor of Mr. Molteno was Mr. Sprigg. He was entirely imbued with Sir Bartle Frere's views, and during a speech at East London sketched the outlines of a new policy. He stated his intention to propose a scheme for frontier defence, a Disarmament Act, abolition of chieftainship, tribal disintegration, and the settlement of natives in small locations easily kept in order. He said, "We shall inaugurate a great South African Dominion, as a glorious and strengthening part of the British empire."

The taxpayer and economist in England may, with regard to these Kafir wars, object, and say, "What is the use of this indefinite and costly expansion? Where are we to end? Is there no limit, no, not even at the equator? Do we intend to go on annexing until we pass the basin of the Congo and touch the sources of the Nile?" But Sir Bartle Frere's policy was whole and complete in itself. A glance at the map will prove that he *aimed at attaining certain strategic and commercial points of great and essential value*. In other words, he had in his mind a clear conception of an unassailable basis of the future empire in South Africa. Including Damaraland and Namaqualand on the west, and on the east Zululand and Kafirland, using the word generally, as well as such territories as Pondoland, &c., the sea-board of South Africa was secured for England. The only strategic point Sir Bartle Frere was unable to get was Delagoa Bay; but it was quite reasonable to suppose that, had the Transvaal and its gold districts remained in British hands, some arrangement would have been made with the Portuguese. The strength of such a base is conspicuous at a glance. Besides securing the sea-board, it includes the natural trade-routes to the interior, *viâ* Bechuanaland, of which route, as well as for the sake of injured honour,

Sir Charles Warren has been sent as defender late in the day.

“But were not native liabilities indefinite?” may be the next question. Mr. Charles Brownlee, late Minister of Native Affairs in the Cape Colony, pointed out that there were two central systems of native power on the east and north-east frontiers of the British colonies. Of the one, Kreli was the acknowledged head, Cetywayo of the other. Once these systems were destroyed, the Kafir power was hopelessly broken in South Africa. There was nothing further north to stop progress. The breaking up of Kreli’s and Cetywayo’s power must have meant peace for South Africa for many years to come, especially if Sir Bartle Frere’s system of defence could have been perfected and confederation become a fact. Animated by these wide views, and determined to effectually kill this native difficulty, Sir Bartle Frere requested that the 10,000 British troops employed in the Zulu war might be allowed to make a demonstration through the eastern parts of the Cape Colony, where Basutos and Pondos were still sceptical of the power of the white man; but this statesman-like idea was rejected. In fact, as already noticed, Sir Bartle Frere laboured all through his governorship under the difficulty of having to put up with an *arrested* policy. The Cape Government

were so anxious about this idea of a demonstration along their eastern borders, thinking, doubtless, it would enforce disarmament all along the line, that they volunteered to pay the expenses incurred by an overland march. Basutoland is now on the Imperial hands, and it is rumoured that Sir Charles Warren may have to go there and take those measures of safety now which Sir Bartle Frere proposed in 1879. But under what different circumstances! The burden will fall on the Imperial Government alone, for the colony will not offer that help now which was refused then. The irony of fate could have no more forcible illustration.

As matters stand now, the Germans at Angra Pequena have attacked the western side of that African empire Englishmen have laboured to build up, and on the east are threatening to take Zululand under their protection. From Zululand and St. Lucia Bay they, or any other Power, may creep up to Delagoa Bay and Amatongaland, and hold the British colonies in a skilfully designed mesh. The protests from the Cape Colony or Natal may come too late if Germans, associating on friendly terms with the Transvaalers, make the country north of the Vaal their basis of operations. The marts of Cape Town may be left desolate

if the trade to the interior is diverted by the cheaper and more expeditious route *via* Delagoa Bay and the Transvaal. The only prospect the English colonies will have is that of expansion towards the barren regions of the Kalihari desert.

## XI.

### THE FRERE ADMINISTRATION. (*Continued.*)

#### "ACROSS THE TUGELA."

ON the eastern border of Natal the Zulu king, Cetywayo, had, in 1878, consolidated a strong and powerful kingdom. Inheriting the valour of his ancestors and their stern military spirit, he had acquired the character of being the savage arbiter of the destinies of that part of the world. With 40,000 armed warriors at his beck and call, he was a formidable antagonist for the white settlers to provoke. His *impis* and soldiers were under complete control, and ready to carry out at a moment's notice the despotic will of their chief. The traditions of the Zulu race had always been cruel and bloodthirsty. From the days of treacherous Dingaan down to Chaka, Panda, and Cetywayo, an unbroken tradition of force had been maintained. The centre of their power had shifted. At one time it was on the Natal side of the Tugela; and at Stanger, a small village on the

road to the Lower Tugela Drift, the site of Chaka's kraal, and especially Chaka's grave, are pointed out to the traveller as objects of historic interest. But Cetywayo had been crowned at Ulundi, far beyond the Tugela, and the territory of the Zulus was definitely bounded by the sea on the one side and the Tugela on the other. There was no doubt that within this district lay the very heart of the great Kafir nation. The Zulus were the cream of the Kafir clans, and were in reality a conquering caste who had fought their way down little by little from the equator within comparatively recent times. But where the heart of the Kafir nation lay, there was its greatest resisting power. Even now, after such carnage as raged at Gingholovo, Ulundi, and after the months of desolating warfare that have followed the failure of the Wolseley settlement, the vitality of the Zulu nation is extraordinary. To Sir Bartle Frere, the "man-slaying machine" of Cetywayo seemed to constitute "a standing menace" to Natal. As long as this menace remained there could be no peace on the border. Sir Bartle Frere determined to remove it.

On Wednesday, September 18th, 1878, he left Cape Town for Natal by the *Courland*; in his suite was a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church,



Stegman by name. This gentleman accompanied his Excellency with a view to persuade the Transvaal Boers to accept the annexation as an inevitable thing. The Boers attach great importance to the guidance of their "predikants," and might be persuaded to listen to the voice that, apart from political reasons, counselled peace. It will be gathered, therefore, that upon this second journey eastwards Sir Bartle Frere had a double object in view. He wished, first of all, to settle the Zulu question, and then, with the native difficulty removed, approach the Transvaal Boers on the wide subjects of their own government and the confederation scheme. When he steamed out of Table Bay all colonists felt that the honour of England was safe in his keeping. The threads of his policy were numerous and the chances of entanglement great; but Sir Bartle Frere brought a clear judgment and an inflexible will to bear on the task before him. In the Cape Colony itself the time for a general election was drawing near, and the question of confederation was at length being approached in a practical spirit. Could an unanimous voice be heard upon it *there*, the sympathy of Natal was assured. The successful and speedy settlement of the Zulu difficulty would recommend the policy to the Transvaalers. Peace along the whole border,

from Delagoa Bay to the Kei River mouth, seemed very nearly within his grasp.

The year 1878 was a troublous one for England, the Afghan campaign diverting many of her available troops, and for this reason there was all the more pressing necessity for a sudden and quick blow in Zululand. Military men who had studied Zulu tactics and had heard of their favourite plan of massing large forces for an open and hand-to-hand engagement prophesied a speedy end to the expedition. In former Kafir wars the great difficulty had been to get the natives to face artillery fire in the open. The costliness of a Kafir war had been caused by that long and protracted guerilla warfare which necessitated a large body of men being kept continually on the alert, and working upon an extended base of operations in a difficult country. At first sight and upon the first showing the Zulus seemed to court self-destruction by their tactics of the "horns."

The answer of King Cetuyayo to first communications being evasive, Sir Bartle Frere and his military advisers made their plans. The *Active*, under Captain Campbell, was ordered round the coast to the mouth of the Tugela, there to co-operate with a column which should march into Zululand across the Lower Tugela Drift, and penetrate the king's territory *via* Etshowe. On

the north the fated 24th were ordered to march up to Helpmakaar, and in concert with other troops enter Zululand by Rorke's Drift. The invading columns purposed to traverse the country by different routes and meet at Ulundi, the king's kraal.

Having matured his plans, Sir Bartle Frere endeavoured to bring the king to reason, and with this view he drew up his famous ultimatum, and sent it in on December 12th. The text of this memorable document was briefly this. The river Pongolo was to be the boundary on the Transvaal side of a disputed territory, and a chief named Umbelini was to be surrendered; a British Resident was to be placed in Zululand, and the Zulu army to be disbanded, and not to assemble without the consent of the Resident. The young men of the nation were to be exempt from that stern discipline which, with a military intention, prevented their marrying until they were over thirty years of age. Bloodshed was to cease in the land, and no killing allowed without trial. Thirty days were allowed Cetewayo to consider whether he would accept these terms or not.

Under an historic tree by the Lower Tugela Drift, close to the place where Fort Pearson frowns down upon the broad flood of the Tugela,

an assembly of Zulu councillors were called to hear the words of the white man. The place is a remarkable one, and familiar to many of our troops who from time to time have marched along that dreary road from Stanger to guard Fort Pearson, or to pass over the drift to the memorable fortress of Etshowe in the Reserve. On the south-west of the Tugela extends the county of Victoria, in Natal, the farthest limit of civilisation. Opposite to it lay the realms of dark and cruel despots. Was this flood of the Tugela to be the only safeguard of civilisation? However impetuous its torrents when swollen by summer rains, was it sufficient to keep back for ever the lawless rush of 40,000 armed and dusky savages, ready to carry out at a moment with the the most utter recklessness the behest of the king. To the Zulu councillors the army of the white men seemed small and insignificant, hardly able to fill much more space than these fortresses by the Tugela. They might discern in the offing down the river, where the Indian Ocean sparkled in the sunlight, the tall masts of the "floating waggons" as they termed our ships; but how could they harm them? They could convey no more serious threat to their untutored minds than the branches of the solitary euphorbia which grew on yonder hill above the Tugela.

The life, the numbers, the spirit and chivalry of their own dark *impis* they knew full well; and was the mere word of the white man to break up this life and scatter this chivalry without an effort? Then there was the king himself. They all knew him, how stern he was, how terribly he ruled, and how faithfully he had kept up the traditions of Chaka and Panda. His clouded brow meant death; and so when these servants of the king heard the conditions of the white man, they trembled and said that no one of them could look the king in the face and live if he carried such a message.

Further, there was the matter about the surrender of the brothers and sons of Sirayo, who had murdered some refugee women in British territory. Compensation was demanded for this outrage, which had come to the ears of her Majesty's High Commissioner, and was made the matter of a public apology. Surely, the time had come to indoctrinate these savages with a higher code!

The justice or injustice of this ultimatum is a subject that has been more freely canvassed than any other during the *régime* of Sir Bartle Frere in South Africa; in fact, it has been used by his adversaries as the strongest indictment against him. Was Sir Bartle Frere right or wrong in

his resolve to break up this barbarian realm? The arguments on both sides have been so lately and so fully discussed that they need scarcely be restated here. Throughout many of the discussions irrelevant analogies have been introduced. For instance, it has been urged that if it is right to remove "the standing menace" of an army in one part of the world, must not the same reasoning hold good in another? In this case nations would be involved in perpetual warfare. But the analogy between civilised and uncivilised Powers cannot hold good. The former may be trusted not to abuse their power, and to abide in the main by the spirit of international law; but in a kingdom like that of Zululand, held together by terror, and based on stern and cruel usages, there was an element of unmixed evil. Left to itself it not only remained unprogressive, but constituted an ever-impending menace to the peace and prosperity of Natal. Sir Bartle Frere determined that it should cease to exist, and had Isandlwana never happened, little hostile criticism would probably have been heard with reference to the ultimatum. Had a sharp blow brought the Zulu nation suddenly down on their knees, all that would have been known would have been contained in some such observation: "Sir Bartle Frere has conquered a savage tribe in

an unknown corner of Africa, and has removed one great difficulty in the way of confederation."

Undoubtedly the reckless gallantry of these Zulus—for the fullest praise of gallantry must be given them—recommended their cause to the English public, whose sympathies are with a brave adversary. But in reality this gallantry by itself could hardly atone for the evils of their national life.

Just beyond the Tugela a white chief and adventurer, of the name of John Dunn, had established himself. In many ways he had made himself useful to the English during the course of the negotiations leading up to the ultimatum. This man's history had been a curious and eventful one. Brought up from boyhood amongst the Zulus, he had acquired their language perfectly, and obtained a most complete insight into their customs and habits. He had combined the two characters of sportsman and trader, and knew the country thoroughly from the mouth of the Tugela to St. Lucia Bay. At the latter place, formerly the paradise of a "big game" sportsman, he had been in the habit of organising hunting expeditions, and many an Englishman who had sought the fame of an African "shikarri" knew John Dunn well. In person he was strongly made, of

medium height and well knit together, and was, as might be expected, a splendid shot and a good rider. Bronzed by many African suns, he presented the appearance of one who had spent his life out of doors and in following the occupation of the veldt ; in fact, he had shot his first elephant before he was fifteen years old. As he had spent so much of his life in Zululand, he found himself more than once embroiled in the intestine feuds which have always desolated that country when left to itself. On one occasion he had espoused the cause of Cetywayo against his brother, and had been on the losing side according to the uncertain chances which guide party strife in Zululand, and was almost the sole survivor after a foray in which some hundreds of followers perished. His escape was a miraculous one, as he had to ride for his life and swim the Tugela with his pursuers close upon him. A turn of fortune gave Cetywayo the chance of rewarding John Dunn, and he was installed in kingly favour with many substantial marks of approval. In 1879 John, or, as he became more popularly known, Chief Dunn, was in the position of a fairly powerful Zulu *induna*, with a considerable amount of territory and a large following. Although living mainly as a Zulu chief, he by no means cast off the habits



and customs of the white man. He might be seen occasionally driving his team of horses or mules into Durban—and Chief Dunn was a particularly skilful coachman—differing nothing in aspect and appearance from any wealthy up-country farmer who for pleasure or business might pay a visit to the Natal city.

In a curious way this man contrived to live two lives, that of the Zulu *induna* and that of the English settler. He had a miniature court and large bands of retainers, and a number of Zulu kraals in his territory. After his meals the Zulu court flatterers would sing to him whilst enjoying his cigar that strange monotone called an “isipingo,” in which his former deeds and prowess in the battle or the hunting-field would be recalled. The refrain is hardly so attractive and melodious as that which the imagination is wont to ascribe to the wandering Welsh minstrel, or in old days the Homeric *αοιδός*, who sung to his delighted audience the *τὰ κλέα* of their ancestors, but it is a remnant of the same custom. The phraseology is generally of a picturesque description, although slightly monotonous. The chief is generally likened to an ox or a lion, who, armed with a gun, combines the strength and agility of the animal with the wisdom of the human being. These metaphorical pictures are,

in the isipingo, frequently enlivened by the dramatic action of the reciter, who imitates with the greatest fidelity the episodes of a hunt or a battle. This kind of representation gives the Zulu flatterer every opportunity he may wish for to illustrate the cries of animals, the shouts of hunters or warriors, and every noise incident to the chase or foray. John Dunn had enjoyed his position as chief amongst the Zulus for some years. He was now asked to select which side he would take, that of the king or the English. The choice was a disagreeable one, as his actions might have been interpreted to his disadvantage whichever side he took. Had he remained in Zululand after the ultimatum, he would have been compelled to fight against the British troops or submit to be "eaten up" by the Zulus. His choice was soon made. One of his kraals was situated at Mangete, close to the Lower Tugela Drift, and on January 3rd news was received by the Governor that this chief, who had occupied a position of a non-official agent with Cetywayo, had driven his flocks and herds across the Tugela into Natal territory. Further, he stated that Cetywayo meant to fight. On January 4th Sir Bartle Frere notified for the information of Cetywayo and the Zulus that the further prosecution of all demands for redress had been placed in the

hands of Lord Chelmsford. On January 12th Colonel Glyn's column had the first engagement. It lasted for an hour, and was of a comparatively slight character, resulting in the flight of the Zulus with ten killed. The Natal contingent lost two men. As one of the causes of the war had been the conduct of the chief Sirayo, the 24th, under Colonel Degacher, marched to his kraal and took it. To the Zulu nation the following notification was made:—

1. "The British forces are crossing into Zululand to exact from Cetywayo reparation for violations of British territory committed by the sons of Sirayo and others, and to enforce compliance with the promises made by Cetywayo at his coronation for the better government of his people.

2. "The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people. All Zulus who come in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be provided for till the troubles of the country are over, and will then, if they please, be allowed to return to their own land; but all those who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies.

3. "When the war is finished, the British Government will make the best arrangements in its power for the future good government of the Zulus in their own country, in peace and quietness, and will not permit the killing and oppres-

sion they have suffered from Cetywayo to continue."

The die was cast, and the Zulu war begun. How the home authorities viewed the action of Sir Bartle Frere in his capacity as High Commissioner may be gathered from the following sentences, which occur in Todd's "Parliamentary Government," p. 99:—

"On March 19th, 1879, the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed a despatch to Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, reproving him for entering upon a war with the Zulus without the previous sanction and authority of her Majesty's Government. But while it was thought necessary to animadvert with some severity upon the conduct of Sir Bartle Frere in this instance, the Government, mindful of his eminent public services, were unwilling to supersede him, being convinced that his continued retention in office was, upon the whole, most desirable, notwithstanding the presumed error of judgment on this occasion. The policy of the Government in still retaining the government of South Africa in the hands of Sir Bartle Frere after their condemnation of his proceedings in the despatch of March 19th, 1879, gave rise to a motion of censure in the House of Lords on March 25th, which was directed alike against Sir

Bartle Frere and her Majesty's Government. After a long debate, however, the motion was negatived by a large majority." In spite of military disasters, the Government felt that "his retention in office was, upon the whole, most desirable."

On January 22nd the sky in South Africa became suddenly overcast. The bright light of a summer sun, such as is usually thrown upon an African veldt with dazzling brilliance, flickering and radiating from the ground, suddenly began to assume a sombre and lurid hue. The blue and cloudless vault was changed to the colour of bronze. In the stillness of the broad African veldt this appearance of the heavens seemed strange and portentous, and a brief examination of the sun's surface showed that a partial eclipse was going on. On this day the battle of Isandlwana was being fought, and a force of more than 1,200 men annihilated. The gloom of the skies had fallen, as it were, upon our arms, all the more terrible because it came when fear was lulled and hope rose high. Until this fatal day the prospect on the distant eastern borders had seemed to most as unclouded as the refulgent African noon itself before the shadows had crept across the source of light. A shudder ran through the length and breadth of South Africa, from the Tugela to Cape Point. Natal trembled for her safety, and hourly expected a

foray of the victorious barbarians across her defenceless borders. Not even the gallant stand made at Rorke's Drift by Chard and Bromhead sufficed to allay the panic. Then the whole story unfolded itself little by little, gathered from the trembling lips of fugitives, and made the listeners' faces blanch with horror or their hearts throb with pride, as a tale of cruel carnage or heroic steadfastness was recited. Englishmen and colonists, Natal carabineers and British regulars, had fallen side by side, and lay in yonder savage country in the sad comradeship of death. Bitter and irretrievable sorrow for the lost came upon many a Natal home, as it was destined soon to be passed across the sea to many a distant English home. Those grim and swarthy battalions, reckless of life, had come rushing down the grassy ridges of Zululand, until the veldt seemed literally alive with yelling and demented men closing with one fell purpose upon our devoted bands; they had gripped them in the formation of the "horn," and charging home, with shield and stabbing assegai met the hail of bullets and the thrust of bayonet, an ever-surging and ever-recruited black throng against the thinned bands and despairing groups of Europeans. The news was too terrible! Many old frontiersmen, fearing that the English

generals had under-rated the skill of Zulu tactics and the force of a Zulu rush, had uttered words of wisdom and of warning. Their worst fears were realised.

The 24th were, for a second time in their history, almost annihilated by the rush of savage bands. No disaster fell more unexpectedly than this one upon the ears of the British public. And it must be confessed that the field of "the little hand," for such is the meaning of Isandlwana, has been pregnant in its consequences. At the time the interest in it was of an appalling nature. No tale of ambush or surprise in the annals of our history abounds more in tragic and eventful episodes. That small conical hill, with its scattered boulders and steep *krantzies*, was a silent witness to many a hand-to-hand death-struggle between our men, who, split up into parties by the flanking action of the Zulu "horn," sold their lives dearly, one by one. For a long time afterwards a search amid the long grass of the "neck" would reveal the bones and skeletons of white and black men, broken swords, ox-hide shields, and all the debris of a terrible battle-field. When Lord Chelmsford, who, in an unaccountable fashion, was reconnoitring some miles ahead of his column, returned to Isandlwana, he saw nothing but ruin and carnage, dismantled

and pillaged waggons, dead men, oxen, and horses, strewed on every side. No attempt had been made to "laager" the waggons.

It is not intended to follow the incidents of the Zulu war after this. Everyone is familiar enough with the history of that sad battle-field; the frantic efforts and ride of Lieutenants Coghill and Melvill to save the colours of the 24th; the defence of Rorke's Drift, and all the exciting episodes of the combat. After a long and tedious campaign, not the least depressing feature of which was the inactivity of the Lower Tugela column under General Crealock, the fate of Cetywayo and the Zulu nation was settled at Ulundi, in a fair stand-up fight. The savages fought with incomparable valour; but our men, drawn up in a square, with the cavalry inside, awaited their onset—a small compact army of redcoats in the midst of a cloud of swarthy assailants. As the Zulus rushed upon our ranks the deadly fire of the Gatlings and rifles withered them up. The Zulu power was broken for ever at Ulundi, the place of the king's kraal, where he had been crowned by Shepstone some years ago. After Ulundi white men could travel through the country with comparative security. The Zulus acknowledged their destiny and made no further struggle. They were ready for any form of



government the British might have been willing to impose. As a race they are neither revengeful nor treacherous, when they are convinced that they can do no more in war. At a tremendous cost the heart of Kafirdom was destroyed at last. The capture of Cetywayo by Major Marter put a finishing touch to the collapse of his power. To the south the less formidable obstacles presented by the rising of the Gaikas and Gcalekas had been removed. Sandili had been killed, and Kreli was a fugitive in the thick forests and covers of the Amatolas. The fangs of the black antagonist had been shown with terrible effect at Isandlwana; but the white man had been more than avenged by such actions as Gingholovo and Ulundi. The campaign itself was never free from some engrossing and exciting scene. After the pause which followed upon the blow at Isandlwana, the siege of Etshowe proved how perilous was the position of our small band of men there, and how firmly and gallantly they held their own in the heart of an enemy's country. For weeks and months the only communication they held with Natal and Fort Pearson was got by means of stray Kafir "runners," and the flashing of the sun signals. The higher position of Fort Etshowe rendered the use of the heliograph possible. Then there was the death

of the Prince Imperial. Such an untoward event as this, which affected men's minds and imagination most deeply, seemed to point to the conclusion that some evil destiny was dogging the footsteps of Sir Bartle Frere, and showing its baneful influence at most unexpected times and in most unexpected ways. How different the sequel of history had "poor Durnford" or Lord Chelmsford remembered to "laager" their wag-gons at Isandlwana! Had they done so, probably the Prince Imperial would never have offered his sword for England, nor met that unworthy fate by that lonely hill-side in Zululand; the Empress Eugenie would not have mourned for her only son, nor taken that sad pilgrimage to Zululand in the agony of irreparable sorrow; nor would Imperial France have lost her hope and stay. Surely Isandlwana was far-reaching in its consequences!

END OF VOL. I.











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